\T ITU TO- J 



'O'PHILO 



r\ f 
ig 


JC 


ill 


)S 


01 


it 



: HOLLY €STlL€ 





"zS~- 



Glass 



03jl^ 



Book , C % 



K+MO 



COMRIGHT DEPOSrr. 



AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PHILOSOPHY 



BY 



HOLLY ESTIL CUNNINGHAM, A. M., Ph.D. 

Head of the Department of Philosophy in The State University 
of Oklahoma. 




BOSTON 
RICHARD G. BADGER 

THE GORHAM PRESS 



Copyright, 1920, by Richard G. Badger 



All Rights Reserved J§ J] 3 / 

,Ct 



JAN 1 7 1920 



Made in the United States of America 



The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A. 



©CLA5615 01 



TO 
MY FIRST TEACHERS OF PHILOSOPHY 

THIS BOOK IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED 

BY 

THEIR SON 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/introductiontophOOcunn 



PREFACE 

The chief purposes of this work are (a) to present the 
student with a method of studying problems of the type of 
those discussed in philosophy especially and in the social 
sciences generally, and (b) to acquaint him with the funda- 
mental movements and problems of philosophy. The imma- 
ture student usually leaves his early courses with the feeling 
that he has gained little of value and that everything is "up 
in the air." He has come from the study of the exact 
sciences and mathematics, and to tackle the problems of 
philosophy directly when there is no method in sight for 
handling them creates the feeling that he is beating thin air. 
The experience of the average student is seldom such as to 
render him sympathetic with the great problems of philoso- 
phy — he is too full of the concrete affairs of the world to 
stop to theorize and speculate ; and his past training in the 
exact sciences and mathematics renders him suspicious of 
any procedure that does not approximate the exactness that 
prevails in the world he knows. The problems themselves 
generally seem too far away and too indefinite. Conse- 
quently, both from the standpoint of method and problem, 
matters appear alien, and students are driven away from 
the further study of philosophy. Later in experience indefi- 
niteness may be looked upon, and rightfully so possibly, as 
a thing to be desired. 

With these two ideas uppermost, this text attempts to 
furnish a method, the genetico-inductive, not only in theory 
but in the actual handling of the subject matter of the book 

7 



8 Preface 

itself; and to show that the problems of philosophy are not 
something far removed "from the crowd's ignoble strife," 
but that they grow out of the conditions of the actual life of 
the people. It is not at all claimed that these are new ideas, 
but it does seem that they have not been sufficiently em- 
phasized in introductory courses, and, indeed, in the litera- 
ture of certain "fixed" varieties of philosophy. If too much 
emphasis is placed on these ideas it is because of the lack of 
it in many other works. 

It is also hoped that the linking up of philosophy with 
the affairs of life will aid in the direction of rendering it a 
more vital force in the affairs of this world — in the render- 
ing of knowledge of philosophy power in man's world. 

Acknowledgments are due to a large group of men whose 
lectures I have been fortunate enough to attend, to those pa- 
tient students whose works I have frequently cited, and to 
my wife who has helped at every turn in the preparation of 
the manuscript. 

Holly Estil Cunningham. 

The University of Oklahoma, 

September 1, 1919. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. Method of Treatment 11 

II. The Psychological Background of Philos- 
ophy 18 

III. The Physical Background of Philosophy . 40 

IV. The Social Background of Philosophy . . 54 

V. Agencies in the Advance from Custom to 

Reflection 70 

VI. The Nature of Primitive Thought ... 83 

VII. Origin of the Problems of Philosophy . . 102 

VIII. The Problems of Philosophy 115 

IX. Platonic Idealism 125 

X. Philosophy from the Decline of Greek 

Speculation to the Renaissance . . . 136 

XI. Philosophy from the Renaissance to Berke- 
ley 147 

XII. Subjective Idealism 162 

XIII. Objective Idealism 171 

XIV. Empiricism 184 

XV. The Doctrine of Evolution 204 

XVI. Evolution in Disciplines Related to Phi- 
losophy 214 

XVII. Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 226 

Index 255 



INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 



CHAPTER I 



METHOD OF TREATMENT 



1. Introductory. — Every undertaking must follow some 
plan or method if it would be fruitful in results. The data 
which any science takes as its own must be handled in ac- 
cordance with some well-conceived plan in order that any 
one who would follow the science might become possessed of 
the point of view of the author of it. In fact, the method 
which is employed is of the greatest importance in determin- 
ing the value of any intellectual pursuit. If one were asked 
to indicate in what field intellectual efforts have made the 
most advance in recent years, one would not be far wrong 
in asserting that the most far-reaching and influential steps 
had been taken in the realm of scientific method, or the 
method of procedure. We may cite as examples the radical 
changes connected with the methods of present day econo- 
mists in contrast with the earlier thinker in this field who 
worked on a few so-called axiomatic principles from which 
he deduced his system ; or the psychologist who formerly em- 
ployed the "arm chair" method on the workings of his own 
consciousness, in contrast with the modern man of this 
science whose laboratory rivals in completeness that of the 
physicist or chemist. The method of deduction, so fruitful 

11 



1& An, Introduction to Philosophy 

in many ways, has, until recently, been the method par ex- 
cellence of science. It was thought that this method was the 
method of mathematics, and that, since mathematics is pe- 
culiarly certain and exact, the other sciences, in order to 
possess these same attributes, must also follow this method. 

In the physical sciences, especially, the experimental 
method has won the day. Briefly, this method can be de- 
scribed as working under controlled conditions. With the 
historical and social sciences the case is somewhat different 
— the conditions can not well be controlled. This does not 
mean that no control whatever can be exercised, for if this 
were the case no movements of reform could be possible ; but 
it does mean that in the latter the control is more difficult 
to secure. We may say that the method to be pursued in 
dealing with social, political, economic, religious, and philo- 
sophical problems is the genetic method. It may be de- 
scribed as the treatment of problems from the standpoint 
of their origin and development, from the point of view of 
their genesis and history. This method which is not new, 
but which has not been applied consistently to all the prob- 
lems of interest, has certain advantages which will now be 
pointed out. 

2. Advantages of the Genetic Method. — Of the two meth- 
ods of reasoning usually employed, the deductive and the in- 
ductive, the genetic method is more in harmony with the 
spirit of the latter. It has no general principles to reason 
from but it assists in the formulation of principles so that 
the deductive method may then be employed as a test of the 
genuineness of the principles reached genetically, histori- 
cally, experimentally, and inductively. 

(a) It gives simpler material to work with. When we 
look about us to-day, we find that our methods of action are 
so complex that we are likely to become confused and lose 



Method of Treatment 13 

our way. Our political life calls here, our economic there, 
our religious yonder. On every side we find conflicting 
claims which demand attention. 

In the last few decades we have so changed our methods 
of living that it is almost impossible to get outside of the 
demands of the present to investigate the principle which 
runs through all our actions. We have become so special- 
ized that it is with great difficulty that we can see the claims 
of our opponents. It is within the last century that most 
of the great inventions which have changed our methods of 
getting a living have been made. Each one of us is able no 
longer to carry on all the activities necessary to the de- 
mands of modern life, and the result is that each must do 
some one thing well and leave the rest to some one else. A 
scholar now is one who has become a specialist in some one 
line of interest. He is not the man he once was, namely, one 
who knew everything. We sometimes wonder how it could be 
possible for a man to be so learned as were some of the an- 
cients, but we must remember that there was not so much 
to be known in those days. A man might know all about 
physics, chemistry, medicine, astronomy, and mathematics, 
but there was not so much to be known about each of these 
in the earlier days. For example, when the treatment of 
diseases centered about bleeding the patient and giving him 
much hot water to drink, one soon could become a physician. 
Consequently, if we begin genetically we shall find our ma- 
terial greatly simplified. We shall see the same principle at 
work throughout, but it will be more easily witnessed when 
the details are not so numerous. 

(b) The genetic method illustrates a great principle for 
the interpretation of intellectual activity, namely, that 
theories are the child of the age in which they have flour- 
ished. It is often thought that certain theories are true 



14 An Introduction to Philosophy 

universally, i.e., regardless of time, place, or circumstance; 
but the genetic method shows us that theories, principles, 
truths, axioms, et cetera, are merely methods of meeting 
certain problems which arose in the experience of the people 
who projected the theory or principle. This principle that 
theories, truths, and axioms are the child of the age in which 
they have flourished will be employed by us in our discussions 
of the various philosophical systems which we shall consider 
farther on. We find it difficult on any other principle to 
account for various practices which we know to occur in 
primitive society. It also assists us in interpreting customs 
of ancient peoples, which to us appear even immoral. Such 
theories, for example, as "natural rights" the "Ptolemaic 
astronomy," the "contract" theory of the state, the "divine 
right of kings" have been fruitful and indeed have met the 
conditions against which they were set ; but they have served 
their day and possess for us an historical interest only. 

(c) The genetic method makes possible a statement of 
the principle of progress. It is by a treatment of matters 
in their historical development that we discover the condi- 
tions that make the development possible. Should we take 
things as they are with us to-day we should experience great 
difficulty in making evident the principles which are implicit 
in the chaos of life ; we should have no means of discovering 
the method by which progress is made for we should know 
none of the difficulties against which past theories and prin- 
ciples have been set. The genetic method, however, renders 
less difficult the task of accounting for progress by showing 
just what factors were present in the experience of any 
period which made necessary a reconstruction of the theo- 
ries of that period. The method makes it possible to indicate 
the relation between the physical environment and the 
thought of the period ; the influence of wars ; the significance 



Method of Treatment 15 

of the mingling of different races ; the influence of newer 
methods of securing food and clothing; and, in short, 
it provides for the introduction of all matters which 
are influential in shaping the intellectual attitudes of a peo- 
ple. From an examination of these facts we discover a prin- 
ciple which is valuable as a means of reform, a principle 
which makes it possible to predict with reasonable accuracy 
the possible outcome of any given set of conditions. From 
the standpoint of reform, we observe that this can occur 
only when the proper conditions underlying it are present. 
It makes evident the fact that great reforms can not occur 
in a night, that revolutions are the result of a continuous 
growth along social, political, economic, religious, and in- 
tellectual lines, and are not, as is sometimes thought by the 
demagogue, and even by the "social reformer," the result of 
sudden and sporadic outbreak along some particular line 
of interest. 

(d) The genetic method acquaints us xuith survivals. 
Should we begin our investigation of problems such as are 
present with us to-day, we should shut ourselves out from 
one of the fruitful means of interpretation of facts. Facts 
as they exist with us have a history; they did not spring 
full grown from the head of Zeus, but each one is steeped in 
the dew of the past. Facts are neither true nor false — they 
just are; and since this is the case we should have no means 
of evaluating them unless we had recourse to a method 
which gives light on how the facts came to be as they are 
and what they are. A vestigial fact might, to all intents and 
purposes, masquerade as a valid, valuable, or genuine fact 
unless we possess means of knowing that it is indeed a sur- 
vival. The human body possesses a great number of organs 
which, as far as we can determine, have ceased to function 
in the vital processes of the organism. These are vestigial 



16 An Introduction to Philosophy 

organs which have served their purposes in the economy of 
the organism in some remote past, but which are now of no 
discernible value in the processes which are essential to the 
welfare of the individual. Just so it is with certain facts — 
some are survivals, and we have no other method of knowing 
this than by a study of how things came to be what they are. 
When we once know that a custom is a survival, be it a mat- 
ter of morality or of science or of philosophy or what not, 
we are able to behave intelligently in the presence of the 
fact ; we are able to evaluate it ; and the business of evaluat- 
ing facts is the highest achievement of the species ; it is this 
which differentiates man from the other animals. The re- 
sults of more elaborate intellectual efforts, such as theories, 
hypotheses, standpoints, methods of interpretation, are also 
matters of history. These frequently survive in an age 
which is unsuited for them just as clothing in certain sec- 
tions is out of style. The change from the old to the new 
has not been so radical but that the older theory answers 
certain demands and for this reason it remains over beyond 
its full usefulness and in general serves as a check to further 
progress. 

The genetic method is valuable just here in that it makes 
known those survivals in fact and in theory. It assists us in 
giving due consideration to, and full appreciation of, the 
merits of the system in question. 

It makes us tolerant; we are less prone to throw aside a 
method of thought as useless or worthless, less likely to dis- 
miss a system of morality as foolish or absurd, less likely to 
dismiss a religious system as false, if we know the conditions 
and circumstances surrounding its origin and development. 
When we know these conditions it is probable that we shall 
feel that the system of religion, or of morality, or of philos- 
ophy which was born of them is the only system in the 



Method of Treatment 17 

presence of the circumstances which would do justice to 
them; or at least we shall see that the system is plausible 
and is consistent with the circumstances which it attempted 
to meet. 



CHAPTER II 

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF PHILOSOPHY 

1. The Meaning and Place of Psychology.— When we 
speak of psychology as a background of philosophy we do 
not mean to employ the term as it is ordinarily used in the 
text books on that subject. Psychologists generally are 
dealing with the individual consciousness and this is the 
psychologist's own. The traditional method of that science 
is introspection, and this tends to narrow the view of the 
scope of psychology. This method is least effective in a 
realm of behavior which is of greatest importance for the 
understanding of many of the problems of politics, econom- 
ics, sociology, religion, and philosophy. That realm is our 
emotional and instinctive behavior. Introspection yields re- 
sults in the field of the cognitive processes which are espe- 
cially amenable to description, analysis, and classification, 
but man is more than a thinking being; he is a feeling being 
as well. Man thinks only when he must do so. If he is able 
to meet the demands of the situation on any other level of 
conduct than the cognitive, thinking will not take place. 

Writers on the various philosophical disciplines have gen- 
erally recognized the value of psychology as a foundation 
for their efforts, but, because of a narrow conception of the 
scope of psychology, they have been compelled to assume a 
set of psychological principles, and from these they deduce 
their system. For example, the older political economy 
worked on the false assumption that man is a "reasonable 

18 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 19 

being" who always seeks his own good. From this assump- 
tion was deduced the principle that free competition in the 
open world markets would secure goods at the lowest possi- 
ble cost. But such theorists failed to take into account an- 
other aspect of man's make-up, namely, the feeling or emo- 
tional side. They overlooked the fact that man is moved to 
act on other levels and bases than the intellectual; that he 
is open to suggestion, a fact which is daily demonstrated in 
the principles of advertising. 

Psychology, as we mean to use it in this connection, does 
not deal -with a strictly individual human mind, for such 
mind is an abstraction and has no significance for our pur- 
poses. But in keeping with our statements in the first chap- 
ter, the mind itself is a product of the ages. It is the result 
of the play of innumerable social and environmental factors. 
In this sense we may speak of mind as social consciousness 
and of the self as a social self. The mind, as we shall view 
it, is possessed of certain tendencies to action, which deter- 
mine the more elaborate and complex forms of behavior. 
These tendencies we call the instincts which are the foun- 
tains from which more elaborate types of action flow. It is 
to be understood that the instincts themselves have a his- 
tory, and are not ultimate "givens" in the sense that they 
were planted in man once for all at some early period of his 
existence. They may be described as race habits, methods 
of meeting certain crises in the battle that man had to wage 
against the competitors in the world, and against the world 
itself. 

2. The Origin of the Instincts. — As to the origin of the 
instincts we have not time to inquire at any length, though 
several theories have been advanced. One is the theory of 
lapsed intelligence which briefly is that consciousness was 
present at the beginning of organic life and that the first 



20 An Introduction to Philosophy 

movements of the organism were conscious; but when 
the movements became fixed, consciousness lapsed and the 
forms of behavior were inherited by later generations. An- 
other theory is that of Herbert Spencer, who holds that 
consciousness appeared after actions at some moment of 
stress in the nervous system. For our purposes we may say 
that instincts represent variations which have proved suc- 
cessful in meeting the demands which nature made for sur- 
vival. These variations have been handed down along with 
many others such as eyes, ears, and hands, and all 'represent 
means of meeting the demands of the environment'. All the 
instincts are not of equal strength, and they vary even in 
different individuals ; but the higher types of behavior such 
as our most recondite intellectual efforts are founded ulti- 
mately on these simple modes of action. 

3. Classification of the Instincts. — The student who has 
given some attention to the study of instincts as they are 
treated by various psychologists will have noticed that the 
list varies from author to author. This is sometimes due to 
the different points of view from which the subject is at- 
tacked, and sometimes from the purposes of the author. We 
shall group the instincts under two great headings, namely, 
those that have to do with the getting of food, and those 
that have to deal with the reproduction of the species. Cer- 
tain of the instincts might profitably be considered under 
either heading, for example, the instinct of pugnacity. The 
instinct to fight is aroused when another of the species at- 
tempts to block the satisfaction of hunger which is connected 
with the food processes, or the same tendency may be stimu- 
lated when another encroaches upon the sex interests of any 
member of the species. The instinct of curiosity also may 
be considered as falling under both headings. The headings 
themselves are selected as comprehending all the instincts 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 21 

for at least two reasons: (a) food and sex are two elemental 
necessities for any survival whatever; (b) in the concrete 
experiences of primitive tribes and from our knowledge of 
early man, and from the study of survivals in the various 
aspects of experience, such as in religion, art, literature, and 
science, we find the activities of life, the ceremonials, the 
myths, magic, et cetera, centering around these two prime 
necessities. The second of these reasons will be elaborated 
as we proceed, but we shall offer no arguments for or 
against the first one further than to say that in the absence 
of these two necessities there would be no occasion for the 
study of philosophy or of anything else. 

4. The Principal Instincts of Man. — We have now to 
enumerate the chief instincts of man and to show how they 
function in his social and physical environment. It is un- 
derstood that the instincts discussed in this connection fall 
under the two general headings mentioned above, some under 
one, some probably under both. 

It is highly probable that all the instincts are derived 
from the two primary needs, and that in the last analysis 
these two springs are the feeders of all our elaborate and 
complex modes of action, that they are the motors which 
keep the organism at work. But we shall speak of instincts 
more in keeping with present psychological usage rather 
than to enter into controversies over the matter. 

(a) Of the general instinct of the reproduction of the 
species we may note the following divisions : 

(1) The Parental Instinct. — This is sometimes called 
the maternal instinct because it is more pronounced in the 
female of the species. It is the instinct which drives 
the mother to protect and care for her young and is com- 
mon not only in the human family but in the lower animal 
world as well. It is one of the most powerful of the in- 



22 An Introduction to Philosophy 

stincts as one can readily see, who has beheld the mother in 
the presence of danger sacrifice herself for her young. Even 
among the apes the mother carries her young for many 
months, seldom permitting a separation even for a short 
time. Often the emotional aspects of the instinct are ex- 
tended through association to the objects which are inti- 
mately associated with the child. Clothes and toys elicit 
the same type of response that the original object, the child, 
did. This transfer to other objects is highly important and 
will be considered in due time. Here we may say that ex- 
tension of the emotional life to other objects is at the bot- 
tom of what we know as moral indignation which is the root 
of public law. 

(2) The Instinct of Self -display. — This instinct is pe- 
culiarly connected with sex life, not only in man, but in the 
lower animals. It is primarily social in its nature, as in- 
deed are all instincts connected with sex. Among the lower 
animals the instinct is best in evidence during the mating 
season. Among young children it is noticed in such expres- 
sions as, "See what I can do," when some display of physi- 
cal ability is made. In the period of adolescence it takes the 
form of elaborate dress, vanity in girls, peculiarities in 
speech, bravado in boys, and numerous other interesting 
variations which every one knows. 

On the other hand we have the instinct of subjection, the 
correlate of display, which is present also in the lower forms 
of organism. The little dog crawls in the presence of the 
big one as though apologizing for being alive; the young 
child expresses itself along these lines in the side glances it 
casts at visitors and strangers ; the adolescent, in the pres- 
ence of parents and older people ; and primitive and even 
civilized people, in the presence of superiors. We shall later 
see the connection of this instinct with religion and social 
life. 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 23 

(3) The Pugnacious Instinct. — This is not only con- 
nected with sex, but is also related to the food getting pro- 
cesses. The stimulus which calls it into play is the thwart- 
ing or obstructing of the free activity which is called out by 
any other instinct. In the animal world the greatest excite- 
ment is provoked when the sex impulse is thwarted, and it is 
a matter of common observation that it is stimulated when 
food is taken from a hungry animal. These elemental ten- 
dencies to attack an opponent when another tendency to act 
is thwarted become highly elaborated in more advanced so- 
cial and economic life, but the root of all these elaborations 
is to be found in this primordial disposition. 

It has been pointed out that peoples of regions in which 
the food supply is abundant possess a weakened pugnacious 
instinct. 

(b) The instincts which group themselves about the food 
getting process and which are probably derived from this 
prime necessity will be enumerated at this point, and will be 
further considered in another connection. 

(1) The Gregarious Instinct. This, as is practically 
the case with all the other instincts, is found in the life and 
activities of the lower animals. The instinct is probably 
derived from the necessity of cooperation in securing an 
ample food supply. It is certain that this instinct is of first 
importance in the building of social institutions, and is fun- 
damental in family life. Anthropologists disagree as to the 
particular form primitive human society took, whether horde 
or group of blood relatives, but they agree as to the social 
or gregarious nature of man. It is this indigenous tendency 
which is at the bottom of the growth of cities and the prob- 
lems that grow out of them. We can readily see how those 
animals which by chance roamed in groups were able to sur- 
vive against their less fortunate competitors who struggled 
singly. The latter perished while the former passed on their 



24 An Introduction to Philosophy 

tendency to the future generations. After a long time the 
tendency became a race habit, an instinct, which, in many 
cases, would actually work to the disadvantage of the 
species, for many more might congregate in one place than 
could be supplied with food. 

(2) The Instinct of Acquisition grows out of the food 
getting process. Those species which developed these ten- 
dencies survived while others perished in the struggle for ex- 
istence. The instinct is expressed in children who collect and 
guard carefully all sorts of odds and ends. In exaggerated 
or perverted form it is seen in men who collect great for- 
tunes far beyond their food or shelter needs. 

(3) The Instinct of Construction is developed from the 
primal necessity, food. Man's first tools were constructed 
in response to the food need; his snares, his bows and ar- 
rows, his spears and lances, are expressions of the need to 
eat. His implements of warfare are for the supreme pur- 
pose of depriving an enemy tribe of its means of living and 
of its women. It was Aristotle who said that man is a social 
animal, but, it well may be added, man is a constructive ani- 
mal. A glance at the large vessels, railroads, et cetera, of 
modern civilization will convince one that the constructive 
instinct is all-powerful in the development of society. While 
in many ways the primitive desire for food seems lost in the 
maze of details, a little thought will reveal that after all 
these wonderful elaborations are for the purposes of render- 
ing less difficult the gratification of the hunger demands. 

(4) The Instinct of Curiosity is the tendency to ap- 
proach and examine an object which excites the organism. 
The unfamiliar, the non-habitual, is usually the stimulus. 
It is of importance in such activities as the trying out of 
new foods, new methods of capture, new plans of meeting 
problems, and, finally, is a driving force in all our intellec- 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 25 

tual achievements. It is the radex of science. Of course it 
is quite difficult to connect the efforts of science in every 
case with the prime needs of life, but, as James says, all 
theories must sooner or later "cash in" in terms of the prac- 
tical needs of life. 

There are many other innate tendencies to action which 
we shall not discuss here but which may be employed as oc- 
casion demands as we advance. Such, for example, are fear, 
play, imitation, jealousy, et cetera. All these, however, are 
modes of the great necessities for survival. For example, 
the most generally accepted theory of play, that of Groos, 
is that it is a preparation for the more strenuous duties 
and activities of life. Tarde and Baldwin have seen fit to 
make imitation the chief instinct, and to group all activity 
about it. Jealousy is primarily connected with sex and il- 
lustrates the power of one of our primal needs, reproduction 
of the species. 

5. How the Instincts Function in Man's Environment. — 
Thus far we have spoken of the instincts as if they occur in 
their pure, unmixed form. Such, however, is rarely the case. 
An analogous case is seen in the psychological treatment of 
the phenomena of sensation. There, it will be remembered, 
the qualities of sensation are considered, the end organs 
which receive the stimulus, the attributes of the elemental 
fact of consciousness, and many other details regarded as 
necessary to a complete understanding of the subject are 
diligently presented. After all this has been done the stu- 
dent is informed of the fact that there are no such things as 
pure sensations, but they are supposed elements out of which 
higher individual conscious processes are made, and that 
they are means for the interpretation of the facts of cogni- 
tive consciousness. We may say that sensations occupy 
somewhat the same place in the cognitive processes that the 



26 An Introduction to Philosophy 

instincts do in the higher mental and social life of the spe- 
cies. As we never experience a pure sensation, a pure qual- 
ity, but always a quality belonging to something; so it is 
that we seldom if ever witness the operation of a pure in- 
stinct or experience a pure emotion, the latter being the con- 
scious concomitant of the former, especially when the in- 
stinct fails in its functioning. Our instinctive and emotional 
life become organized about objects in the same manner in 
which sensations become organized into objects in percep- 
tion. For example, the tender emotion so noticeable in the 
attitude of the mother towards her child does not exist at 
large, but it is organized with other emotions about an ob- 
ject, namely, the child. Neither does jealousy exist on "gen- 
eral principles," but it always has reference to an object, 
usually a member of the opposite sex. In the absence of 
objects about which our life is organized, we should behave 
in a chaotic, irregular, and wholly irresponsible manner. 
Following Shand and others we may call this organization 
of our mental and social life about things, the sentiments, in 
the absence of which our emotional life would lack consist- 
ency, coherence and order; and our conduct which is based 
on these springs of action, would be correspondingly chaotic 
and disorderly. 

Man lives and moves and has his being in a world of ob- 
jects, and these objects are not merely "given," not just 
there to be reacted to, not "neutral" things ; but they are 
built up, developed in the course of experience. Objects, 
in other words, have a history. Emotionalized objects, 
that is, evaluated objects or those towards which an atti- 
tude is taken, are of two general kinds : first, those of ap- 
proval; second, those of disapproval. We speak of ap- 
proval and disapproval in the widest sense of these terms as 
signifying a "yes" or "no" attitude, "for'* or "against," 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 27 

"satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory," as meeting the needs of 
the organism or failing to do so. It is out of approval and 
disapproval in this wider sense that right and wrong, truth 
and falsehood, beautiful and ugly, good and evil, arise. These 
are much more elaborate and demand a much higher grade 
of intelligence than elemental approval and disapproval 
which are almost instinctive ; and it is the task of a thor- 
oughgoing genetic psycho-philosophy to show the stages 
of growth in attitudes about objects from the most elemen- 
tal to the complex forms which make up the subject mat- 
ter of logic, ethics, aesthetics, law, government, science and 
religion. 

In another connection we have shown the influence of cer- 
tain types of agencies in the building of more complex modes 
of action, in the building of valuable objects and institu- 
tions. Here we mention war as a means of rendering valu- 
able certain objects, of making sharper certain ideals, of 
defining more precisely certain aims and purposes, of ren- 
dering loosely organized groups into stable and permanent 
forms of organization, of developing group solidarity, and, 
finally, of building up that sentiment about a territorial 
expanse and the institutions which it supports which makes 
it possible for men to give their lives for its defense and 
maintenance. We see also grouped about the child a set of 
actions which we denominate acts of self-sacrifice. To form 
an estimate of the value of the sentiments about the child 
we have but to look at the many regulations of society, not 
only in civilized groups, but in savage as well, for its protec- 
tion and for the care in providing that the race shall be 
continued. To insure a continuance of the race the institu- 
tion of marriage has prevailed in all times and among prac- 
tically all peoples. 

This institution has been guarded by the most solemn 



28 An Introduction to Philosophy 

social sanctions as is witnessed by the fact that marriages 
have usually been associated with religious activities. Cere- 
monials of marriage in our own society are usually per- 
formed by the representatives of religion, but with the 
growth of political power and with the breakdown of the 
supremacy of the church, the civil authorities sometimes 
perform the rites ; but the point is true, nevertheless, that 
the strongest social, legal, and religious sanctions support 
the institution of marriage. 

6. Elaborations of the Instincts in the Life of Society. — 
We have to consider some of the workings of the instincts 
in society, or how they become centered and grouped about 
objects, or, stated otherwise, how objects become valuable 
or what they are. 

(a) In addition to what has been said about the sex 
instinct and its elaborations, we must add that it not only 
is the foundation of family life, but it also figures in all 
humanitarian movements and is the source of moral indigna- 
tion. We have but to think of the love of the mother for 
her child as transferred to other objects, first, possibly to 
those that are intimately associated with the child, such as 
its toys, then to other children and to other people, and at 
a still later period to abstract ideals, such as justice for all 
mankind, to gain an idea of the numerous movements that 
take their origin in this instinctive tendency. Poor laws, 
hospitals, better working conditions, the abolition of slav- 
ery, child labor laws, are some of the results which follow 
in part from the mother instinct. 

(b) Self -Display and Self-Subjection in Social Life. 
What a group does and how it is organized for doing it are 
always reflected in their speculative life, be that religious, 
scientific, or philosophical. This is fundamental for under- 
standing the relation between the instincts and the complex 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 29 

behavior founded on them. Self display, for example, may 
lead to any exaggeration of certain valuable objects. These 
over-evaluated objects dominate the thinking of the indi- 
vidual or the group which owns them. This means that "the 
world is jaundiced to the jaundiced eye," so that all specu- 
lative efforts of such an individual or group are always 
clouded by the ruling interest. 

Self-display is social, that is, it is for another, and the 
other is usually one of the opposite sex. It becomes more 
elaborate in the course of time, so that cities, states, and 
nations manifest it. It is chiefly in this more elaborate form 
that it affects the behavior of the individual for he thinks 
and acts in terms of the social life about him. Institutions 
are thus created, ideals are established, and organizations 
effected which embody the instincts of display, and which, 
when established, form a portion of the social environment 
which is man's medium of speculation. 

Subjection, the counterpart of self-display, functions 
in situations in which man feels that he has exhausted his 
resources in coping with the difficulties which present them- 
selves to him. One in the presence of the chief must humble 
himself as does the little dog in the presence of the big one. 
Subjection thus becomes one of the chief sources of classes, 
castes, orders, which in turn become reflected in specula- 
tive efforts. Social classes, for example, are projected into 
the life and activities of the gods so that a chief god sur- 
rounded by subordinates forms the ideal of the spirit world. 

The similarity between the social organization that pre- 
vailed in the middle ages in which every one "belonged" to 
some one else and the organization of the church in the same 
period has often been pointed out. Some of the most diffi- 
cult questions of the early church fathers were centered 
about the relations that should obtain between the Father 



30 An Introduction to Philosophy 

and the Son, that is, the co-ordination and subordination of 
power and function, just as the great governmental prob- 
lems have hinged on the relation between the various de- 
partments of the government, and the relations between 
the state and the people, or the rulers and the subjects. 

(c) The Instinct of Pugnacity in Social Life. As was 
indicated a few pages back, this instinct is not generally ex- 
pressed in the same manner as in primitive times. The 
bodily combat has given place to other forms as laws and 
customs have developed, but at times the primaeval tendency 
gains the ascendency and the whole world organizes on the 
principle of the "claw and fang." The whole history 
of the race has time and again been written as a series of 
wars in which it is often difficult to show just what was 
gained by either side. If we ask as did little Peterkin, "Now 
tell us all about the war, and what they killed each other 
for," we often get no other answer than, "But 'twas a 
famous victory." As good an answer as we can find gener- 
ally is that wars are due to the pugnacious instinct of some 
ruler plus the desire for power and self -display. 

The social effects of the instinct of pugnacity are 
marked. Among those races in which the pugnacious instinct 
is deficient we find a patient people who do not have a taste 
for war and who despise the military virtues. The lack of 
progress on the part of China, for example, is due largely 
to a defective pugnacious instinct, but among those peoples 
in whom the spirit of the warrior is strong we note the 
greatest progress along all lines. In societies formed by 
those peoples who are deficient in the pugnacious instinct 
there is little group solidarity. Among them, also, a reli- 
gion of peace and quietness finds a congenial home. Bud- 
dhism flourishes among them "in spirit and in truth" ; while 
among the more pugnacious peoples the religion of Chris- 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 31 

tianity is accepted in theory only. A rather sharp distinc- 
tion is, accordingly, drawn between the "religious" and the 
"moral," and between "religion" and "business." One of 
the greatest problems that Christianity has had to face is 
that in connection with the pugnacious instinct. In mediae- 
val times the monk went his way unarmed, dressed in the 
robes of Iris calling, while on the other hand the armored 
knight representing the calling of war "chased his favorite 
phantom." Christianity teaches us to turn the left cheek 
if the right is struck, but the instinct of pugnacity dictates 
another modus operandi. The problem of harmonizing 
these two diverse methods of action is one of the great prob- 
lems that confronts our religion. 

Collective pugnacity operates in what we know as moral 
indignation. The community is "outraged" by certain acts 
of violence, and our courts of law are the means by which 
we inflict punishment on the offender. The state is the 
plaintiff in crimes against its "peace and dignity," and 
while punishment is theoretically for the purpose of refor- 
mation, it still partakes of primitive retribution. "The ad- 
ministration of criminal law is the organized and regulated 
expression of the anger of society, modified and softened in 
various degrees by the desire that punishment may reform 
the wrong-doer and deter others from similar actions." 

Among peoples who possess a highly developed pugna- 
cious instinct we find the greatest progress in the arts, 
sciences, social and political organization, commerce and 
industry. The instinct takes the milder form of rivalry 
which is the motive force of the great portion of the serious 
labors of mankind. We strive to excel those in the same 
line of occupation as ourselves, and he who employs a "pace- 
setter" is working unconsciously perhaps on a race-long 
tendency of human nature. Every teacher knows the ad- 



32 An Introduction to Philosophy 

vantages to the class of having one or two bright students 
who set the pace for the rest. The great men of science such 
as Newton and Galileo, the leaders of literature, the geniuses 
of philosophy, the masters of art and music, are the pace set- 
ters of the race, and the social importance of these leaders 
can not be over-estimated. Competition, the fundamental 
premise of the older economy, is based upon the pugnacious 
instinct. "Competition is the life of trade" — this we hear 
again and again. It is one of the modified forms of "getting 
even," which is displayed all the way from the corner gro- 
cery to international trade. "Blood revenge" is now ex- 
pressed in competition, skilful advertising, in the duties of 
the "traveling man," and in the dozens of activities con- 
nected with the movements of business. The old expression, 
"Everything is fair in love and war," is the common man's 
generalization of two great tendencies essential to the sur- 
vival of the race. It represents the "chimney corner" philos- 
ophy of those who dimly perceive the motive force of these 
tendencies and their importance in the higher and more elab- 
orately organized types of reaction in the presence of 
stimuli. 

(d) The Gregarious Instinct. We have spoken of the 
gregarious instinct as probably derived from mutual aid in 
the quest for food and defense against the attack of ene- 
mies. We now want to indicate the operation of this in- 
stinct in the life of society. The rapid growth of cities in 
the last one hundred years is not wholly due to economic 
factors, as has been urged by some, because in countries 
which are highly favorable to agricultural and pastoral life 
the tendency to congregate in cities is' in evidence. China 
presents one of the best examples of the gregarious instinct 
as operating rather than economic factors. Likewise half 
the population of Australia is found in towns and cities 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 33 

along the coast, although the country is primarily an agri- 
cultural and pastoral one. The problems which arise as a 
result of urban life are too well known to need mention. 
The race has always until recently lived in close connection 
with the soil, and we have not as yet fully reflected our newer 
methods of living into a conscious philosophy. In primi- 
tive societies we find those in the same group who are of 
blood kin, of the same totem, tribe, or clan, occupying a 
definite territory. The idea of class, clan, or kin is reflected 
in modern society in certain class distinctions, as the capi- 
talist and the labor classes, the professions and the voca- 
tions, et cetera. That is to say, after the gregarious in- 
stinct has brought together any number of individuals, they 
tend to divide into classes of more or less "like-minded" in- 
dividuals — a fact which accounts for various "quarters" in 
the large cities, for religious sects, lodges, and to some 
extent, political parties. 

(e) The Acquisitive Instinct, derived, as was suggested 
from the food-getting activities, occupies a prominent place 
in the elaborations of industry. Manufacture and foreign 
trade grow up and with them the problems of labor and 
capital, employer and employee, freedom of the seas, and 
the numerous questions relating to property. A great bulk 
of the laws of a state refers to the rights of property, more, 
indeed, than to the person. Possibly one of the greatest 
problems growing out of the instinct of acquisition, rein- 
forced by the gregarious instinct, is that created by the in- 
troduction of the factory system which led to the massing 
of large numbers of people in the towns and cities. Redis- 
tribution of population takes place, the city becomes the 
center of advancement and the generator of social and politi- 
cal ideals; the country, because of lack of intercourse, be- 
comes backward and often reactionary. The town of the 



34 An Introduction to Philosophy 

middle ages helped as much as any other factor in the break- 
down of feudal society. Outside the towns the industrial 
classes were servile and a stigma attached to labor; but in- 
side the towns labor was honored due to the fluid intercourse 
between the inhabitants. Town life developed a mentality of 
its own far more plastic than that which prevailed in the 
country. Races inter-married, the mind became alert, kin 
and class ties were broken, and the group was established on 
a different foundation. In fact it was in this type of activ- 
ity that the individual was born, for, becoming wealthy he 
no longer needed the continual support of the unseen powers 
and the support of his immediate group, but relied on his 
own skill and foresight. 

The division of labor brought about as a result of a large 
number of people in the same place is reflected in their moral 
life in a sharp division between the secular and the religious, 
between morality and religion, and finally, between morality 
and business. It tends to develop a different type of cate- 
gories of value, a newer kind of virtues, and a different 
method of interpreting the facts of experience because the 
facts themselves have changed. 

"There is, furthermore, reason to believe that the forma- 
tion of large, dense, complex bodies of population is favor- 
able to the growth of a belief in the rights of man as man 
and to the spread of ideas of human equality, that is, of 
habits of thought that underlie individualism and democ- 
racy." The enlarged consumption of goods resulting from 
mass brings about social changes. Crimes against property 
decrease and vice increases ; ethics becomes an ethics of 
temperance ; religion forsakes the view of human depravity 
and ideas of human punishment die out ; the god of fear be- 
comes the god of love, and praise gains at the expense of 
prayer; the wealthy tend to segregate into a distinct social 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 35 

class which converts portions of its means into political 
power, privileges, and exemptions ; and an aristocracy re- 
sults apart from royal grace or from the grace of God. 

Such an aristocracy based on wealth is of great signifi- 
cance from a political point of view. It overthrows the 
primitive equality of citizens based upon their equal ability 
to bear arms in defense of their ideals, or for the winning 
of territory or other advantages, rendering the poor mem- 
bers of society clients and retainers of the rich ; it is the first 
step in the development of knighthood, for the ability to 
own a horse and to fight on horseback rather than on foot 
has been the foundation of knighthood the world over. 
"Out of it grew the Greek hippeis, the Roman Equestrian 
Order, the Gaulish equites, and the mediaeval knighthood." 

The wealthy class can, accordingly, devote themselves to 
war and politics while the poor labor with their hands. 
Such facts account for the political philosophy which pre- 
vails in monarchies, aristocracies, and oligarchies. The 
masters themselves being the only class which possesses the 
necessary leisure for reflective thinking, since the poor are 
kept close to the activities essential to bare existence, project 
their own interests, aims, and purposes into an ideal state, 
and enthusiastically set as a goal the realization of their 
own purposes. 

Many other results flow from the gratification of the in- 
stinct of acquisition, but we can not consider them all here. 
One is the idea that labor is not respectable. Since wealth 
carries with it freedom from toil, it soon becomes an appar- 
ent badge of wealth to get on without the performance of 
any labor. Carried to extremes, the wealthy class becomes 
the leisure class, and still farther, the idle rich class whose 
only benefit to the group, if it may be at all called a benefit, 
is to furnish employment to certain persons for personal 



36 An Introduction to Philosophy 

services. By imitation the less wealthy follow the more 
wealthy all down the graded line, with results that may be 
disastrous since the virtues of thrift, economy, and produc- 
tive labor are forgotten or thrown aside. A second result is 
that the gratification of the acquisitive instinct may take 
precedence over all other activities, so that human values 
are measured in terms of property. A striking example of 
this appeared in Roman society during the closing years of 
the republic. Mommsen says in this connection: "To be 
poor was not merely the sorest disgrace and the worst crime, 
but the only disgrace and the only crime ; for money the 
statesmen sold the state and the burgess sold his freedom ; 
the post of the officer and the vote of the juryman were to 
be had for the money ; for money the lady of quality surren- 
dered her person as well as the common courtesan ; the fal- 
sifying of documents and perjuries had become so common 
that in a popular poet of this age, an oath is called "the 
plaster of debts." Men had forgotten what honesty was ; 
a person who refused a bribe was regarded not as an up- 
right man, but as a personal foe." 1 

Many of the greatest crises of history have centered 
about the instinct of acquisition. So great and so numer- 
ous have been the periods of destruction and construction 
grouped about the instinct of acquisition that many con- 
sider it the chief instinct in man, and accordingly have 
written histories and philosophies of history purely from the 
economic standpoint. The food getting activities . un- 
doubtedly have shaped a vast portion of man's energies, 
but we must guard against taking too narrow a view of the 
causes of social progress and of the woes of mankind. We 
have had occasion to see that there are other springs of 
1 Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. II, p. 616. 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 37 

human action, chiefly those based on the reproduction of the 
race, and which furnish the elements which enter into the 
more elaborate altruistic interests of man. These will be 
given more attention when we discuss the social background 
of philosophy. Here we merely indicate some historical re- 
sults of acquisition, and leave the reader who is interested 
to pursue the references at the end of this chapter. 

The downfall of Greek aristocracy was due in the main to 
the large fortunes made in commerce, industry, and naviga- 
tion. The old aristocracy, busied with war and government, 
left the lands to the poorer classes who finally became 
wealthy through thrift and good management, and conse- 
quently demanded representation in the government. The 
result was at last, democracy. This triumph of property 
over birth does away with one form of monopoly but inau- 
gurates another which in time becomes as great a menace 
to social welfare and progress as the one which was sup- 
planted. Graccus broke down the senatorial aristocracy of 
Rome by granting the merchants and industrial leaders cer- 
tain privileges of an agricultural nature in Asia, and by 
giving them control over the jury courts. The towns of 
the middle ages bought their freedom from the feudal lords, 
and thus was entered the wedge which was mighty in break- 
ing asunder the social organization of the period. Espe- 
cially significant for us is the fact that democracy, freedom, 
equal opportunities — in short, the ideals of our own coun- 
try are closely associated with equal opportunities to accu- 
mulate wealth due to the fact that there exist in our coun- 
try large tracts of public lands. 

7. Reasons for a Consideration of the Psychological 
Background. — We have considered some of the principal in- 
stincts in man, and the question might arise as to the sig- 



38 An Introduction to Philosophy 

nificance of the discussion. We take the opportunity in 
concluding to suggest what was intimated in the beginning 
that the psychological background is essential because, 

(a) It shows what are the springs, the sources of our 
action. 

(b) It makes clear the point that these springs of action 
determine within what limits our philosophical, scientific, 
social, and political problems must move. 

(c) It shows that all knowledge, even philosophical, is 
for action. 

Philosophy is one type of action, one method of meeting 
problems, one way of responding to stimuli. The springs 
of all action, philosophical as well as so-called practical, are 
the instincts. Since they are the sources, they set the kind 
of problems we shall meet — we know, that is, that our prob- 
lems will fall under the great categories of food getting and 
reproduction of the species. Just what particular turn the 
statement of the problem and its answer will take we can 
not determine in advance. There are many factors which 
direct an instinct now in this direction for its satisfaction, 
now in another, and it is our purpose to examine some of the 
factors in greater detail. 

REFERENCES 

Ames, E. S., The Psychology of Religious Experience, 33- 
51; 

Baldwin, J. M., Mental Development, Methods and Pro- 
cesses ; 

Colvin, S. S., The Learning Process; 

Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, 37-50 ; 

Draper, J. W., The Intellectual Development of Europe, 
Vol. I, Chapters I and II; 

Hobhouse, L. T., Mind in Evolution, and Morals in Evolu- 
tion ; 



The Psychological Background of Philosophy 39 

Jerusalem, W., An Introduction to Philosophy, 25-41 ; 

Keane, A. H., Ethnology ; 

Mason, 0. T., Origins of Invention; 

McDougall, W., Social Psychology; 

Morgan, L. H., Ancient Society; 

Ribot, Th., The Psychology of the Emotions, Part II, In- 
troduction, 187-199, and Chapters VI, VIII, IX; 

Ross, E. A., Social Psychology; 

Sutherland, A., The Origin and Growth of the Moral In- 
stinct ; 

Tarde, G., The Laws of Imitation; 

Thomas, W. I., Source Book for Social Origins, Part II; 

Thorndike, E. L., Animal Intelligence, 282-294, and Edu- 
cational Psychology; 

Ward, L. F., The Psychic Factors of Civilization ; 

Westermarck, E., The Origin and Development of the 
Moral Ideas. 



CHAPTER III 

THE PHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF PHILOSOPHY 

1. Introductory. — We have said that the instincts are 
built up about objects, that there are no pure emotions, and 
that man lives and operates in this world of objects thus 
built up. Instincts and objects are in fact but phases or 
modes of the same continuous process which we may call ex- 
perience. We do not first possess instincts and later objects 
for them to act upon, but to act at all involves both in- 
stincts and objects, that is, to act as we mean to employ the 
term in human behavior. To make clearer what is meant 
here let us take an example or two. It is thought by many 
that we at first have consciousness and then objects, and 
by others that we first have objects and then consciousness; 
but as a matter of fact we do not first have either objects 
or consciousness, but the two are aspects in the one continu- 
ous act which we may call experience. Again, in the realm 
of ethics, it has been urged that an act is good if the inten- 
tion is good. On the other hand it has been maintained that 
an act is good if the consequences are good. An act, how- 
ever, can not be divided into these two aspects, motive and 
result, except for the purposes of discussion; but both go 
into any act which may be spoken of as moral. A failure 
to take note of the continuity of things and processes and 
their interdependence has led to much discussion and confu- 
sion among philosophers. In general, the doctrine of ideal- 
ism has grown out of the conviction that consciousness ap- 

40 



The Physical Background of Philosophy 41 

pears first and is primary, while the most recent addition to 
the philosophical household, the new realism is based on the 
assumption of the priority of things. We come to believe 
that because for the purposes of discussion an act must be 
broken up and its elements or aspects considered separately 
the act itself is one element plus another, et cetera. Let us 
cite an example. In the text books on psychology there is 
a chapter on memory, one on perception, one on imagina- 
tion, and one on each of the so-called cognitive processes. 
All these chapters bear on the general topic, the knowing 
process. These processes are not separate activities which 
are carried on, one for a little time and another for another, 
but all may be present all the time. In the same way we 
have become accustomed to speak of the environment on the 
one hand and heredity on the other, as if they were two 
fixed things always struggling to adjust to each other. But 
when we think about it we see that both environment and 
heredity are not fixed but they vary together. 

2. Divisions of the Physical Background of Philosophy. 
— With the above suggestions in mind we shall consider now 
the physical background of philosophy from the two stand- 
points: 

(a) physiological, 

(b) environmental. 

The center of interest from the physiological standpoint is 
that of sex. Our question is : what problems originate from 
the physiological differences between the sexes, which are 
important for philosophy? We are to understand from the 
outset that what one does determines what one thinks about, 
and what one does is partly conditioned by one's physio- 
logical abilities and disabilities. The first great point to be 
recognized is that it is upon the physiological differences 
between the sexes that a division of labor is based. Herbert 



43 An Introduction to Philosophy 

Spencer divides the life of the history of civilization into two 
great periods — militancy and industrialism ; but as has been 
suggested by Mason, 1 it seems more in keeping with the 
facts to speak not of an age of militancy, but a sex of mili- 
tancy; not an age of industrialism, but a sex of industrial- 
ism. In short, women did the work and the men did the 
fighting — a fact which developed a peculiar type of mind for 
each sex. In primitive society woman and man had to a 
great extent different food, different occupations and con- 
sequently different mental types and social attitudes. 2 

Woman, the bearer and protector of the child, must stay 
near the lodge ; her movements are hindered ; her home is 
more permanent ; her food, consequently, is that which can 
be found near at home, such as roots, berries, herbs, and 
fruits, and when these are not to be found the great pro- 
gressive step is then made, namely, cultivation of the land — 
a step due to woman's need. 

What are some of the other effects of the physiological 
differences of sex? It makes woman the worker in the veg- 
etable world. Her whole life is built up about the staples 
used for bread, whether it be the taro and bread fruit of 
Polynesia; or the palm, tapioca, millet, or yams of Africa; 
or the rice of Asia ; or the cereals of Europe ; or the corn 
and potatoes of America. All the occupations grouped 
about any vegetal industry, such as the gathering, transpor- 
tation, and the activities necessary to a change from the 
raw to the cooked state, are those of woman. Thus she is 
the food bringer, the ancestor of freight trains, granaries, 
and mills. Her life leads her to take up and develop weav- 
ing — at first using the twigs about her, but later developing 
raw material for clothing. Among the Alaska Indians the 

s O. T. Mason, Woman's Share in Primitive Culture, p. 2. 

a E. S. Ames, The Psychology of Religious Experience, pp. 35 ff. 



The Physical Background of Philosophy 43 

ceremonials of initiation for girls, beginning at the dawn of 
puberty, emphasize the domestic duties which as a woman 
she must perform ; she sews the skins of the squirrel into 
blankets, makes mats, and grinds the grain. She learns the 
virtues of the woman, self-denial, temperance, and quietness, 
through fasting for four days and thereupon tasting of 
water and grease, she begins with another period of four 
days of fasting. Woman skins the game and learns to tan 
the hides for clothing. "If aught in the heavens above, or 
on the earth beneath, or in the waters wore a skin, savage 
women were found on examination to have a name for it, 
and to have succeeded in turning it into its primitive use 
for human clothing, and to have invented new uses un- 
dreamed of by its original owner." She is also the potter, 
the first ceramic artisan, the beast of burden, and is vitally 
connected with the origin and development of language. 

Many theories have been advanced to account for the 
origin of language, among them being the inter jectional, the 
mimetic, and the intuitive ; and while an element of truth 
may be present in each of them, it is certain that woman has 
played an important part in the development of speech as 
related to invention and occupation, to its spread, and to its 
change. Woman gathers her food in packs, in gangs, or 
groups, making it possible for her to chatter with her fel- 
lows, since her food is still, inert ; man, on the contrary, 
hunts live things, so he becomes silent and taciturn. Gender 
comes about through the personification of the results of 
labor of the sexes. Because the sailor is "attached" to his 
ship he calls it "she." Woman aids in the spreading of 
language as a result of the custom of capture, thereby en- 
riching the language and consequently the thought of those 
among whom she was brought. 

It is woman as the founder of society that is of chief in- 



44* An Introduction to Philosophy 

terest to us. "Through her sexually determined manner of 
life she becomes the center of the social group." As the 
female bird makes the nest, or the female mammal digs the 
burrow for her young, or the female bee makes the honey- 
comb for her young, so does woman provide the surround- 
ings essential to the survival of her offspring. Of the home 
itself woman invented the industrial portion while man in- 
vented the defensive. A man's house is and always has been 
his cattle, but for the woman, it is more than a castle — it is 
her home, the seat of her labors and interests. The woman 
group is dominated by sympathy and mutual aid, and this 
attitude is not wholly lost to man for he becomes sympa- 
thetic, ready to assist in matters pertaining to others. 

Man, on the other hand, is the hunter and fighter. His 
food-getting activities and his love are all built upon the 
chase. Wife capture is a form of the chase. Great em- 
phasis has been placed by some on the significance of the 
method of getting food in determining the type of mind 
which is developed. In this connection Professor Dewey 
says, "The occupations determine the chief modes of satis- 
faction, the standard of success and failure. Hence, they 
furnish the working classifications and definitions of value; 
they control the desire process. Moreover, they decide the 
sets of objects and relations which are important, and there- 
by provide the content or material of attention and the 
qualities that are interestingly significant. The directions 
given to mental life thereby extend to emotional and intel- 
lectual characteristics. So fundamental and pervasive is the 
group of occupational activities that it affords the scheme 
or pattern of the structural organization of the mental 
traits." 3 It is, as Professor Dewey goes on to show, per- 

"John Dewey, Interpretation of the Savage Mind, Psychological Re- 
view, 1902, p. 217. Italics not in the original. 



The Physical Background of Philosophy 45 

missible to speak of a hunting type, military, pastoral, agri- 
cultural, and the manufacturing type of mental life. The 
increase of population which has resulted in the destruction 
of game has brought about newer methods of getting food, 
has developed new occupations, and consequently, new men- 
tal types. 

Man, the hunter and fighter, developed initiative, spon- 
taneity, alertness, and cunning by the very necessities of his 
activities. This accounts for the fact that in the social 
affairs of the group man is the leader ; he is the master of 
the ceremonials, even though these reflect the occupation, in- 
terests, and pursuits tff women. In general the content of 
ceremonials is woman's but the form is man's. The social 
aspects, the content, are sympathy, mutual aid, solidarity — 
these come largely from woman's part in the battles of the 
group ; but the form by which these attitudes are expressed, 
such as the dance, the priesthood, the incantation, and sym- 
bols, belongs chiefly to man. The Australian initiation cere- 
monials illustrate the motor type of mind which man pos- 
sesses, while the ceremonials for adolescent girls as practiced 
by the Alaskan Indians, illustrate vividly the type of men- 
tality prized in the woman. Man has always until very re- 
cently assumed leadership in political, social, religious, and 
military life, due in great part to the long history back of 
the activities connected with the chase. With the coming 
of new methods of making a living, based on other agents 
than bone and brawn, we witness woman taking her place in 
the fields of activity, with the natural result that she is 
assuming the leadership in aspects of industry, politics, re- 
ligion, and other forms of social life formerly reserved for 
men. 

This new feature of our civilization is just beginning to 
be expressed in the philosophy of the times, and it is the 



46 An Introduction to Philosophy 

task of the philosophy of the future as manifested in scien- 
tific, social, industrial, and political life to adjust to these 
changes wrought by different methods of meeting the ele- 
mental necessities of life. We may expect, for example, a 
greater emphasis in protestant religion on the feminine as- 
pects of it ; a more humanitarian ideal of government ; a re- 
vival of idealism in some form in the domain of philosophy ; 
a literature more romantic, appealing for greater social 
solidarity, but lacking in ruggedness of style. In the prac- 
tical applications of theory, as in methods of punishment 
and in the distribution of goods, we shall see an increasing 
contribution of woman's nature built up through the long 
ages of toil in the domestic pursuits of the group. 

(b) We have indicated some of the results of the physio- 
logical differences between the sexes and our purpose now is 
to inquire into some of the effects of the physical environ- 
ment on the type of society which is developed in that en- 
vironment, and the kind of thinking that flourishes therein. 
We must guard against the tendency of making the environ- 
ment the sole factor in the determination of a people, for we 
have seen that there are psychological factors which must be 
considered. The environment in a large way determines the 
course which the instincts must take, but, as we have found, 
the two great needs of any people are food and reproduc- 
tion regardless of the environment — a fact that accounts for 
similarity of customs in diverse parts of the world. This 
being the case, the environment is powerful in shaping the 
direction which these needs must travel to find satisfaction. 
In one part of the world the sea dominates with the result 
that commerce soon assumes great proportions ; in another 
the fertile lands call out an agricultural life ; while on the 
great plains the herder flourishes. These facts are espe- 
cially valuable when we consider that they determine largely 



The Physical Background of Philosophy 47 

the outlook on life of a people, shape their methods of solv- 
ing problems, determine the content of their categories of 
value, fix the virtues, and in general mark out the lines 
within which their speculative as well as their practical 
thinking takes place. 

We can readily see how this is possible when we reflect 
that "Man is the product of the earth's surface — that the 
earth has mothered him, fed him, set him tasks, directed his 
thoughts, confronted him with difficulties that have 
strengthened his body and sharpened his wits, given him his 
problems of navigation or irrigation, and at the same time 
whispered hints for their solution. She has entered into his 
bone and tissue, into his mind and soul. On the mountain 
she has given him leg muscles of iron to climb the slope; 
along the coast she has left these weak and flabby, but 
has given him instead vigorous development of chest and 
arm to handle his paddle or oar. In the river valley she 
attaches him to the fertile soil, circumscribes his ideas and 
ambitions by a dull round of calm, exacting duties, narrows 
his outlook to the cramped horizon of his farm. Up on the 
wind-swept plateaus, in the boundless stretch of grass-lands 
and the waterless tracts of the desert, when he roams with 
his flocks from pasture to pasture and from oasis to oasis, 
where life knows much hardship but escapes the grind of 
drudgery, where the watching of grazing herd gives him 
leisure for contemplation, and the wide-ranging life a big 
horizon, his ideas take on a certain gigantic simplicity ; re- 
ligion becomes monotheism, God becomes one, unrivalled like 
the sand of the desert or the grass of the steppe, stretching 
on and on without break or change. Chewing over and over 
the cud of his simple belief as the one food of unfed mind, 
his faith becomes fanaticism ; his big spatial ideas born of 
that ceaseless wandering outgrow the land that bred them 



48 An Introduction to Philosophy 

and bear their legitimate fruit in wide imperial conquests." 4 
(1) Some of the physical factors which are influential 
in shaping the history of a people will be mentioned here, 
for if these factors are influential in shaping history it is 
certain that they figure in the philosophy of that people for 
a philosophy is nothing more than the most highly general- 
ized and carefully articulated conceptions which account for 
the facts in their experience. Their philosophy depends 
upon their stage of development, their social organization, 
their methods of doing things — in short, philosophy is al- 
ways an aspect of the life interests and activities of a 
people. 

We want to indicate some of the factors which help to 
fashion the philosophy of a people, which help to mold the 
hypotheses which are advanced as an explanation of their 
life and interests. These hypotheses or theories always 
come long after a form of social organization has been ef- 
fected, and when man begins to try to account for the facts 
about him, he always projects his social life into his expla- 
nations. This is the chief reason for our discussion of the 
various backgrounds of philosophy — the backgrounds tell 
us what the later developments will be. 

The physical fact of remoteness has been powerful as a 
factor in shaping the ideals of a people. The ancient 
Roman consul in far-off Britain often assumed an inde- 
pendence of action unknown among the provincial governors 
of Gaul. Centuries later Roman Catholicism in England 
maintained a similar independence towards the mother 
church. Both of these facts are in part the results of re- 
moteness from the center of authority. The remoteness of 
the thirteen colonies from the mother country made it pos- 
sible for the former to assert themselves in the formation 
of a great democracy. 
4 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, pp. 1-2. 



The Physical Background of Philosophy 49 

The effect of nearness is equally significant. The history 
of Greece is intimately tied up with that of Asia because 
Greek thought has always been mingled with the more mys- 
tical Asiatic strain ; Greek culture with Asiatic culture ; and 
the legendary historj 7 of Greece is tied up with that of Asia. 

Natural barriers such as mountains and deserts are per- 
sistent factors. The Carpathian Mountains divided the 
Slavic hordes into two streams, the one to the north into 
the plains of Germany and Poland, the other into the valley 
of the Danube and thence to the Adriatic and to the Alps. 
We witnessed some of the results of this division in the late 
world war. The Alps made it possible to develop a great 
society in Italy free from the barbarian of the north, and 
rendered possible the survival of Rome for a much longer 
period than would have been the case otherwise. Our own 
Rockies barred the weaker ones from the Oregon and Cali- 
fornia countries, checked the free movement of laborers to 
the factories there, thereby tightening the hold of the labor 
unions on the industries of the coast. 

Natural highways, rivers, lake chains, make possible the 
free movement of peoples and are thus important factors in 
history. The Danube valley has admitted into Europe a 
long list of invaders from Attila, the Hun, to the besiegers 
of Vienna in 1683. This valley has been the scene of warring 
tribes and unassimilated races for hundreds of years, and 
played its last great role in the recent war. The road-bed of 
the Pennsylvania Railroad between New York and Phila- 
delphia covers the trail of the Lenni-Lenapi Indians, which 
later was the old Dutch road from New Amsterdam and the 
Delaware trading posts, and still later the King's highway, 
and in 1838 it became the route of the Delaware and Raritan 
canal. 

Climatic influences have often been exaggerated, but it is 
certain that these are powerful. Extreme cold has held 



50 An Introduction to Philosophy 

back the development of the arctic regions, permitting only 
two inhabitants to the square mile. Just so extreme heat 
tends to debilitate and weaken the fiber of a people. 

(2) We recount a few of the effects of the physical en- 
vironmental factors, and leave to the interested reader the 
references at the end of the chapter. 

Mountains and the deltaic swamps of the Indus and 
Ganges and the coastal marshes and lagoons on the east 
have shut India out from direct intercourse with the rest of 
the world. The result is that we find them superstitious, 
immutable in their religious and social customs, and highly 
ignorant. Their overwrought imagination has been ac- 
counted for by Buckle 5 from the fact of their living in the 
presence of great plains and high mountains such that the 
reason is overpowered and paralyzed. In Greece, on the 
contrary, where reason flourished, the natural features were 
on a smaller scale such that they could easily be compassed 
by man's reason. In this connection Treitschke 6 points out 
that the lower hill country of Swabia and Franconia, where 
nature is gentler, has produced the great majority of poets 
and artists. The rough highlands of Savoy, the Alpine 
country and the province of Brittany have produced but few 
if any great artists. These facts may be due to both isola- 
tion and the overpowering of the reason by the natural sur- 
roundings. Mountain countries seldom furnish men of great 
genius because they are far removed from the currents of 
action, they permit no leisure but demand incessant toil to 
meet the immediate needs of life. The fertile plains, on the 
other hand, are the seat of wealth, luxury, and leisure and 
permit that freedom of intercourse necessary to the forma- 
tion of art, science and philosophy. 

B Buckle, Henry, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 86-106. 
9 Treitschke, Politik, Vol. I, pp. 225 ff. 



The Physical Background of Philosophy 51 

These factors function in the political and social life of a 
people. Plutarch states that after the rebellion of Kylon 
in 612 B. C, the people of Athens were divided into three 
political parties corresponding to the three physical types 
of country. The mountaineers, the poorest of all, wanted 
a democracy ; the people of the plains, the richest of all, 
were anxious for an oligarchy ; the coast people, intermedi- 
ate between the two in wealth and in social position, wanted 
something between a democracy and an oligarchy. In the 
Civil War, West Virginia became a state because the people 
of the mountains could not profit by slave labor, and as an 
index of their temper they chose as their motto, "Montani 
Semper Liberi." Back of the strong abolition spirit in New 
England stood rocky farms, as back of the Hartford con- 
vention stood the profitable sea trade. Thus we see that our 
moral and political philosophy is often determined by the 
conditions which make for success in our food getting activi- 
ties. 

The effects of the environment on man's physical body 
have been carefully discussed since the time of Darwin. 
Many of the physical peculiarities if not all are determined 
by the nature of the physical features of the habitat of the 
people in question. Man and his environment grow to fit. 
The great lung capacity of those living in high altitudes ; 
the thickness of skin and hair ; the color of the animal ; the 
stature of individuals ; the small size of wild animals in 
mountain regions in comparison with the same species in 
the lowlands ; the dwarfed horses in Iceland, and in the 
Shetlands and Sardinia; the low stature of the peoples in 
the poorer districts in Europe ; the greater stature of the 
Hottentots who are pastoral over their kinsmen the Bush- 
men; the stunted Snake Indians of the Rocky Mountains as 
against the buffalo hunters of the plains ; the thin legs and 



52 An Introduction to Philosophy 

thick arms of the Indians along the Paraguay river — all 
these are associated with the efforts at a "fit" between man 
and his surroundings. 

We are more concerned with the psychical effects of the 
physical environment. They, of course, are bound up with 
the physical effects, but we wish to separate them for em- 
phasis. Different races possess different temperaments, and 
the differences prevail in the same race and even in the same 
locality. It is probable that the temperaments have a phys- 
iological basis — that, for example, phthisis renders one 
buoyant and happy, et cetera, resulting in the fact that 
man's view of life in a very large way is tied up with his 
temperaments. This fact had led some one to say that a 
man's philosophy depends upon his temperament, a state- 
ment which contains an element of truth. Anyway, man's 
environment is reflected in his religion, his law, and his lit- 
erature. Blackstone states that "in the Isle of Man, to take 
away a horse or an ox was no felony, but a trespass, because 
of the difficulty in that little country to conceal them or to 
carry them off; but to steal a pig or a fowl, which is easily 
done, was a capital misdemeanor, and the offender punished 
with death." 7 Greek cosmography is a reflection of their 
environment ; Eskimo hell is dark and cold ; the Jew's is a 
place of everlasting fire ; Buddhism looks upon heaven as the 
cessation of all activity, and we little wonder that this is so 
when we think of the incessant struggle against the steam- 
ing heat and humidity of the Himalayan lowlands. 

REFERENCES 

Chapin, Social Evolution; 

Deniker, J., The Races of Man, Chapter III; 
Draper, J. W., The Intellectual Development of Europe, 
Vol. I, Chapters I-II; 

7 Quoted from Semple, Op. cit., p. 40. 



The Physical Background of Philosophy 53 

Loeb, J., The Influence of the Environment of Animals, in 
Darwin and Modern Science, edited by Seward ; 

Patten, S. N., The Development of English Thought, Chap- 
ter I ; 

Ross, E. A., Foundations of Sociology, 225-253 ; 

Semple, E., The Influence of the Geographic Environment; 

Thomas, W. L, Source Book for Social Origins, 29-74 ; 

Woodruff, C. E., The Effects of Tropical Light on White 
Men, 



CHAPTER IV 

THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF PHILOSOPHY 

1. Introductory. — We come more directly to the prob- 
lems of philosophy in a treatment of the social conditions 
out of which speculative thinking arises. We should keep in 
mind that the psychological agencies which we have dis- 
cussed in a former chapter operate in a physical environ- 
ment, and that these two agencies, psychical and physical, 
mutually cooperate in the formation of a social environment. 
It is essential again to call attention to the fact that primi- 
tive man does not start with a ready-made system of ad- 
justments, that is, with fully developed instinctive responses 
and mechanisms of responses, but these very responses and 
mechanisms grow up in the course of the long period that 
has elapsed since man first appeared on the earth. Also, 
that the physical environment is itself not fixed in advance 
but becomes, grows, as man develops and grows. The physi- 
cal aspects of New York City, for example, are by no means 
what they were in the days of the Dutch traders. Thus 
the physical and the psychical aspects which we may distin- 
guish for purposes of description, grow up together, the one 
being the complement of the other. But the resultant of the 
mutual play of these two phases or aspects of experience is 
what we shall call the social environment. 

As far as primitive man is concerned this social environ- 
ment is his philosophy, his science, his religion, his law, and 

54 



The Social Background of Philosophy 55 

his government, and, indeed, all other modes of action which 
we separate, divide, and classify. The same is true as far as 
the civilized and highly cultured man is concerned. His 
social environment includes all these specialized methods of 
behavior, but the difference between the primitive and the 
cultured man is that the latter clearly differentiates these 
fields of action, evaluates them, and behaves towards each in 
keeping with the value he attaches to it. Philosophy for cul- 
tured man is a highly technical and specialized way of look- 
ing at things. At least this is what people usually believe it 
to be, and if we go deeply into certain theories we may be 
convinced that the belief is well-founded ; but for primitive 
man the whole undifferentiated mass of custom is his philos- 
ophy, if we agree to use the term in this extended form. 
The history of progress is precisely the history of the dif- 
ferentiation of methods of meeting and evaluating the prob- 
lems which confront a people. From the standpoint just 
stated the degree of advancement of a people or an age in 
the history of the world can be estimated by the degree of 
specialization which prevailed in their society. Broadly 
speaking, there have been but two great periods of high in- 
tellectual achievement in the history of the world, namely, 
that of the Greeks in the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aris- 
totle; and that of the modern world from about 1500 to our 
own time. In these two periods specialization, differentia- 
tion, individuation are the key words. 

As the social conditions reflect the physical and psycho- 
logical backgrounds out of which and upon which they are 
developed, so does philosophy as we understand it in cul- 
tured society reflect the social conditions from which it has 
arisen and of which it is a part. The philosophy of a period 
is an expression of the "nature and life and society in terms 



56 An Introduction to Philosophy 

of collective human desires and aspiration as these were de- 
termined by contemporary difficulties and struggle." x In 
the same way that we speak of eighteenth century litera- 
ture, dress, or modes of travel, we may speak of eighteenth 
century philosophy. 

Each age, time, period, is dominated by certain ideals 
which in turn are a reflection of that age ; but because of the 
continuity of culture, because the past lives in the present in 
the form of books and art, we find it more difficult to point 
out the actual contributions of a people as opposed to what 
they have inherited. 

These introductory remarks are intended to emphasize 
the relations between the social environment and the type 
of philosophy which is an expression of it, for it is this way 
that we account for continuity in development. For ex- 
ample, we are told by the historians of philosophy that 
philosophy began with the Greeks. This is a statement 
which is true under certain conditions only and if we define 
philosophy as we employ the term here, it is not true at all ; 
for our position is that the lowest savage has a philosophy 
and this is his way of life. It is true that it may not be 
of a very exalted type, but for him it answers his purposes 
as well as the most highly elaborated and detailed theory 
answers the purposes of the professional philosopher. As 
we indicated above, his ways of life are non-differentiated, 
and if we were to select a word or term to cover all his 
methods of reaction, we could do no better than to employ 
the term so common at this time, namely, Custom. Custom 
is all — science, law, philosophy. Within recent years there 
has been a growing tendency to treat the elaborate forms of 
action, such as our moral behavior or ethics, as growing out 
of the backgrounds which we have discussed, plus the social 
1 Dewey, John, German Philosophy and Politics, pp. 10-11. 



The Social Background of Philosophy 57 

background which is our immediate problem here. By the 
social background we mean the conglomerate of science, re- 
ligion, and social organization which prevailed in primitive 
society. Later when we speak of particular philosophical 
theories the relation between the prevailing social organiza- 
tion and the type of philosophy developed will be discussed, 
but here we have in mind the chaos of customs of primitive 
life. 

The hypothesis was advanced earlier that our elaborate 
forms of behavior are founded on two prime necessities, 
namely, food getting activities and reproduction of the spe- 
cies. We have indicated how these needs split up into more 
definite instinctive reactions and our purpose here is to show 
that the elaborate customs* of primitive society are built on 
these ground forms. The various forms of social life are 
the occupations, the relations between the sexes, folk-ways, 
and various ceremonials involving magic and myth — the 
early science, philosophy, and religion of man. The cus- 
toms that are of the greatest importance are those which 
are connected with the getting and the distribution of food, 
the birth of children, marriage, initiation ceremonials which 
are the high school education of the primitive adolescent, 
and rites connected with death, and war. 

2. The Nature of Primitive Social Life. — Primitive social 
life is a life of custom, more rigid and binding than modern 
man generally thinks. The crime of primitive society is the 
breaking of custom, for in this way injury comes to the 
group and not to the individual who breaks the custom. 
Departures from custom are taboo. That is, taboo is the 
negative side of custom. "The customs are the thou-shalts, 
and the taboos are the thou-shalt-nots of primitive life." 2 
How do these customs get started? Various answers have 
a Ames, E. S., The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 52. 



58 An Introduction to Philosophy 

been offered. It is probable that as good an answer as can 
be given is that they originated through luck or accidental, 
successful ways of meeting the demands of the situation 
which they cover. 

Man's behavior becomes habitual through repetition, and 
ways of acting which have brought success have been handed 
down, while other ways become taboo. The trial and error 
method certainly is the chief one by which knowledge is 
acquired not only by primitive man but by civilized man as 
well. Our most elaborate rational processes are not fully 
proved or tested until they have been acted upon. So we 
may safely say that customs have grown up about success- 
ful ways of action induced by the primitive needs of man- 
kind, and that they are not originally based on ideas of suc- 
cess, plans in advance of the occasion of their formation, or 
as Professor Sumner states it, "From recurrent needs arise 
habits for the individual and customs for the group, but 
these results are consequences which were never conscious 
and never foreseen or intended." Then again certain meth- 
ods of action appeal to a people. Aside from the useful 
and the lucky, "there is the more immediate reaction of in- 
dividuals or groups to certain ways of acting according 'as 
things jump with the feelings or displease them.' " 3 

3. Taboo. — As custom centers about the occupations and 
other forms of social life and activities of the group, lend- 
ing themselves to the positive aspects of experience, so does 
taboo revolve about the same experiences as a negative fac- 
tor. The things which possess taboo most powerfully are 
sex, leaders, strangers, and the dead. Sex taboos extend 
both to the person and to the occupations of the members. 
We have spoken of the physiological factors of sex as de- 
termining in part the type of mental life of the individual, 

8 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 54. 



The Social Background of Philosophy 59 

but in this connection it should be pointed out that on 
the psychology of habit formation these modes of reaction 
earlier determined by physiological necessity become fixed 
modes of response, or custom, which can not be violated ex- 
cept in approved ways. In other words, the physiological 
fact of sex is a center for a wide range of customs and 
taboos, that is of early science, philosophy and religion. 
Woman has generally been debarred from the public and 
civil rights which have been accorded man. This is an ex- 
tension of the biological difference of occupation, sometimes 
exaggerated into seclusion among polygamous races, and 
into somewhat of inferiority in martial and feudal societies. 
The habits of man who is motor, martial, aggressive, are op- 
posed to those of woman who is docile and submissive, due 
to the conditions under which each has struggled to live. The 
taboos between the sexes are gradually being broken down in 
the presence of other ways of living, different means of 
evaluating conduct, and changed social and political condi- 
tions. 

Great men, chiefs, kings, and priests are taboo ; they are 
set apart, consecrated, sanctified. They have gained their 
positions because they have been powerful leaders in wars, 
and in other forms of group life. Once having gained lead- 
ership through some service to the group the right of chief- 
tainship or kingship is handed down to members of the 
family or to others closely associated with the chief or king. 
In our own society we note how persistent is the taboo on 
rulers, great men, high church officials, and others. So per- 
sistent is this fact that some have explained customs of 
religion and others as well as the devices of priests and 
rulers for the purpose of keeping themselves and their class 
in power. It is more in keeping with sound psychological 
principles, however, to account for these facts on the prin- 



60 An Introduction to Philosophy 

ciple of habit formation, driven on by the instinct of self 
subjection and its correlate. It has been one of the great 
problems of government to break down the taboos which 
have grown up about rulers. We have just witnessed the 
tragedy of those who rule by "divine right." The taboos 
which have been built up about them have been broken down 
and they have been subjected to the rightful punishment of 
the common man. Viewed from one standpoint it would be 
possible to write the whole of political history as a gradual 
breakdown of taboos on rulers and chiefs. The highest 
achievement in this respect is found in the democracy in 
which, theoretically at least, "every man counts as one." 
The development of religion follows the same route — the 
gradual breaking of taboos on priests, medicine men, and 
religious institutions in general. For example, it is a recent 
fact of great significance that religious phenomena have 
yielded to psychological, and hence, scientific, treatment, 
the theory before being that matters of sacred and divine 
import would be debauched by being submitted to scientific 
methods. 

Accordingly in custom and taboo we witness the "funded" 
experience of a people — their method of response to those 
needs which must be gratified if the group is to survive ; and 
in higher forms of society those customs which, while being 
elaborations on primitive needs, embody the spiritual ideals 
of the group. 

4. Various Types of Custom. — We have now to consider 
some of the principal customs of primitive society with the 
following idea primarily in mind : With what are the customs 
concerned? About what do they center? 

A possible origin of custom has been suggested in the 
psychology of habit, in which successful ways of action dis- 
covered by trial and error become fixed and handed down in 



The Social Bad-ground of Philosophy 61 

ceremonials of initiation and by imitation. But the time 
comes in the history of the race when reflection on these 
customs arises, and at that point we have theoretical know- 
ledge or the speculative achievements of primitive man. 
Man unconsciously develops a type of social organization 
just as we develop a language, but it is not until much 
later that he attempts to explain his social life or that he 
writes his grammar. He gains an immense store of prac- 
tical knowledge such as the making of bows and arrows, 
traps for animals, axes, boats, and bridges before he asks 
for principles. But a time does come when principles are 
demanded and at this point science and philosophy as we 
think of them are born. We shall later have occasion to 
enumerate some of the agencies which compel a search for 
principles, which, that is, demand a reconstruction of cus- 
tom or habitual modes of action. Such a process involves 
consciousness of the reflective, and hence, critical type. 

(a) Sacrifice. We shall begin our discussion of cere- 
monials and their purposes with sacrifice, the basic and 
characteristic act of which is that of eating food and this is 
generally the staple food of the group. 4 Sacrifice, in other 
words, is fundamentally a food process, though in higher 
forms of society this fact is more or less disguised. Ori- 
ginally the totem animal was the staple article of food, and 
was itself sacrificed, but later when it became rare, sacri- 
fices were made to it. Spencer and Gillen, 5 in their elaborate 
studies of the primitive tribes of Australia, say that the 
purpose of sacrificial ceremonials is to increase the food 
supply. The eating of the totem animal became taboo due 

4 "Sacrifices, from the lowest to the highest levels of culture, consist, 
to the extent of nine tenths or more, of gifts of food and sacred ban- 
quets." Tylor, Primitive Culture, Vol. II, p. 397. 

•Native Tribes of Central Australia and Northern Tribes of Central 
Australia. 



62 An Introduction to Philosophy 

to a scarcity and no member is permitted to eat of it except 
at the ceremonial feast. The uncertainty of the food supply 
and the indispensable need for food rendered ceremonials 
for its increase of deep and lasting significance. As Craw- 
ley says, "The food quest provides the earliest illustration 
of the way in which (primitive man) lays hold of life. It is 
the most engrossing fact of primitive existence. Man's 
daily bread thus becomes the object of innumerable acts of 
caution and superstition." 6 

(1) Sacrificial Rites and Totemism. Sacrificial rites 
are closely connected with totemism, a word taken from the 
language of the Ojibway Indians, and which means that man 
has descended from an animal, and in some cases from a 
plant, ancestor. The animal or plant from which the group 
had its origin is one closely connected with their food sup- 
ply, and indeed usually forms the staple article. The In- 
tichiuma ceremonials described by Spencer and Gillen and, 
by Howitt, have as their object the increase of the totem. 
Grass seed is thrown broadcast by the members of the grass 
seed totem, and a huge lizard is formed by the members of 
the lizard totem, and parts of it thrown about, all for the 
purpose of a direct appeal to the totem to multiply itself 
by virtue of the magical power which it possesses. The in- 
crease in the totem is as a matter of course a benefit to the 
group in a substantial way for it relieves hunger, and in 
addition gives power to the group. Since the totem group 
comes from a common ancestor the eating of the totem 
animal gives the group the magical power of the animaf 
itself. It is significant that at this stage the sacrifice is not 
made to the ancestor or to the god, but it is the god or an- 
cestor itself that is sacrificed. Thus the group received di- 
rectly the sacredness, taboo, or magic of the object eaten. 
The eating of other food objects than the totem for the 

6 Quoted from Ames, Op. cit., pp. 120-21. 



The Social Background of Philosophy 63 

purposes of gaining power is common. Cannibal feasts are 
probably to be explained on the principle that the magic of 
the powerful enemy is transferred to the feasters. The 
youth, at the initiation ceremonials, may be fed from the 
organs of powerful enemies. "The liver gives valor, the 
ears intelligence, the skin of the forehead perseverance." 
The North American Indian eats venison to gain swiftness 
and cunning, but he avoids the clumsy bear, tame cattle, 
and slow moving swine, so that he may not gain their 
qualities, because these qualities are detrimental to the con- 
ception of the "virtues" which have been built up out of 
the essential activities for group survival. South American 
Indians eat birds, fish, monkeys, and deer, but avoid the 
peccary and tapir; Africans eat the meat and drink the 
blood of lions and tigers so that they may become strong 
and mighty in battle. 

(2) The Occasions of Sacrifice. Any unusual, non- 
habitual occurrence may call for sacrifice. When the se- 
curity of a people is broken, when they are weakened by 
death, war, pestilence, or famine, or when something unusual 
is about to take place, such as a battle or an eclipse, then 
the rites of sacrifice are in order. They may occur also 
at stated intervals such as at the beginning of the seasons 
and the opening of the hunting season for certain game. 
In fact every happening which calls for a closer union 
among the group and between the group and their ancestor 
or the unseen power is an occasion for sacrifice. 

When taboos have actually been broken, when sin has 
been committed, and when the consequences have to be dealt 
with we have sacrifices known as rites of purification. 
When the sick regain health, when the women return to 
camp after childbirth, 7 when mourners return from the fu- 
neral, rites of sacrifice are generally performed. Water is 
'Leviticus, Ch. XII. 



64 An Introduction to Philosophy 

commonly employed in these rites because it is sacred and 
mysterious. Any method of coming in contact with it is 
employed — drinking, sprinkling, or bathing. Blood and fire 
are sometimes used because they are also sacred and im- 
part sacredness to whatever they come in contact with. 

(3) What is done in Sacrifice? We have said that the 
purpose of sacrifice is to come in contact with a sacred 
object in order to become possessed of its sacredness. It 
unites the members of the group with the powers which they 
believe to control them. Then again come the rites of 
atonement for sin either of omission or of commission. We 
are better acquainted with Hebrew sacrificial rites as given 
in the Old Testament, and we are therefore better able to 
discover the purpose of them by an examination of Hebrew 
customs. The earliest Hebrews were shepherds and nomads, 
the sheep being the most important animal of their experi- 
ence, and hence their totem animal. The oldest feast of the 
Hebrews, the Passover, is a survival of the totemic stage. 
Remembering that the sacrificed animal was itself the deity, 
it is evident that those who ate of it gained the sacredness 
and magical qualities of the deity. When they entered the 
rich country to the west they became war-like and their 
desert gods became gods of war. An agricultural life car- 
ried many changes in their customs, among which was the 
substitution of the bull as the sacred animal instead of the 
sheep as in their nomadic days, because cattle became the 
chief food animal. This fact is reflected in their religious 
life in that the bull was a symbol for Yaweh, their God. 
This symbol was set up in the various shrines and even in 
the temple at Jerusalem. 

In modem Christianity we witness the oldest ideas of sac- 
rifice. "The Passover determines the conceptions which 
center in Mass or the Lord's Supper. The communicant 



The Social Background of Philosophy 65 

partakes of the magic life, literally by eating the body and 
drinking the blood ; or ideally by employing bread and 
wine as symbols." Baptism as practiced in modern churches 
is also a survival of ancient rites of purification in which 
the sins are "washed away." "The sacramental doctrines 
and customs of religion spring from the living and peren- 
nial superstition of the masses. They exist not merely be- 
cause it is the fashion to cultivate them, but also because the 
magic and mystery which they involve are native to unen- 
lightened minds." 8 

(b) Initiation Ceremonials. We wish next to consider 
ceremonials of initiation, one of the chief aspects of early 
custom. These customs have to deal more directly with in- 
terests connected with the reproduction of the species, such 
as marriage, birth, and relations between the sexes ; whereas 
sacrifices were more intimately related to food processes. 
These ceremonials are the objective regimen to which youths 
have been subjected as they cross the threshold from child- 
hood to maturity. They are for primitive and savage man 
the method of transmission to the young of the ideals, as- 
pirations, and interests of the group. We can best under- 
stand them if we think of the high school education of the 
modern boy or girl, in which the attempt is made to ac- 
quaint the adolescent with the culture of the race for the 
purpose of providing such with instruments the better to 
meet the problems, demands, and needs of our time; and to 
indicate methods by which the ideals, aims, purposes, and 
aspirations may be refined and purified. As our high 
schools give the youth those principles which have been 
found valuable in coping with our civilization, so do the ini- 
tiation ceremonials acquaint the youth of primitive culture 
with the elements which are deemed valuable by the group ; 

8 Ames, Opus cit., p. 192. 



66 An Introduction to Philosophy 

and just as we are able to determine the ideals of a period 
by a consideration of the curriculum, so may we discover 
the values of those whose ceremonials we study. 

In the lowest types of savagery it is highly probable that 
the ceremonials of initiation are purely a matter of cus- 
tom, i. e., there are no ideas or ideals involved at all, no 
reflection on the inner significance of the rites ; but even so, 
they represent the type of thing that the group responds 
to necessarily. 

By the method of trial and error certain habits of re- 
sponse have been built up and these habits are handed down 
to the young members of the group, who are about to as- 
sume the duties and activities of full members. Conse- 
quently, if, in the initiation ceremonials as in sacrifice, we 
study what is done rather than what is believed, we shall 
not be tempted to found them upon too firm an ideal back- 
ground or to search too seriously for the ideas that underlie 
them. In our interpretation of these phenomena we may 
do what is permissible, namely, to seek for the causes of 
them as the facts surrounding warrant ; but it is not per- 
missible to ascribe to the savage and primitive man the lofty 
conceptions of duty, which are found in civilized ethical 
theories, or abstract notions of cause and effect which have 
become the possession of civilized man only at the expense 
of endless experimental research. An example or two will 
show the general form of the ceremonial of initiation and 
will make evident the "virtues" of those who practice them 
— those elements which are deemed of value to such as would 
be members of the group. 

(1) Ceremonial of the American Aborigines. "In the 
life of the Thlinkett there is almost nothing between child- 
hood and adult age. Youth, that delicious pause between 
infancy and maturity, has no place in his experience. At 
the age when our children are barely ready to lay aside 



The Social Background of Philosophy 67 

pinafore and short trousers, Alaskan boys and girls are 
declared to be old enough to marry and begin life for them- 
selves." The first great event in the life of the Thlinkett 
girl was her arrival at maturity. She was banished for six 
months in a small out-house from which she could not stir. 
During the period she was kept busy sewing squirrel skins 
into blankets, and weaving hats and baskets, the object of 
which was to teach her the virtues of woman, to wit, pa- 
tience and industry. On the first day of her retreat, a small 
pin was inserted through her lower lip, which was changed 
to a labret on her wedding day. She was taught self-denial 
by being tempted by food and drink of which she was de- 
prived for four days. She must not move about lest she 
acquire habits of restlessness, nor must she talk lest she 
become a scold. After the period, she made her debut. At 
this coming-out feast she was introduced to all the young 
men of the opposite phratry and, dressed in her best, stood 
on an elevation while being examined by all the young men. 
"If she were healthy and industrious, modest and reserved, 
spoke slowly, quietly, and moved deliberately, and especially 
if she had gained a reputation for unusual industry and 
skill, suitors abounded and she was soon married." 9 

The Brazilian girl's experience is more trying. Endur- 
ance is the chief virtue here as is seen in the ceremonials. 
She is secluded for a month and is fed on bread and water. 
She is brought out before her parents and friends, and each 
person present gives her six licks across the back and breast 
with a sipo, until she falls senseless or dead. If she re- 
covers, it is repeated every six hours, and it is considered an 
offense to parents not to strike hard. Meats and fish are 
made ready, the sipos are dipped in them and given her to 
lick ; then she is a woman and is ready for marriage. 10 

•Quoted from Hall, G. S., Adolescence, Vol. II, p. 233. 
10 Walker, A. R., Travels on the Amazon, p. 325. 



68 An Introduction to Philosophy 

(2) Initiation Ceremonials of the Africans. Frazer has 
made interesting studies of the ceremonials of the African 
Zulus and neighboring tribes. We shall state briefly some 
of the points of the Zulu ceremonial. At the first signs of 
puberty the girl must hide, not be seen by men, cover her 
head, lest the sun shrivel her, and seclude herself for some 
time in a hut. In New Ireland girls at this age are confined 
for four or five years, kept in small cages in the dark, and 
not allowed to set foot on the ground. The cages are small 
and hot but are clean and the girls are taken out once a 
day to bathe ; in these cages they remain until they are 
taken out to be married and attend the great feast which is 
a part of the ceremony. Poor people can afford to keep 
their daughters thus shut up but a few weeks, but the time 
increases with wealth and station. 

It will be noticed that the feast is usually an important 
element in the marriage ceremonial. We have, therefore, in 
marriage both of the great interests of life present. 

Every tribe of the present day has ceremonials of the 
nature we have just indicated. Not only are these found in 
primitive and in present savage tribes, but they have been 
topics of supreme interest throughout the development of 
civilization. If we take the tribes of Australia, the early 
Jews, the people of Borneo, New Guinea, or of any other 
place, we shall find some form of initiation ceremonial cen- 
tering about the interests of reproduction. The wide preva- 
lence, indeed, the universal prevalence of the ceremonial is 
highly suggestive. 

REFERENCES 

Ames, E. S., Psychology of Religious Experience, 51-168; 
Bougle, C, Darwinism and Sociology, in Darwin and Mod- 
ern Science, edited by Seward; 
Brinton, D. G., Religions of Primitive Peoples; 



The Social Background of Philosophy 69 

Chapin, Social Evolution ; 

Cooley, C. H., Human Nature and the Social Order; 

Deniker, J., The Races of Man, Chapters V-VII; 

Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, Chapters II-VIII ; 

Dopp, K. E., The Place of Industry in Elementary Educa- 
tion; 

Dowd, J., The Negro Races, Chapters II- VII; 

Farnell, L. R., The Evolution of Religion; 

Haddon, A. C, Syllabus of Lectures on Magic and Primitive 
Religion, The Study of Man, Chapter XIV; 

Harrison, J., Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion; 

Hose and McDougai/l, The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, Vol. 
I, Chapter V; Vol. II, Chapters XV, XVIII, XXII; 

Jevons, S., Introduction to the History of Religion ; 

Ratzel, F., History of Mankind, Vol. I; 

Rivers, W. H. R., The Todas ; 

Ross, E. A., Foundations of Sociology, Chapter VIII; 

Smith, W. Robinson, The Religion of the Semites ; 

Spencer and Gillen, The Native Tribes of Central Aus- 
tralia, and Northern Tribes of Central Australia; 

Sumner, Folkways ; 

Thomas, W. I., Sex and Society, Source Book, 112-130, 
and Part II ; 

Tylor, Primitive Culture, Chapter V, and Anthropology, 
IV; 

Wundt, W., Elements of Folk Psychology; 



CHAPTER V 

AGENCIES IN THE ADVANCE FROM CUSTOM TO REFLECTION 

1. Introductory. — We have discussed some of the types 
of action of primitive man as manifested in ceremonials of 
sacrifice and initiation. As far as it was possible to do so 
we emphasized what was done rather than what was believed, 
for it is a common fallacy to treat these customs from the 
standpoint of the scholar and not from that of the primitive 
thinker or actor himself. We reason that since a certain 
type of action in our experience involves a plan that all 
action is consciously purposive, involves aims, objects, and 
ideals. The dog, while he makes adjustments which meet 
the needs of his existence, certainly does not form free ideas 
involving plans of acts to be done ; and we shall be closer to 
the facts of primitive experience if we think of it as a body 
of habits involving the minimum of conscious reflection. 
Action is primary and appears long before reflection. 

2. The Levels of Conduct. — Psychologists recognize at 
least three levels of conduct. They are the instinctive, the 
habitual, and the conscious. Speaking generally, we may 
say that the instinctive level represents and is correlated 
with what we have spoken of as the psychological back- 
ground of philosophy. The psychological aspects of habit 
are, when transferred to group life, what we have discussed 
as group custom or mores, or the social background of 
philosophy. When treated socially conscious behavior or 
conduct becomes the science, philosophy, and all the other 

70 



Agencies in the Advance from Custom to Reflection 71 

types of action, and methods of behavior which we have in 
mind when we speak of the reflective and speculative work 
of mankind. 

Instinctive action meets the demands of an organism up 
to a certain point in its development. Its difficulties are not 
numerous, its modes of response, though highly elaborate in 
many cases, are more or less certain in their end or aim — • 
the aim being- of course not a conscious one in the individual 
organism. Habitual action, likewise, does not involve the 
use of the high brain centers but is carried on almost auto- 
matically. But psychologically, there are times in the life 
of the highest organism when these modes of behavior break 
down. There are crises which can not be met on these two 
lower methods of behavior, and it is at the point of the 
breakdown of instinctive and habitual responses thut con- 
sciousness arises. 

As it is at the point of breakdown of customary modes of 
response that consciousness arises in the individual thinker, 
so it is that reflection as a social and objective undertaking 
has its origin in the breakdown of customs. Progress, that 
is, takes place only at the point of conflict between some 
new fact and the group of customs believed or at least ac- 
cepted as valuable. Consequently, in the advance from cus- 
toms which are merely accepted to customs which are ac- 
cepted because they are chosen, we have to search for those 
conflicts which arose in primitive life, which brought about 
these changes. In so doing we are not introducing new 
factors, but we shall see at work a clash of interests founded 
on the very facts which we have already considered, namely, 
activities for food and for the race, and the various modifi- 
cations of these as we noticed in the several instinctive ten- 
dencies in man. That is, through a clash of interests for 
the satisfaction of man's elemental needs, these very in- 



7£ An Introduction to Philosophy 

stincts and habits built about them are transcended, and we 
reach a higher level of action based on acceptance after a 
survey of the facts. There is a world of difference between 
the customs of a primitive group accepted blindly and those 
of an advanced civilized people which have been accepted, in 
part at least, because they are the best methods of account- 
ing for the facts of experience ; but the important likeness 
consists in this, that the customs of the primitive man as 
well as those of the highly civilized are group habits built 
up to meet the problems which confront or which have con- 
fronted them. 

3. Agencies in the Breakdown of Custom. — What are 
some of the factors which make for an advance over in- 
stinctive and habitual or customary modes of action? In 
answer to this question we have to inquire into some of the 
causes of the clash of interests among men, for, as we in- 
timated, progress and advancement take place in a conflict 
between something already in operation and some other fact 
which does not square with what is accepted. At a still 
higher level of development we shall find the conflict to 
center about the interests of the individual as against those 
of the group as a whole. It is in such a struggle that indi- 
vidualism as against group life gains in prominence and in- 
fluence. Early man, however, is engaged in the food quest, 
making tools and crude houses, fighting and making slaves 
of the conquered, satisfying his emotional life in song, the 
dance, and physical contests, and winning women for wives. 
All these activities are carried on habitually; but a time 
comes when reflection is essential to group survival. 

Of the agencies which cause man to become thoughtful,, 
reflective, and hence, speculative, we mention the following: 

(a) Work. 

(b) The Arts. 



Agencies in the Advance from Custom to Reflection 73 

(c) War. 

(d) Mutual Aid. 

(e) Family Life. 

(f) Initiation Ceremonials, Sacrifice, et cetera. 

(g) The Behavior of Refractory Members of the 

Group. 
We shall indicate in a summary manner the influence of 
these various agencies in the development to a higher level 
of behavior. 1 

(a) Work, by which we mean action for some end out- 
side of the process itself, involves an alertness not only of 
the body but of the mind ; it quickens perception and makes 
for foresight; it accustoms one to control the immediate 
demands for a remoter good in the future; it develops con- 
tinuity of purpose, the ability to hold to a single line of in- 
terest, and to what is greatest of all, the formulation of 
plans for accomplishing tasks with the greatest ease. Like 
thinking, which is done only when man fails by other meth- 
ods of acting, work is done usually when no other way will 
bring results. The result is that plans for gaining ends, 
of meeting needs, and satisfying desires are devised involving 
as little work as possible, and yet bringing the greatest 
returns. The division of labor which at first was based 
upon differences between the sexes, which we have discussed 
in an earlier chapter, later became extended to different 
classes and castes, and still later to the highly specialized 
type of labor that goes on in our modern life. This special- 
ization together with inventions and devices along so many 
lines, have as their purpose the saving of work with an in- 
crease of product. The bare fact that man was forced to 
earn or win his living rather than to catch it, that he was 

*For more extended treatment see references at the end of the 
chapter. 



74* An Introduction to Philosophy 

forced to become an agriculturist and a herder rather than 
a hunter and a fisher, so sharpened his wits that he has 
planned, thought out, means of satisfying his needs with the 
least effort ; and the greatest thing of all is that work helped 
to teach him to think. 

(b) The Arts. The essential feature about the arts is 
that they provide some embodiment for form or order. 
They are the tangible ideas of man, that is, they are the 
outward expression of the idea. In order to express clearly 
the idea it must be definite and in this sharpening and de- 
fining the idea so that it can be expressed in song, the dance, 
in pottery, in weaving, or in music, lies the chief value of 
art as a factor in man's intellectual development. Order, 
form, balance, equilibrium, symmetry — all are brought to 
consciousness and are made parts of the environment of the 
social group by becoming objective in music and in the other 
arts. Certain occasions and activities of primitive man 
called for art. For example, war calls for "fore-dancer" who 
leads out the fighting line and who performs in pantomime 
all the motions of the fight. "The deeds of the great hunters 
are remembered in songs and pantomimes." The movements 
of the hunter as well as of the animal hunted are reproduced. 
All of these facts make for a clearing up of ideas, they make 
for thinking, for reflection, and philosophy is just a serious 
kind of reflection. 

(c) War. This is one of the chief means of sharpen- 
ing ideas and issues. Among the lowest savage peoples in- 
tellectual progress hinges about methods of warfare and 
efficiency, but at a higher level of advancement aims, ideals, 
and issues become clearly defined and set off. The conflict 
develops keenness of perception, agility of body and mind, 
aptitude in solving problems immediately, patience, perse- 
verance, and initiative. It tends also to render man social 



Agencies in the Advance from Custom to Reflection 75 

by emphasizing the need of team work, of subordination to 
leaders and loyalty to his group. A powerful result of war 
from the intellectual standpoint is the clash in methods of 
action between the conquered and the conquerors. "Con- 
quered Greece her conquerors conquered" is an old state- 
ment that illustrates the point here. The ideas of the 
conquerors are always enriched by those of the defeated foe, 
a richer vocabulary results, and the novelties in handwork, 
music and other forms of intellectual and emotional re- 
sponses become incorporated in the life of the conquerors. 

The social results of war are numerous and highly signi- 
ficant, especially in view of the fact that the social life and 
organization of a people marks a starting point for their 
theoretical speculations and at the same time determines 
the limits within which speculation can take place. War de- 
velops group sentiment, group cohesion, and group loyalty. 
It is probable that feudalism had its origin from the fact 
that "a little society compactly united under a feudal lord 
was greatly stronger for defense or attack than any body 
of kinsmen or co-villagers and than any assembly of volun- 
tary confederates." The Hebrews, after they had settled in 
Canaan, seemed fated to disintegrate into local communities, 
but were welded into one nation by wars. The Greek con- 
federacies resulted from the Persian wars ; and the New 
England colonies became united as a result of the activities 
of King Philip. 

(d) Mutual Aid. This agency is primarily social and 
has been employed as the foundation of all social life. It 
implies a common purpose which forms a controlling rule 
of action. Mutual Aid or "association was the chief cause 
in the development of intelligence." 2 Language, imitation, 
and social experience are the offshoots of mutual aid, and 
2 Chapin, Social Evolution, p. 104. 



76 An Introduction to Philosophy 

it is agreed generally that language is an essential to any 
thinking whatever. Thus as language is enriched by the 
coalescing of peoples, and as social life becomes more and 
more integrated, the intellectual aspects of life become 
quickened, sharpened, and better defined. 

(e) Family Life. "Family life needed more permanence 
than sex attraction could provide, and before the powerful 
sanctions of religion, society, and morals were sufficient to 
secure permanence, it is probable that the property interest 
of the husband was largely effective in building up a family 
life requiring fidelity to the marriage relation on the part of 
the wife." 3 

Parental care is one of the chief incentives to industry, 
one of the great sources in the development of thoughtful- 
ness, foresight, prudence and judgment. The care of the 
young, based on the instincts heretofore discussed, leads to 
all theories of education, from the crudest savage initiation 
ceremonials to the most elaborate philosophy of education. 
The conflict brought about by having children which inter- 
fere with the customary modes of adult behavior brings to 
the foreground the question as to methods of rendering them 
socially fit individuals. The answer to this question has 
provoked as much discussion in the history of the race as 
any other that has ever confronted man, and the solutions 
have varied from time to time and from condition to condi- 
tion, moving from the extremes of exposure and early death 
to elaborate educational and social advantages. It is diffi- 
cult to think of any other problem which has brought so 
forcibly to man's attention the meaning and value of life; 
or which has been a greater stimulus to industry, and to the 
development of sympathy; or to the quickening of the in- 
8 Ethics, Dewey and Tufts, p. 47, 



Agencies in the Advance from Custom to Reflection 77 

tellectual activities for meeting the demands which the child 
imposes. 

(f) Initiation Ceremonials and Other Group Customs. 
The chief value of these from the intellectual standpoint is 
that they bring to consciousness the group ideals. In gen- 
eral, as is well known, group life is a life of custom. There 
are occasions which bring these customs to the focus of con- 
sciousness, they become selected, are attended to. The youth 
when initiated into the mysteries of the group is made ac- 
quainted with the funded experience of that group, of those 
ideals and purposes which the group deems essential to its 
survival. Rigid as is custom it is modified by the council of 
old men and the leaders in order to meet the contingencies 
not originally contemplated by it. The ceremonial brings 
to consciousness that there are features of it which may not 
apply to conditions as they appear at a more recent time, 
and the result is that such a custom is consciously amended 
and enlarged here and abridged there, but all the time as 
rigid an adherence as is possible is given to the old. The 
following of custom among primitive tribes can be under- 
stood best by an example from our own life. Theoretically 
the constitution of the United States is our fundamental 
law, but the interpretations which have been placed upon it 
by our courts, often conflicting, would doubtless not be 
recognized by the original framers. So many novel situa- 
tions have arisen since its adoption, situations, moreover, 
which its framers could never have contemplated, that it is 
often with greatest difficulty that we recognize the original 
intent at all. It serves, however, as a principle of action 
just as do the rituals, but the ways of interpreting and act- 
ing depend upon the conditions and circumstances of the 
immediate present, that is, upon the conflicts which demand 



78 An Introduction to Philosophy 

adjustment. Man of any time and place always reads into 
the intent of his customs or constitutions his own needs, 
purposes, desires, and interests ; and these conflicts of the 
present with the past are a valuable means to revision and 
progress. 

(g) The Behavior of Refractory Members of the Group. 
In general, society both primitive and modern, frowns on any 
radical deviation from the customary modes of doing things. 
It requires time and much effort to get a habit instituted, 
and it is with reluctance that society breaks with an old 
method of solving its problems, whether that method pre- 
vails in religion, science, education, philosophy, or what not. 
But there always have been those who have not been satisfied 
to accept things as merely given, "handed out" by some 
authority, whether that authority be the deity, the king, 
chief, state, school, instructor, or parent. This break with 
the accepted methods of action varies in degree from the 
social outcast and the hardened criminal to the critic of 
the social institutions, and doubters in philosophy, religion, 
and science. Some form of doubt is essential to any prog- 
ress whatever; some form of breaking with the established 
methods of behavior is essential in order to bring to con- 
sciousness the fact that the custom actually prevails ; and 
when the break occurs each side must of necessity state its 
case. 

The whole history of progress might be written under this 
topic provided we treat a refractory member of society in 
the manner we have suggested — as one who breaks in some 
manner with the customary method of doing things. Such 
a history would be an account of the methods by which a 
member of a group, who possesses the instincts which we 
have discussed, becomes an individual; or more generally, 
how a group becomes conscious, reflective, and consequently, 



Agencies in the Advance from Custom to Reflection 79 

hypothetical in methods of problem solving, and experi- 
mental as to its social customs. We should see that the 
breaks or collisions group themselves about the interests of 
the group as opposed to those of the individual; and the 
conflict, between habit and reflection, between custom and 
progress. The interests relating to the former would be 
those more elemental demands which we have considered un- 
der food getting or economic activities, and the racial or re- 
productive interests of life. Those interests relating to the 
latter, while they grow out of the former, represent the more 
intellectual aspects of progress, such as we find in the de- 
velopment of law, religion, science, and philosophy. 

We should find that an agricultural or commercial life 
emphasized individual initiative, thrift, personal sagacity, 
and cunning. As Maine 4 states the case of the joint fami- 
lies of the South Slavonians, "The adventurous and energetic 
member of the brotherhood is always rebelling against its 
natural communism. He goes abroad and makes his fortune 
and as strenuously resists the demands of his relatives to 
bring it into the common account, or perhaps he thinks his 
share of the common stock would be more profitably em- 
ployed by him as capital in a mercantile adventure. In 
either case he becomes a dissatisfied member or a declared 
enemy of the brotherhood." As man becomes able to get on 
by himself he forgets both the Unseen Powers and his 
group, but the latter does not forget the individual but calls 
him to strict account, causing the clash and the resultant 
statement of the issues involved. 

The history of the development of law and justice is a 
history of the struggle between the interests of the refrac- 
tory member and those of the group. The purpose of law 

♦Maine, Early Laws and Customs, p. 264. Quoted by Dewey and 
Tufts, opus cited, p. 60. 



80 An Introduction to Philosophy 

is to make for uniformity of action, and he who steps too 
far aside from this expression of the public conscience, is 
an enemy of the group. From Hammurabi and Moses to 
our own day the problem has been to restrain the individual, 
to hold him in line. If there is a commandment against cov- 
etousness it is because this is against the interests of the 
group as a whole ; if there is a statute prohibiting the issu- 
ance of "watered stock" it is because the interests of the in- 
dividual must be subordinated to those of society. Thus 
the constant clash between the individual or groups of indi- 
viduals and society as a whole affords the setting for a 
clearing up of ideas, for defining interests, aims, purposes, 
and for the effecting of harmonious relations between con- 
flicting parties. 

Religion, too, has had its refractory members. The early 
history of the Christian religion is a history of compro- 
mises of conflicting elements in the air at the time of its in- 
ception — Greek philosophy, oriental mysticism, Jewish re- 
ligion, and primitive Christianity. The establishing of 
church dogmas served the same general purposes in religious 
life as the founding of constitutions, commandments, and 
laws in political life, namely, to mark off the limits within 
which the individual could live and operate. The recal- 
citrant member made it obligatory upon the institution 
clearly to state its premises and the conclusions flowing 
from them. 

Science, philosophy, and all the interests of man, have 
had their Thomases who have served to bring into the lime 
light of consciousness the oppositions to prevailing methods 
and theories, who stimulate to reflective activity, and con- 
sequently to reconstruction. As all life is quickened by the 
doubter and critic, so it is made richer and fuller by the man 
who stands a little above his fellows in the ability to analyze 



Agencies in the Advance from Custom to Reflection 81 

and invent. While the history of progress can not be 
written about the lives of a few great men, it is worth while 
to keep in mind that the great men in history are the pace 
setters of the race, that they set high marks to be reached, 
which, if not attained by many of us, spur us on to greater 
diligence and perseverance. It may be true that the great 
man seizes upon what all dimly perceive and throws this into 
simple statements, into tangible form, so that, when it is be- 
held by the many they immediately acquiesce in it and as- 
sert that they have always held the same opinion, believed 
the same thought, or had in mind the same principle. 

These various agencies which we have discussed are, of 
course, not the only ones that call forth progress, advance 
from custom to reflection, but they serve to illustrate the 
general point, namely, that advance comes about through 
conflict, and that conflict is an inevitable result of the play 
of instincts in diverse physical surroundings. After the 
race has become reflective there are occasions for advance 
and these center around devices for the saving of labor, bet- 
ter methods of communication, and the discovery of new 
principles in science and philosophy ; but the agencies that 
we have discussed are mainly those which compel man to do 
any thinking whatever. We have assumed that when he be- 
gins to think, something new is going to happen, and to in- 
dicate some of the results of this process is the purpose of 
this work. 

REFERENCES 

Baden-Powell, The Land Systems of British India, Vol. 

II; 

Barton, A Sketch of Semitic Origins ; 
Bury, J. B., A History of Freedom of Thought; 
Carpenter, J. E., Comparative Religion; 
Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, Chapter V; 



82 An Introduction to Philosophy 

Ely, R. T., The Evolution of Industrial Society; 
Harrison, J., Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion; 
Kellogg, V. L., Beyond War; 
Kropotkin, Mutual Aid a Factor in Evolution ; 
Maine, Sir H. S., The Early History of Institutions; 
Morgan, L. H., Ancient Society; 
Murray, Four Stages of Greek Religion; 
Ross, E. A., Foundations of Sociology, Chapters VII- 
VIII. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE NATURE OF PRIMITIVE THOUGHT 

1. Introductory. — Before man begins to speculate on the 
facts of his world he has an abundance of practical knowl- 
edge concerning things which come within his experience. 
He knows how to make weapons and houses, he has informa- 
tion concerning the habits of animals and the properties of 
plants, and he has a mass of information concerning what 
later comes to be physics, astronomy, mathematics, and 
medicine. In fact he has acquired a great deal of knowl- 
edge of the empirical variety by the method of trial and er- 
ror. While this is not strictly speaking science, it is the 
stuff out of which science and philosophy arise, for all 
thinking takes its origin in the materials of sense. This 
empirical knowledge is, as a matter of course, connected with 
the life interests of the group : man needs shelter and he be- 
comes a builder; he needs food and he devises methods in the 
nature of bows and arrows, traps and snares, to satisfy these 
demands ; he needs to cross the stream and he learns to build 
bridges ; when he takes to the sea he learns to find his course 
by the stars, and he names the constellations after the ani- 
mals that he knows ; he learns to count, to survey, to experi- 
ment, to measure, to correlate, in response to the needs which 
are his. And the important aspect of it all is that thinking 
never wholly severs its connections with these practical 
needs. Thinking after all is thinging. 

Out of these concrete happenings of man's life grow his 

83 



84 An Introduction to Philosophy 

speculative endeavors. He wants to account for things ; 
the world is a mystery in a great many ways, governed by 
strange laws, it is alive, and can be accounted for on the 
only creative principle man knows, namely, his own ability 
to do things. 

2. Some Occurrences which Provoke Thinking and 
Speculation. — What are some of the happenings which call 
for thinking and for speculation? We remember that think- 
ing in the genuine sense of the term does not take place ex- 
cept when there is something to be solved, some problem to 
be met which can not be adjusted to on the other levels of 
behavior, i.e., on the instinctive and habitual. With this in 
mind we shall ask the question thus : "What are some of the 
happenings in the life of early man that call for explana- 
tions, that can not be adjusted to habitually?" What are 
some of the unusual things? The usual things do not call 
for explanation — the very fact that they are usual, ordi- 
nary, customary, is explanation enough. It is a mark of a 
decidedly higher intellect to take cognizance of the common 
things. For example, it took a Newton to connect the com- 
mon, ordinary happening of an apple falling to the ground 
with the falling of the moon towards the earth. But then, 
a break does come in the habitual, and it is at this point 
that man begins to wonder. His attention is arrested, and 
this means that the matter in question becomes the object 
of reflection ; and it is that set of facts most striking which 
first becomes the subject matter for the sharpening of man's 
wits. 

(a) Birth, Death, and Sickness. These are facts which 
arrest attention and which, therefore, furnish material for 
the operation of the cognitive processes. Among almost if 
not all peoples we see ceremonials connected with these facts, 
as the rites of purification among the Hebrews, or the burial 



The Nature of Primitive Thought 85 

customs among the American Indians. Death, especially, 
has a profound effect on primitive man and on civilized man 
as well. The moment a man dies the impulse of the primitive 
man is to leave him and run. The pallor of death, the cessa- 
tion of action, of breathing, and the cold clammy feel of the 
dead body strike terror to the mind of the nature man. He 
must think of death as the sudden departure from the body 
of that which brought life — a fact which functioned in the 
origin of the soul idea. 

Sickness interferes with the routine of the day, it calls to 
attention the interrupted habits, heightens by contrast their 
value, and leads to speculation concerning its causes. It is 
generally thought to be due to the presence of demons or 
devils, and when these are cast out by the machinations of 
the medicine man the patient returns to normal life activi- 
ties. As one does not fully appreciate liberty and its bless- 
ings until one has undergone some type of confinement, and 
as one does not meditate on it until it is jeopardized, so does 
one not appreciate the benefits and pleasures of being well 
nor does he speculate on the causes of disorders and their 
remedies until he has faced the problem. The old adage, 
"We never miss the water till the well goes dry," illustrates 
the value of the problem in provoking to thought and specu- 
lation. 

Sickness, birth, and death figure in situations which lead, 
in part, to the origin and growth of magic, belief in demons, 
spirits, and souls ; to negative magic, the medicine man, and 
later to more elaborate soul theories which function even in 
present day thinking, to myths concerning the origin and 
destiny of man, and to the profession of the priest, physi- 
cian, and minister. 

(b) Unusual Occurrences in Nature, such as eclipses, 
thunder and lightning, floods, and comets are of interest to 



86 An Introduction to Philosophy 

primitive man. Eclipses have always been a subject of much 
mystery and superstition among men, and many stories are 
invented to account for them. In central Africa, in Aus- 
tralia, and in America, the belief prevails that in an eclipse 
of the sun it is swallowed by a dark spirit ; the changes of 
the moon are connected with the gods, not only in the myth- 
ologies of those mentioned above, but in most mythologies, 
as the Greek, Roman, and Teutonic. The superstitions con- 
nected with comets is well known for even within the memory 
of all are the weird stories of Halley's comet fresh and 
amusing. 

(c) Seasons. The connection of the seasons with seed 
time and harvest has made them the subject of myth and 
ceremonial the world over. Among the Egyptians, and 
Babylonians, and other peoples of western Asia the chief 
ceremonials were vegetation ceremonials which occurred at 
stated seasons. In the east the ceremonials were held at the 
time of the solstices, and the prevalence throughout the east- 
ern world of ceremonials connected with vegetation has led 
some to conclude that these represent the earliest deity 
ceremonials. 

"The idea of changing seasons, of summer and winter, of 
the budding and withering of grain, are naturally associated 
with life and death." Winter, bleak, cold, horrible, re- 
sembles death; spring, joyous, gladsome, buoyant, repre- 
sents life ; and "as lifeless nature is again resuscitated in the 
spring, so will the soul awaken to a bright and joyous ex- 
istence in the future." 

(d) Other Occurrences. We shall not stop to mention 
the numerous occasions for myth in primitive life, for the 
above will indicate the point we wish to impress, that think- 
ing comes out of the unusual, the non-customary. Every- 
thing about which myths have been made are just such oc- 



The Nature of Primitive Thought 87 

currences — and they are many. They have all occasioned 
what we are characterizing as speculative thinking, certainly 
of a low order especially in the cruder myths, but increasing 
as the myth becomes more refined. 

The facts of day and night, the changes in the position 
of the stars, the origin of cultural institutions such as the 
family, the city, the state, language, and religion ; the origin 
of the world, of man, of evil and sin — all this and more, 
primitive man has incorporated in his speculations. 

3. Speculation Growing Out of These Occurrences. — To 
account for the phenomena just considered gives origin to 
speculative thinking. The facts are to be explained, and 
man, possessed of the instinct of curiosity, offers various 
hypotheses to take care of the facts. To state the question 
more clearly, Given the above facts, what explanation will 
satisfy the instinct of curiosity? Almost any tale will do it 
for primitive man does not employ many checks and balances 
in his thinking. But he wants to know how things got 
started, what brings about day and night, what is back of 
the many facts that strike his attention. The answers to 
such questions constitute primitive thought — the philosophy 
and science of the early man. The same phenomena are also 
present with us and set our problems, and it may be that the 
answers we return will appear "primitive" to a later genera- 
tion. 

We shall discuss primitive thought under three general 
headings: (a) Magic, (b) Totemism or Animism, (c) Myth. 

These categories are not exclusive, but they represent 
stages, attitudes, or points of view towards the phenomena 
of nature. We can best understand these attitudes if we say 
that magic represents what we are accustomed to speak of 
as the world viewed from the scientific standpoint ; animism 
as the religious view of the world; and myth as the meta- 



88 An Introduction to Philosophy 

physical standpoint for the regarding of the same prob- 
lems. We know that science, religion, and metaphysics are 
by no means exclusive, but that their fields overlap* — all are 
dealing with the same phenomena with different interests at 
stake. So is it with magic, animism, and myth — they are 
different though related methods of giving some type of ex- 
planation to the facts which arrest man's attention. 

(a) Magic. We may think of magic as devices for the 
control of nature in the interests of the group, and, at a 
later stage in its history, for the interests of the individual 
who practices it. Nature is alive with a mysterious force 
or power which can be controlled if the proper means are 
employed. The medicine man and the witch are persons who 
have connections with the mysterious power, and are able 
to bring happiness or ruin. By contact with the thing or 
power the worshipper secured for himself and the group that 
which made him strong and mighty in battle, fleet of foot, 
cunning, sagacious, a mighty man of valor in the interests 
of group life. Courage, prudence, cunning, swiftness, 
strength, in fact all the "virtues" could be had by eating of 
the flesh or drinking of the blood of such animals as pos- 
sesssed the "force." If a lean woman is to become fat this 
desired result may be brought about, according to the Aus- 
tralian belief, by the simple process of procuring a fat, 
young opossum and giving it to the woman to eat. 

The performance of magical rites often involved an elab- 
orate technique. Spencer and Gillen's elaborate studies of 
the Australian tribes convince one that should the same 
technique be developed along what we are pleased to call 
scientific lines the results for science would be remarkable. 
It is, indeed, from magic that our scientific and religious 
technique derives. "Out of the technique of magic has arisen 
two very different types of technique. One is the technique 



The Nature of Primitive Thought 89 

of science which aims, by the use of delicate and standar- 
dized instruments of observation, measurement and calcula- 
tion, such as fine balances, micrometers, microscopes, micro- 
tomes, dividing engines, statistical tables and algebraic for- 
mulas, at acquiring an accurate and economic intellectual 
control or shorthand formulation of the order of nature. 
The other is religious technique, which aims, by its symbols, 
rites, prayers, et cetera, at bringing into right relation with 
one another the human group and individual on the one 
hand, and the Supreme Power, who is the custodian and dis- 
penser of the values on participation in which depend indi- 
vidual and social well-being, on the other hand. In brief, re- 
ligious technique aims at vital, moral and spiritual control. 
Both these techniques have grown out of primitive magic 
which was primitive science and religion in one. Religion 
and magic became differentiated as religion came to embody 
more clearly and rationally the organization of human 
values into a coherent and socialized whole, and thus to fur- 
nish explicitly the motives and sanctions for a higher social- 
moral order; while magic, incapable of developing into an 
agency of social moralization and rational spiritualization, 
remained merely a technique for the satisfaction of isolated 
interests and irrational passions." * We note that among 
the Australians a differentiation is taking place between the 
"layman" and the "priest" in the use of magic, a fact which 
is significant for among all culture peoples this differentia- 
tion has taken place, resulting in classes, vocations, and 
professions. Certain ceremonials may be performed by the 
Australian layman just as the layman in religion among us 
may perform certain religious rites, but those which involve 
more serious matters must be presided over among us by 
the man whose life is "dedicated to the cause," and among 
Brighton, J. A., The Field of Philosophy, pp. 12-13. 



90 An Introduction to Philosophy 

them by the sorcerer and medicine man. Among the Arunta 
tribe of Australia a man who wishes to use any of the sacred 
or magical sticks, the takvla, for example, goes away by 
himself to some isolated spot in the bush, "and, placing the 
stick or bone in the ground, crouches down over it mutter- 
ing the following, or some similar curse as he does so : 'May 
your heart be rent asunder,' or 'May your backbone be 
split open and your ribs torn asunder,' or 'May your head 
and throat be split open !' " When he has done this he re- 
turns to the camp leaving the stick stuck in the ground, but 
later he brings it back near the camp and hides it. Then 
some evening after it has grown dark, he removes the magic 
stick from its hiding place, creeps quietly up until he is close 
enough to recognize his victim. He then stoops down, turns 
his back towards the camp, takes the stick in both hands, 
jerks it repeatedly over his shoulder, and mutters again the 
same curse. The magic goes from the point of the stick 
straight to the man, who soon sickens and dies unless his 
life can be saved by a medicine man who can discover and 
remove the evil magic. Sickness and death are thought of 
as the result of evil magic, of the entering into the body of 
the victim some of the mysterious force or power which 
abounds in nature; and again the technique both for the 
bringing of the evil magic into the body and for the re- 
moving by counter magic is often intricate and elaborate. 
The theory involved in sickness and death, that is, magic, 
is doubtless largely unconscious, as among us we are often 
democrats, methodists, and what not because of custom. 
But it is certain that at some point in the history of a 
people, especially among the cultural races, the acts which 
are performed involve reasons, theories, and hypotheses. 

The practice and belief in magic involve a principle 
closely related to what we call the "law of causation." 



The Nature of Primitive Thought 91 

Primitive man speaks of events as involving spirits, magic, 
mysterious forces or powers ; but modern man attempts to 
account for the same facts on a more mechanical basis, and 
speaks of "the universal law of causation." When David 
Hume wrote so strongly against "cause," he may have had 
in mind such an idea of it as the primitive man possesses — 
something which can be seen to pass from one thing to 
another. In the progress from magic to science we see a 
movement which may be described as involving three stages, 
namely, first, that which attributes to events a mysterious 
force which brings them to pass — a conception which pre- 
vails not only in primitive society but also in our own. Ig- 
norant people stand aghast at hypnotism, have great re- 
gard for "personal magnetism and will power" ; wear a rab- 
bit's foot for good luck, plant potatoes only at certain times 
of the moon, act on the suggestions of the fortune teller, 
believe in mind reading, take "magic" medicines, eat wonder- 
working foods, refuse to occupy room number thirteen, be- 
lieve that "the whistling girl and the crowing hen, never 
come to a very good end," and numerous other suspicions 
based on that "mysterious force." The second stage is rep- 
resented in that type of thinking which speaks of a Univer- 
sal Law of Causation, Force, Energy, Matter, and such con- 
cepts as have had wonderful influence in scientific and philo- 
sophical discussions in recent times. In the third stage of 
development in which we now live and in terms of which we 
think today we believe that such a concept as the Universal 
Law of Causation is of no value in determining any particu- 
lar cause but that if we speak of cause at all we should speak 
in the plural and not in the singular — we should talk of 
causes, the particular job in each case being to determine 
the conditions under which a given occurrence may be ex- 
pected to repeat itself. 



9# An Introduction to Philosophy 

(b) Animism. The common view among primitive man 
is that everything seems to be alive, and that most things 
possess a soul. To be alive means for the primitive thinker 
to be able to move, to change, to have offspring, et cetera. 
These being the criteria of life, trees, sun, moon, stars, 
rivers, ocean, plants, and animals are all alive and may pos- 
sess a soul; and to be alive is a sufficient explanation of all 
movement, motion and change. Things have a soul also, 
a second person, or double which can talk, walk, wear cloth- 
ing and do generally what the first person is able to do. 
But, in addition, it possesses powers which the first person 
does not possess; it can go through objects which the body 
can not penetrate ; it can move with greater rapidity ; and 
is able to take on various shapes and forms which the body 
can not do. This latter ability of the soul is due to its 
nature, since it is less tangible, not so solid, but is like 
breath or air. 

It is not to be understood that primitive man draws a 
sharp distinction between spirit and object, between soul 
and body, for certainly he has no clear cut idea of soul or 
spirit as would make it possible to draw such a distinction. 
It is more in keeping with sound psychology to assert that 
object and spirit are non-differentiated — that the object 
is both the object and the spirit; and that whatever strikes 
the attention forcibly, what interrupts a purpose or thwarts 
a desire is "animated." In this simple way a world of "live" 
objects is built up, not only men and animals being alive, 
but, as Herbert Spencer has shown, plants and inorganic 
objects, or as Ratzel has said, "The words spirit and soul 
indicate generally any expression of life," and the criteria 
of life is movement, change, power to thwart purpose, and 
to arrest attention. Things out of the ordinary, such as 
strange trees, peculiar stones, white buffaloes, and night 



The Nature of Primitive Thought 93 

birds are all "animated." Diseases such as delirium and 
epilepsy (the sacred disease) are the work of spirits. 

At a later stage in primitive thought there is a dualism 
between spirit and object, based possibly on a distinction 
between the normal and the abnormal, the customary mode 
of behavior of a thing in contrast with its usual behavior; 
but for primitive man there is never an absolute break be- 
tween spirit and object. It is a well known fact that even 
among highly cultured peoples the belief in animism prevails 
generally. Even the scholar may kick the chair against 
which he accidentally stumbles, and derive great satisfac- 
tion from thus "getting even" with the perverse chair. 

In one of its forms, almost too elaborate to be recognized, 
animism exists as the greatest achievement of an intellectual 
nature that man had yet made — the idealistic philosophy, 
the attempt to show that the particular object or fact par- 
takes of, reflects, or participates in, the universal ; the uni- 
versal, moreover, which the Fijians call Kalou; the Melane- 
sians, Mana; the Zulus, Inkosi; the Omahas, Wakandi; the 
Algonquins, Manitou. 

Thus primitive man accounts for his world, if we may 
call it an explanation, on the principle that it is alive and 
has a soul. To be alive means that to go further into de- 
tails is useless — that is sufficient; just as it was useless to 
inquire further as to why a stone falls to the earth when it 
was explained that "that is its nature" ; or why water rises 
in a tube when the fact was accounted for on the theory that 
"nature abhors a vacuum" ; or why opium makes one go to 
sleep when the theory was, and the explanation as well, that 
"it possesses dormant powers" ; or how the earth is held in 
place when it is evident that a man has it on his shoulders. 
The latter explanation was carried a step further, however, 
under the inquisitive and critical questioning of the nature 



94t An Introduction to Philosophy 

man who had his scruples as to what the man who held up 
the earth stood on, but his curiosity was satisfied when it 
was explained that the man stood on the back of a large 
turtle. 

Certain of the most striking of spirit-objects become the 
centers about which ceremonials group themselves ; and these 
are the life interests of the group. As the striking occur- 
rences give origin to spirits so are these spirits in turn ap- 
pealed to, propitiated, charmed, worshipped, sacrificed to, 
and bribed. Thus social life expressed in ceremonial, reli- 
gion, magic, myth, and in what later become science, art 
and philosophy, is centered about those facts that arrest 
attention ; and the facts that arrest attention are the cen- 
tral life interests of the group, those factors essential to 
group survival. 

(c) Myth, which involves both animism and magic, is 
more directly concerned with explanation. It appears as a 
higher stage of thinking, and is most closely associated with 
our science and philosophy. We do not want to be under- 
stood as saying that animism, magic, and myth have ceased 
to exist in present day thinking for such is by no means 
the case ; but there was a time when these methods were 
characteristic, accepted, prevalent. At a lower stage of 
myth making we see the crudest attempts at accounting 
for things, attempts which, quite probably, involve the mini- 
mum of conscious reflection. 2 For example, among the Al- 
gonquin Indians the words for dawn and giant rabbit were 
similar. The myth of the origin of light, consequently, 
centers about the giant rabbit. Myth formation growing 
out of the similarities between words is common and has 
been considered fundamental in the origin of all myths. 

Such a foundation for myths involves the minimum of 
* Wundt, Elements of Folk Psychology, p. 414. 



The Nature of Primitive Thought 95 

conscious reflection, being a simple case of analogy; but 
the great mythologies of ancient peoples are more directly 
conscious, and, in fact, are hypotheses invented to account 
for the facts of experience ; but "primitive myth accepts the 
world as given. The origin of the world order as a whole 
still lies beyond its field of inquiry." 

In addition to the nature and purpose of myth as pre- 
sented and stated above — that which emphasizes the influ- 
ence of language — it is worth while to state briefly charac- 
teristic opinions of those who have given the question care- 
ful consideration. Spencer believes myth to be distorted 
stories of remote ancestors; Frazer regards them as at- 
tempts to explain the facts which arrested man's attention 
— the facts of nature and the origin of man; Wundt be- 
lieves that myth includes science and religion, that it regu- 
lated private and public life. We suggest that primitive 
myth perhaps arose unconsciously due to striking events in 
man's experience, that man did not consciously set out to 
explain events and phenomena, but expressed the first theory 
that the facts suggested ; for it is a psychological fact that 
anything that arrests attention suggests something that is 
not present, points to a possible solution, or course of ac- 
tion, and indicates a method of interpretation which, in 
this case, is the myth. But at a later period, the myth is 
actually a conscious attempt to give an explanation of the 
facts of experience. 

Myths center about three important facts of man's ex- 
perience, namely, the world he lives in, man himself, espe- 
cially his origin and destiny, and finally, the origin of cul- 
ture of social life. The first type of myth we call the cosmo- 
gonic; the second, anthropogenic; and the third, myths of 
heroes. 

Of cosmogonic myths we are possibly best acquainted 



96 An Introduction to Philosophy's 

with those of the Hebrews. The simple though direct state- 
ment is made that "in the beginning God created the heav- 
ens and the earth." Among other peoples the explanation is 
based on the creative powers of man and woman — the phe- 
nomena of nature being the result of a male and a female 
principle. This method of interpretation is based on the 
psychological facts involved in the perception of an object, 
namely, that a thing is always perceived in terms of the 
experience of the percipient. Those explanations based on 
the activity of two principles such as Love and Hate, Light 
and Darkness, are reflections from the notion of the origin 
of things through the sexes. 

Two conceptions occupy a prominent place in the cos- 
mogonies of cultural peoples. The first is that the crea- 
tion of the world was preceded by chaos, a terrifying abyss 
in Greek mythology or a world-sea encompassing the earth 
as in the Babylonian statement of creation. Terrible de- 
mons exist in chaos and are, in Greek mythology, the chil- 
dren of chaos. The other conception present in creation 
myths of cultural peoples are the accounts of the battles of 
the gods. Here are pictured giant struggles between good 
gods and evil ones, the former finally winning out, and 
bringing order out of chaos. The evil gods are cast out but 
are not wholly crushed, and generally remain as the source 
of evil. Thus, the devil, a fallen angel, "Satan than whom 
none higher sat was once an angel of light," but now he goes 
about "as a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour." 

The anthropogenic myths are found among all peoples. 
They vary according to the culture of the people who pos- 
sess them, but all give some kind of explanation of the origin 
of man, and venture theories as to his destiny. Spencer 
and Gillen 3 say that all the Northern Tribes of Central 
3 Opus cited, pp. 494 ff. 



The Nature of Primitive Thought 97 

Australia have explanations of the creation. These ex- 
planations, as a matter of course, are crude but they answer 
the demands of the nature man. The living men came from 
individuals who lived in the "Alcheringa," the far past, and 
the ancestors possessed powers superior to any of the pres- 
ent members of the group. But if a native is asked, "Where 
did the men of the Alcheringa come from?" he will laugh at 
the absurdity of such a question, as many among us would 
do if asked, "Where did God come from?" These tribes 
believe that all people, good and bad alike, for they have 
no idea of a future life of happiness or misery based on 
good or evil conduct, return to the spot formerly occupied 
in the Alcheringa, and that they may again undergo re- 
incarnation. 

The Hebrew statement of man's creation is familiar to 
all — he was created in the image of God, and there was 
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life. Woman was 
created from a part of the body of man, a statement which 
is suggestive as illustrating the social position of woman at 
this period of Hebrew history. But how. man comes into 
the world and where he goes at death, i.e., birth and death 
problems, have always furnished a fertile topic for the im- 
agination of man. 

The culture and hero myths have to do with accounting 
for the facts of social life and organization, for example, 
the origin of the state, the city, of language, of number, et 
cetera. The hero is not merely the "heroic" hero, but is 
also the hero that figures in the spiritual and social realm, 
as the founder of society, the originator of religion, or the 
giver of some valuable art. Past social achievements are 
regarded as the deeds of great heroes, and in some cases, of 
the gods themselves. The hero is usually an ideal created 
in the image of man and reflects in a heightened degree the 



98 An Introduction to Philosophy 

ideals, aspirations, and virtues of a people. Hero myths 
must necessarily come late in the development of a people. 
It is not until much has been accomplished that the mind 
attempts to account for it. Social and political life, that is, 
must be a factor in experience before they can be the sub- 
ject matter of myth. There must have existed a differenti- 
ation of vocations, family life, a legal system, religion, the 
arts, and all the complexities even of primitive society, in 
order to give the myth of this type a footing. And the 
method of explaining these facts give origin to what we call 
the hero saga. 

Myth, as is evident, deals with the facts in the experience 
of the people who project them; and the similarity of myth 
is due to the similarity in the problems which different 
peoples have had to meet. Common problems lead to com- 
mon solutions, varying according to the local conditions 
surrounding them. Science and philosophy are but more 
thoughtful ways of attempting to solve the same problems. 
Out of magic has grown the technique by which we control 
the conditions in testing our "myths," or hypotheses. Prim- 
itive man has no methods of control and his theories are 
limited only by the fertility of his imagination. Primitive 
man controls mana by sacrifices and by mysterious cere- 
monials ; modern man, by determining experimentally the 
relation between facts, and acting in accordance with the 
results of such research. 

4. Some Characteristics of Primitive Thinking. — There 
are certain liabilities to error which we should examine 
briefly. We have suggested that primitive thinking has 
no methods of control and where this is the case the pos- 
sibilities for error are greatly increased. 

There is a method in primitive thought which we employ 
but we are more careful in its use. This is the method of 



The Nature of Primitive Thought 99 

analogy — something is like something else, therefore the two 
are related. Such a conception or method leads to associa- 
tions of the kind we mentioned in our treatment of myth, 
such, for example as the relation between the giant rabbit 
and dawn; or to the conclusion that whatever moves has 
life and a soul, and is moved by purposes and desires simi- 
lar to those of man. 

Early tradition tells us of an organization of society on 
the basis of the number twelve, 4 a mode of organization 
originating probably among the Babylonians, and regarded 
by them as sacred, since the heavens displayed twelve 
"signs." Since this was a divine number, it was believed 
that a state organized into twelve parts or departments 
would also share in sacredness or the magic of the divine 
powers. "To the Babylonian, the sky furnished a revela- 
tion of the laws that should govern terrestrial life." The 
sacredness of the number twelve is expressed in the twelve 
legendary tribes of Israel ; in the twelve gods of Greece ; and 
in the twelve Apostles. It is also seen in Greek society which 
was originally composed of twelve divisions, there being four 
clans, each of which was composed of three phratries. 

Another aspect of analogical reasoning is that which pro- 
jects the prevailing social organization into the speculative 
thinking of a people. Mention was made earlier of the fact 
that those who live under a monarchical form of government 
project this form of organization into their religious specu- 
lations, forming a heaven after the fashion of their political 
society. One of the best examples of this is seen in the re- 
ligious conceptions which prevail among us to this very 
day. Our religious ideas are to a great extent taken over 
from the political organization which was current when 
Christianity was getting its footing. Christ is king and lord 
4 Wundt, Opus cit., pp. 304 ff. 



100 An Introduction to Philosophy 

of all. "Christ our royal master leads against the foe," and 
the many examples which will occur to any one who runs 
over the church hymns or thinks over the various cere- 
monials of the churches, will convince one that our religious 
life borrows its content largely from monarchy and seldom 
if ever makes a place for a type of social and political life 
which prevails among us today, that is, democracy. 
"Europe was organized through feudalism and the suprem- 
acy of the pope like a vast ladder reaching from the pope 
to the serf ; and correspondingly the world was conceived as 
a similar ladder reaching from God through the angels and 
the church down to man and to nature below man." 

Primitive thinking is prone to commit the fallacy known 
in logic as "post hoc, ergo propter hoc" — because some- 
thing comes before something else, the former is the cause 
of the latter ; or because something comes immediately after 
something else, the former is the effect of the latter. A 
great deal of "knowledge" has been accumulated in this way. 
Our common superstitions are generally the result of this 
fallacy, going all the way from bad luck which follows upon 
the breaking of a mirror to the dire effects of planting po- 
tatoes in the wrong time of the moon — these and the numer- 
ous others are due, as Mill says, to the "propensity to gen- 
eralize." 

Bacon spoke wisely of the fallacies in reasoning which 
are common among highly civilized man. He called them 
"Idols" — the Idol of the Tribe, or the tendency to neglect 
negative instances, e. g., the failure to take account of the 
cases in which bad luck did not come to one who broke a 
mirror ; the Idols of the Cave, the tendency to view things in 
the light of our own interests, or to use Bacon's words, 
"the understanding of men resembles not a dry light, but 
admits of some tincture of the passions and will" ; and the 



The Nature of Primitive Thought 101 

Idols of the Theatre, errors into which one may be led by 
the spirit of the times. These are fallacies to which, in 
addition to those which we have mentioned, man is sus- 
ceptible. 

And if highly cultured men are subject to these fallacies, 
how much more so must be primitive man! 

REFERENCES 

Ames, E. S., The Psychology of Religious Experience, VI; 

Carpenter, J. E., Comparative Religion, Chapters 3-4; 

Clodd, Story of Primitive Man; 

Cooley, C Ho, Human Nature and the Social Order, pp. 
146 ff. ; 

Crawley, Ernest, The Mystic Rose; 

Dewey, John, Interpretation of Savage Mind, Psychologi- 
cal Review, 1902 ; 

Frazer, J. G., Some Primitive Theories of the Origin of 
Man, in Darwin and Modern Science, edited by Seward ; 

Hose and McDougall, The Pagan Tribes of Borneo, Chap- 
ter XVII; 

Joly, Man before Metals ; 

Leighton, J. A., The Field of Philosophy, Chapters 2-3 ; 

Marrett, R. R., Pre-Animistic Religion, in Folk-Lore, 
1900; 

Marvin, History of European Philosophy, Chapter IV ; 

Mason, Woman's Share in Primitive Culture ; 

Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I; 

Spencer, Herbert, Sociology, Vol. I, Chapters 20-24; 

Starr, F., Some First Steps in Human Progress; 

Thomas, W. I., Source Book, Parts II, VI, VII; 

Tylor, Primitive Culture, Vol. II, on Animism; 

Wundt, Folk Psychology. 



CHAPTER VII 

ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 

1. Introductory. — The problems of science and philoso- 
phy arise at the point at which man substitutes for super- 
natural causes and forces, natural ones ; at the point at 
which he begins to attribute change, and the various phe- 
nomena accounted for by primitive man on the ground of 
myth, magic, and animism, to causes which can be more 
easily submitted to verification. Primitive thought lacks one 
essential that we attribute to philosophy, namely, the con- 
scious attempt to interpret all the facts of experience in 
terms of some principle. The universe for philosophy must 
be an ordered universe, one which displays a principle. Thus 
philosophy attempts to construct a consistent world view 
i which satisfies the demands of the head and which provides 

ia place for the longings of the heart. And, as we shall see 
later, the conflict between the "head" and the "heart" has 
been the bitterest one in all philosophy. 

Primitive man did much thinking as is evident from the 
great mythologies, but his speculation was uncontrolled ; he 
had no means of weighing, measuring, balancing, and he 
constructed his theories more to please and satisfy the 
fancy than to satisfy a deep and lasting intellectual de- 
mand. When what we are pleased to call philosophy arose 
among the Greeks, they, too, possessed no methods of con- 
trolling their thinking; but they made the great step men- 

102 



Origin of the Problems of Philosophy 103 

tioned above, namely, that of attempting to account for 
facts in terms of natural principles. This is one of the 
reasons why Greece has been called "that point of light in 
history"; and so thoroughly did they map out the course of 
philosophy that the poet Shelley says, "We are all Greeks. 
Our laws, our literature, our religion, our art, have their 
roots in Greece" ; or as Sir Henry Maine says, "Except the 
blind forces of nature, there is nothing that moves in the 
world today that is not Greek in origin." 

We can, consequently, give a good deal of attention to 
Greek speculation and to the conditions out of which it 
arose for it is true that Greek thinkers have set the problems 
of philosophy, and have largely determined the terminology 
we employ. 

2. Conditions Which Led to the Origin of Philosophy. — 
We have now to inquire into the specific agencies which were 
operative in Greece for the bringing to the front of prob- 
lems of science and philosophy. We have considered various 
agencies which make for reflective thinking, and our purpose 
is now to acquaint ourselves with the specific agencies in 
Greek life which figured in making universal the judgment 
that Greece is the cradle of philosophy. Things do not just 
happen, they do not merely grow, but there are always 
conditions present which favor or hinder development. We 
do not attempt to tell why corn grows, yet we know it does, 
but we can state conditions which make for a healthy crop ; 
neither do we attempt to state why man grows, why he de- 
velops from savagery to civilization, and why he thinks one 
state of society better than another, but we can state condi- 
tions which favor or retard development. We can state 
that progress comes about through conflict, but we are not 
attempting to state why it is better to win in the conflict 



104 An Introduction to Philosophy 

than to lose, why it is better to make progress than to stand 
still. If one wants to believe the latter, there is apparently 
no way of convincing him to the contrary, 
(a) Physical Factors: 

(1) Greece is a peninsula, and the sea is easy of access, 
a sea, moreover, which is full of islands. 

(2) Greece has a temperate climate, much more so than 
the river valleys of Asia. 

(3) Greece is broken into a great number of small dis- 
tricts, making it possible for different peoples to develop 
more or less different ideals. 

(4) The Mediterranean made it possible for the Greeks 
to develop without serious interference on the part of the 
Asiatics for it was impossible to transport large armies. 

(5) Greece faced the civilized east — there are but three 
or four harbors on the west coast. 

(6) The landscape of Greece is upon a moderate scale 
— no great mountains, no desolate deserts. Nature in 
Greece is not terrible. 

Let us inquire into some of the results of such a physical 
environment. The fact that the sea is easy of access and 
that it abounds in islands made it possible for the Greeks 
to find means of expression of the instinct of curiosity, and 
for the growth of trade and commerce. A tendency in man 
which finds an adequate means of expressing itself in action 
tends to be "stamped in," as the comparative psychologists 
say. Thus fortified, made strong by use, the instinct, when 
other stimuli are presented, is expressed with added vigor. 
Moreover, the instinct itself is made more sensitive to 
stimuli, the limen is lowered, so that a stimulus which would 
fail to excite the organism under other conditions will meet 
with a response such that great results are achieved in dif- 
ferent fields of interest. 



Origin of the Problems of Philosophy 105 

The possibilities of a commercial life are a wonderful in- 
centive to growth. The activities essential to a successful 
commercial career are such as to develop keenness and alert- 
ness, and a well-wrought program of action; but the influ- 
ence of such a career in rubbing off the rough edges of iso- 
lation and backwardness are too well known to demand 
comment. 

A temperate climate demands work, and man owes more 
to the fact that he has had to work than is generally recog- 
nized. The natural products of Greece were greater than 
those of the Asiatic countries. This led to greater variety 
in occupations, and we have suggested in another connection 
the importance of occupations in shaping the type of mental 
life of a people or class. Men form the habit of industry as 
they form other habits, and the conditions for habit forma- 
tion must always be present. Once the habit of industry is 
formed through work made necessary by the very conditions 
of a country, this attitude or habit is readily brought to 
bear on other situations, for example, the intellectual activ- 
ities of man. The industrious nation commercially may per- 
haps become the industrious nation intellectually. 

The natural features of Greece divide it into many dis- 
tinct parts — about twenty in all. The natural barriers pre- 
vented one portion from absorbing the other, although they 
were not so powerful as to prevent intercourse and rivalry 
in various lines of interest. The diversity of products of 
the sections of Greece made for intercourse and hence the 
breaking down of the tendency to become conservative and 
superstitious due to isolation. The mountain slopes in 
Attica grew grapes and olives so that the Atticans could 
well become the providers of these commodities to others 
who could not produce them. On the other hand, Attica 
could not produce grain. This fact led to trade, to the 



106 An Introduction to Philosophy 

bringing home of new ideas and customs, to the breakdown 
of that conservatism that prevails in a purely agricultural 
nation, and to the sharpening of the instinct of curiosity, 
for the seafaring Greeks "were always seeking some new 
thing." 

Persia was able to subdue the Asiatic Greeks almost with- 
out a blow but she failed to conquer the European Greeks 
even by supreme effort. The Mediterranean made it pos- 
sible for the Greeks to develop independent of Asiatic inter- 
ference, although the Greeks were able to gain the best ele- 
ments of Asiatic culture, due to commerce. Where the same 
environmental factors as are found in Greece were present 
in other parts, as in west Syria or parts of Asia Minor, 
civilization began with the same characteristics as we find 
in Greece; but in the countries mentioned the river empires 
impressed their culture on that of western Syria and Asia 
Minor. While the Mediterranean made travel less difficult, 
resulting in the mixing of peoples, that essential to prog- 
ress, it at the same time prevented the imposition by force 
of Asiatic culture on the Greek districts. 

The fact that Greece faced the east made it possible for 
her to carry on her traffic with the eastern countries and 
prevented entrance by the barbarians on the west coast. On 
the side towards Italy, Greece is a coast of cliff and marsh, 
with but a few good harbors. There was that security 
from invasion from both directions — from the east and 
from the west — due to the beneficence of nature ; so that 
the Greek genius was able to find other means of expres- 
sion. 

Greek landscape is moderate — no great deserts to pro- 
duce the effect of monotony and homogeneity, no great 
mountains to awe the mind, no terrible earthquakes to strike 



Origin of the Problems of Philosophy 107 

terror to the imagination, and no destructive floods to ap- 
pall the mind, and to discourage a sea-faring life. We re- 
member that it has been suggested that monotheism tends 
to prevail in desert countries, and that the mind is over- 
awed by the phenomena of nature in others, so that no at- 
tempt is made to explain or to understand, but that man, in 
mute submission, bows before them. His attitude is one of 
prayer, faith, mysticism ; but when nature is less compelling 
the mind of man seeks explanations. "Oriental despotism 
gives way to Greek freedom, Oriental submission to tradi- 
tion, and custom was replaced by fearless inquiry and orig- 
inality." Moderation and variety in natural phenomena 
must be influential in shaping the many sided genius of a 
people. The Greeks developed a love for harmony and pro- 
portion ; moderation became the ideal of virtue ; temperance 
and the mean figure constantly in their ethics; and they 
employ the same word for good and beautiful. 

(b) Social Factors. The Greeks are no longer con- 
sidered a "young" people. Before the remarkable researches 
which began about 1870, the chief of which has been since 
1900, it was the custom to stand in amazement at the ra- 
pidity of the rise of Greek civilization. We have since 
learned, however, that "obscure millenniums preceded the 
sudden bloom." 

The "xEgean civilization" spread along the coasts and 
islands of the Mediterranean at various points from Cyprus 
to Sardinia. This is the civilization of the slender, short, 
dark skinned people of southern Europe, and dates from 
about 3500 B. C. to 1200 B. C. This culture was not bor- 
rowed but was native. Steady progress appears from rough 
stone implements and rude carvings up to magnificent 
bronze work and highly developed art. This civilization, 



108 An Introduction to Philosophy 

especially that in Crete, was destroyed by a series of bar- 
barian invasions, assisted probably by the oppressed native 
inhabitants. 

Between 1500 and 1200 B. C, a remarkable change took 
place in Greece. This period marks the coming of the 
Homeric Greeks, the Achseans. They differ greatly from 
the others both physically and in social customs. Homer's 
Greeks are tall, fair, of yellow hair, and blue eyes. They 
burn their dead, worship a sun god, use iron swords, feast 
all night on roast oxen, and are vigorous in all warlike ac- 
tivities. The Achseans imposed their language and cus- 
toms upon the Cretans and Myceneans, and the customs 
blended more readily than the races. The unit of society was 
the clan presided over by a clan elder. The ties which 
bound the clan together were kinship and worship. Clans 
united into tribes, the leading clan elder becoming king of 
the tribe and its priest. Originally a tribe dwelt in several 
clan villages in the valleys around some hill. On the hilltop 
was the common worship place. In hilly Greece many of 
these citadels grew near together, causing a still further 
welding together of the people. Separate citadels would be 
torn down, one large one constructed, so that a city re- 
sulted. As clans federated into tribes so did tribes federate 
into cities or city states. 

The city had three political elements, king, council, and 
popular assembly — the germs of later monarchy, aristoc- 
racy, and democracy. The king was leader in war, judge 
in peace, and priest at all times ; the chiefs were the clan 
elders and members of the king's family; the assembly was 
made up of free men who had at first but little to do other 
than to listen to what the king and the chiefs had already 
planned. But even the assembly had to be persuaded — it 
could not be ordered. Homer gives an interesting picture of 



Origin of the Problems of Philosophy 109 

a free man who even opposed the king. "Theristes, uncon- 
trolled of speech, whose mind was full of words wherewith 
to strive against the chiefs — hateful was he to Achilles 
above all, and to Odysseus, for them he was wont to revile. 
But now with shrill shout he poured forth his upbraidings 
even upon goodly Agamemnon." 

The third great period of Greek history is marked by the 
Dorian invasion which began about 1000 B. C. The in- 
vaders introduced the use of heavy-armed infantry, with 
long spears, in regular array and close ranks. They settled 
in the Peloponnesus, a district which had been the center of 
Mycenaean and Achaean glory. But both invaders and for- 
mer inhabitants lost their lead in culture, and when civiliza- 
tion took a start in about 900 B. C, it arose in new centers 
— in Attica and in Asia Minor. Greek life bloomed again 
about 650 B. C. 

An important social fact is that the Greeks came to think 
that all Hellenes were of one race. The forces which mainly 
made for the unity of feeling were language, literature, and 
the Olympian religion. The likeness in language made it 
possible for a common literature to prevail, so that Homer 
was sung everywhere — a fact which tended greatly towards 
social solidarity. The poets, moreover, invented a system 
of relationship which in mythological garb had much to do 
with uniting the people. Helen, so the poets said, had three 
sons, iEolus, Dorus, and Xunthus. Xunthus became the 
father of Achaeus and Ion. ^Eolus, Dorus, Achaeus and Ion 
were the ancestors of all Hellenes — the JEolians, the Do- 
rians, the Achaeans, and the Ionians. 1 A common language 
and literature, a common ancestry, and a common religion 
were powerful factors in giving solidity to Greek society. 

Between 1000 and 500 B. C, the kings disappeared from 
*Cf. with the discussion of culture myths, Ch. VI. 



110 An Introduction to Philosophy 

all except two of the Greek cities, and the government came 
into the hands of the nobles. The next struggle politically 
was that between the few and the many, between the nobles 
and the masses. The tyrants, whose day approximately 
was between 750 and 500 B. C, then arose as the champions 
of the many, and thus the way was paved for democracy. 

Very briefly we have sketched the social conditions of the 
Greeks down to about 600 B. C, the time when the prob- 
lems of speculative thinking began to arise. Our question 
now is, what is the relation between that social background 
and philosophy? The survey indicates that Greek civiliza- 
tion is old, that time enough had elapsed for characteristic 
traits to develop, for the environment to have become oper- 
ative in the development of traits, for wars to lend their 
contribution as agencies of progress, for commerce to de- 
velop, for governments to be founded and overthrown. The 
fact that a large number of districts each with its clan 
elder consolidated into a city led naturally to a more liberal 
form of government for each clan elder who became a noble 
or chief would be guided somewhat by the desires and in- 
terests of his own people. 

The great period of breakdown due to invasions fur- 
nished the setting for the weeding out of unsuccessful modes 
of action along the line of warfare and such other activi- 
ties as would be engaged in by a people of varied interests 
as were the Greeks. One will readily notice that all through 
the social development the Greeks have been independent. 
They were always suspicious of authority, for even in Tro- 
jan days Theristes could "pour forth his upbraidings even 
upon goodly Agamemnon." Then the fact that all Hellenes 
came from a common ancestor created a feeling of brother- 
hood and democracy. Kings were overthrown, oligarchies 
were superseded, and the people ruled. Such freedom in 



Origin of the Problems of Philosophy 111 

political action could not but be reflected in other types of 
interest, and consequently, we find the Greek thinkers attack- 
ing fearlessly any problems. The field was indeed ripe for 
the problems of philosophy. 

3. Greek Religion. — Before we consider the problems of 
philosophy and science which arose in Greek life we shall 
consider briefly the religious speculations of the country 
which is the father of science and philosophy. It is out of 
a religious matrix that philosophy immediately developed. 
It will be recalled that there was a native population of 
great antiquity in Greece and in the islands about. This 
people had a religion of mysticism which was primarily in- 
terested in the soul. When the barbarians came from the 
north they brought with them their religion which was a 
reflection of their aggressive nature. We have, therefore, 
two tendencies in the religious experience of the Greeks, 
which have figured largely in later developments not 
only of Greek thought but of all thought as well. We may 
call these two tendencies the mystical and the intellectual. 
At a somewhat later period of Greek thought, and before 
the origin of purely scientific problems, the old folk religion, 
that which flourished before the coming of the barbarians, 
became identified with the cults of Dionysus and of Orpheus ; 
while the religion of the invaders, accounts of which we 
have from the Homeric poems, became the Olympic religion. 

The Orphic tendency, the religion of mystery, is pri- 
marily other-worldly. The chief interest centers about 
man's soul, its fall, and its return to its former celestial 
abode. The soul has come from afar, "trailing clouds of 
glory," was once pure and unsullied ; but now it has a cor- 
rupt nature, and the business of man here below is to get 
back to the realms of the blest. The soul makes its eternal 
rounds, from the dead to the living, from the living to the 



112 An Introduction to Philosophy 

dead, now in man, now in a lower animal, and finally in due 
season it reaches the end of its journey only, it appears, to 
start all over again in the endless, eternal whirl of time. As 
Greek thought developed, the Orphic religion or tendency 
found expression in the Pythagorean philosophy which 
flourished in the west. While this philosophy in becoming 
scientific made valuable contributions to mathematics, as- 
tronomy, and biology it never lost interest in the mystical 
and religious. When we reach the great systematic philos- 
ophers we find the Orphic current running through their 
thinking. Especially is this true of Plato who was power- 
fully influenced by the Pythagoreans, and whose soul doc- 
trine reaches far back into the ages before the arrival of 
the barbarians from the north with their more rationalistic 
religion. 

The Olympic religion, on the other hand, was the fore- 
runner of the scientific and practical aspect of Greek life 
and thought. This is the religion which we have learned 
from Homer and from the great dramatists. The Olympic 
tradition is well exemplified in the cosmogony of Hesiod. 
The Fates or possibly Fate which is beyond and superior to 
the gods divides the world into four great provinces: the 
heavens, the earth, the air, and the water, which were later 
to appear in Greek thought as the four elements, earth, air, 
fire and water — concepts that played the chief part in the 
scientific speculations of the Greeks, and which remained 
fundamental and elemental until the rise of the science of 
chemistry. As Greek thought develops from the religious 
to the scientific, from the supernatural to the natural, we 
find the Olympic current accepting atomism and material- 
ism, entering heartily upon the things of this world, and 
throwing aside the idea of a God as essential in the explana- 
tion of the facts of experience. 



Origin of the Problems of Philosophy 113 

We have touched on these two tendencies in Greek thought 
because they run through the whole history of philosophy. 
The one is the mystical, that type of thought which pre- 
vails in time of disintegration and decay — when man loses 
his nerve. Such a period is that which runs all the way 
from the decline of speculation in Greece after the death of 
Aristotle, through the Roman periods and the middle ages 
to the renaissance. In the first part of the nineteenth cen- 
tury the romantic, mystical tendency comes again to the 
front, and finds expression in the literature of Germany, 
France, England, and America, in political life, in religion, 
and philosophy. 

The Olympic, the scientific, flourishes in the "golden 
ages," in those periods of security and of progress when 
man feels himself the master of the world. Such periods 
were the centuries of great systems among the Greeks, of 
the age of discovery and invention at the beginning of the 
modern world, and in the centuries of the remarkable ra- 
tionalistic systems of philosophy which arose with Descartes 
and which have reached, with some exceptions, to our own 
day. 

The mystical tendency, originating in the cults of the 
early inhabitants of Greece, runs through later Greek 
thought, neo-Platonism, and Christianity; the scientific ten- 
dency takes its rise among the pagan Greeks, and runs 
through Greek science, the scientific researches of the re- 
naissance, the political and social life of the sixteenth, sev- 
enteenth, and eighteenth centuries, and finds expression in 
the emphasis on intelligence in our present day philosophy. 
The former regards man as "fallen" and helpless ; the lat- 
ter is buoyant and hopeful, and thinks little of sin. The 
former is non-theoretical, is mystical, cares little for science 
and research; the latter places unbounded confidence in 



114; An Introduction to Philosophy 

reason — it is the key that unlocks the universe and its mys- 
teries if any it possesses. The former is other-worldly ; the 
latter believes that man's job is here below. 

We shall see these tendencies as they appear from time 
to time in the great systems of thought which it is our pur- 
pose to investigate. We shall see, for example, that ideal- 
istic types of philosophy are always other-worldly, mysti- 
cal, and come forward as "defenders of the faith" ; and that 
scientific speculation finds a congenial world where spirits 
and demons and inhabitants of the other world take a sub- 
ordinate position if they figure at all. 

REFERENCES 

Ball, W. W., Short Account of the History of Mathema- 
tics; 

Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy, Part I, 1-101 ; 

Draper, J. W., Intellectual Development of Europe, Vol. I, 
IV; 

Gomperz, T., Greek Thinkers ; 

Grote, History of Greece, Vol. VIII; 

Jerusalem, W., An Introduction to Philosophy, translated 
by Sanders, 3-7 ; 

Leighton, J. A., The Field of Philosophy, Chapter III ; 

Marvin, W. T., The History of European Philosophy, 78- 
94; 

Plato, The Protagoras and Theaetetus, translated by 
Jowett ; 

Rogers, A. K., History of Philosophy, 8-67; 

Thilly, F., History of Philosophy, 1-36 ; 

Weber, A., History of Philosophy, 17-53; 

West, W. M., Ancient World, 95-250 ; 

Windelband, W., History of Philosophy, translated by 
Tufts, 23-139 ; 

Zeller, Outlines of Greek Philosophy, 35-101. 



CHAPTER VIII 



THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 



1. Introductory. — We have now to inquire into the nature 
of the problems of philosophy. They have to deal with 
the same material that myth, magic, and animism deal with ; 
but the answers which philosophy gives are different and 
the spirit of the undertaking is different. Philosophy is a 
more conscious attempt to account for the phenomena of 
experience, in terms of some principle or other which threads 
together the apparent differences into a unity. It sets to 
work earnestly to find principles and is patient in the search 
for contradictions which will not square with the principle 
which is constantly and consciously employed ; for it is by 
the union of apparent contradictions in some higher and 
more inclusive principle that systems are constructed. The\ 
aim is to secure a harmonious view of the world so that we 
may know where to place things, how to evaluate them, and 
how to behave in their presence. 

What will be the problems of any period will depend 
upon various factors, such as the political conditions, com- 
mercial interests, and the social life. In Greek life and 
thought the problem of conduct usually dominated. The 
question, what is good? was the center from which specula- 
tion generally set out. It is true that to attack any of the 
problems of philosophy is to raise them all, for every philo- 
sophical theory must account for all the facts of experience. 
An ethical theory involves a logical theory, a logical theory 

115 



116 An Introduction to Philosophy 

in turn involves a theory of reality, and so on. At one time 
religion is of supreme interest and philosophy is viewed 
from that standpoint ; again science may be the dominating 
interest, and our philosophy will be a reflection of science. 
We have pointed out earlier that a system of philosophy is 
a reflection of the life of the period in which it prospers, 
and that to understand the system in question we must know 
the conditions which gave it birth. We shall have numerous 
occasions to see the truth of this statement in the shifting 
of problems from time to time as we pass in review trends 
of periods in which we shall be interested. We have said 
also that the Greeks, especially Plato and Aristotle, set 
the problems of philosophy. This is true but it should be 
added that the aspects of the problems shift, certain ones 
becoming of chief interest in one period to be supplanted in 
another by new conditions of life. 

The earlier Greek thinkers did not differentiate the prob- 
lems of science and philosophy. It was all science or all 
philosophy as we care to call it. Indeed the process of dif- 
ferentiation has not been completed to this day, as is seen 
in the recent separation of sociology and psychology from 
the parent, and in the tendency to make of ethics a "scien- 
tific" discipline. Many can remember when physics was 
studied as "natural philosophy," and psychology and ethics 
as "mental and moral philosophy." This constant break- 
ing away from philosophy of the various disciplines such 
as sociology and psychology has led certain cynics to re- 
mark on the interesting career of philosophy which was once 
everything and is now nothing — a humble, beggarly parent 
who has been turned out of house and home by a large 
family of children who have grown strong and mighty. But 
those who make such assertions forget the part that philos- 
ophy has played in making the remark possible at all; they 



The Problems of Philosophy 117 

take a retrospect view and assume that what are now definite 
and well defined sciences were always so. 

2. The Problems raised by the early Greeks. — Knowing 
what we do about the conditions in early Greece, what prob- 
lems of a speculative nature should we expect to find? We 
have seen constant changes of a political nature, a shift 
from kings to nobles, to tyrants, and to the people ; we 
have found a commercially active people who were ac- 
quainted with different ideas, customs, and practices all over 
the world ; we have found a heterogeneous people due to dif- 
ferent geographical conditions ; a people who had a common 
language and who sprang from a common ancestor ; and, 
finally, we note that their entire attention in the early stages 
of their experience was directed to the things of the outside 
world, to nature, to the material, and not to the mental or 
spiritual. In fact, up to this time no sharp line was drawn 
between mind and object or matter. 

Out of such a background arose the question: Is there 
anything permanent in the universe? Is there a common 
principle that runs through all the differences that man per- 
ceives? What kind of thing is the world anyhow? This 
is the philosophic problem of permanence and change, one 
of the profoundest problems in philosophy. This is the 
problem of the world and is generally spoken of as the cos- 
mological problem. Instead of the terms permanence and 
change, we may employ the terms being and becoming; and 
the problem stated in these terms would be, Is there a One, a 
Unity which is Being from which all differences flow? 

Other problems arose in Greece as a result of constant 
fluctuations in political affairs. The masses and the no- 
bility were struggling incessantly, laws were changed at 
every meeting of the law-making body, old ideals were con- 
stantly breaking down, customs were giving way to the will 



118 An Introduction to Philosophy 

of tyrants, and tribal conceptions of guilt and retribution 
were being undermined by the new feeling of the worth of 
the individual. The poets, especially Euripides, reflect the 
new ideals of skepticism and individualism as it was ex- 
pressed in practical affairs in the control of the law courts 
and the political machinery in general by strong personali- 
ties. The times afforded ample setting for the growth of the 
individual against the conservative customs which had regu- 
lated the life of the people. 

The Persian wars had a tendency to unite the Greeks 
against a common enemy but once the danger was over, 
Athens entered upon a period of prosperity never known 
before, and the old struggles became more insistent. Athens 
became the chief city of Greece, the centre of commercial 
and intellectual activity, to which came men from all parts 
of the country, drawn by the charm of a busy and interest- 
ing life. As always results when people of diverse interests 
meet, Athens became a city not of one idea but of a thou- 
sand. Custom could not long survive intact in the struggle 
with other customs from different parts of the world. The 
fact that different customs governing the same actions pre- 
vailed in other parts of the world naturally led to a criticism 
of prevailing Greek customs and to individualism in thought 
and action. When success depends upon keenness and 
shrewdness in driving a bargain we always find there the 
individual — he is born in just such a situation. When poli- 
tical life is such that the man of wealth, or the demagogue, 
or the warrior may gain a desirable place by the exercise 
of his powers, whether money, oratory, or arms, we find in- 
dividuals gradually breaking from the mass to qualify them- 
selves for what might be theirs for the taking. The poli- 
tical life was such, as is evident, that any one who could 



The Problems of Philosophy 119 

perchance become an individual might take his place among 
the mighty. 

Athens at this time was indeed a democracy — that is, 
a democracy for citizens for there were many slaves and 
non-citizens whose interests were other than governmental. 
Every citizen had a part to perform in the state ; he was a 
juryman and assemblyman, or some official of the govern- 
ment. Always from a fourth to a third of the citizens were 
in the civil service. These honors were passed around so 
that at one time or another in the life of a citizen he was 
called upon for service in some official capacity. Several 
offices could be held but once by the same individual, so 
that every citizen could count upon serving the state in 
almost every office. "Politics was his regular occupation ; 
office-holding, his regular business." The poorest citizen 
was eligible for any office, and what is more they were paid 
for their services. Such a system made for a high grade of 
intelligence, developed individualism and self-assertion, made 
it possible for man to pursue interests without interruption 
on the part of some authority, such as church or state, and 
made it possible for man to achieve distinction rather than 
to inherit it. 

A social life of this order demanded a particular type 
of education and a characteristic training; and such a con- 
ception of the function of the citizen led to a particular 
type of reflective thinking, a characteristic philosophy. 
That type of thinking is summarized in the doctrine of one 
of the foremost thinkers of his day, Protagoras, that "man 
is the measure of all things." This is the philosophical ex- 
pression of the growing individualism in Greek life. It 
is quite a different problem from that we first mentioned, 
namely, that which was concerned with a principle in 



120 An Introduction to Philosophy 

nature ; yet it is closely related to it. It differs in this, that 
the former is concerned with, and directed towards, an 
outside world, to the world of nature ; while the latter is 
concerned with the world inside, the world of man. The 
problems, then, are the same, but are directed towards a 
different subject matter. We may state the latter thus: Is 
there a principle in man which is abiding and permanent, 
and which is common to all men? The conditions of the age 
forced the question ; it grew out of them, as the literature 
of a period grows out of it. 

The cosmological problem — the problem of the universe — 
does not in our time interest thinkers as it did in the days 
of the Greeks. One reason is that the universe for the 
Greeks was a little universe — the top, the sky ; the bottom, 
the earth. It was the universe of perception, what the or- 
dinary man sees when he looks about him. But the universe 
as we know it from astronomy is a vastly different one from 
that of the Greeks. Consequently the cosmological prob- 
lem is not prominent now; but what once went under this 
general name, we now consider under Ontology or Being. 

3. Classification of the Problems of Philosophy. — We 
may accordingly classify the problems of philosophy on the 
principle of the various ways in which the two questions we 
have mentioned above have been answered — one, the prob- 
lem of the outer world ; the other, the problem of the inner 
world ; one, matter or nature ; the other, mind or soul. 
Both questions, we must repeat, arose necessarily from the 
very conditions of Greek life, and the fact that they are 
still questions argues for their genuineness and depth. But 
the answers that have been given them from time to time 
since the Greeks constitute the history of speculative think- 
ing. These answers have always grown out of conditions 
and circumstances of the period in which the answers were 



The Problems of Philosophy 121 

given; and it can hardly be over-exaggerated that specula- 
tive thinking is always drawn from the necessities of the 
time, that it is always practical, that it always shifts with 
the interests of the times, with the changes of social, eco- 
nomic, and political conditions, and, finally, that it is vain 
to hope to find an eternal, fixed, and immutable system of 
philosophy, and still hope for progress. A fixed system 
is applicable only to a dead society. 

If we believe that there is something permanent in the 
world, something that remains fixed amid the changes that 
we constantly witness, we may believe this permanent some- 
thing to be either (a) Material, or (b) Ideal, either, that is, 
of the nature of matter or of mind. If we believe (a) our 
system of philosophy will be some form of Materialism; if 
we believe (b) the system will be some form of Idealism. 
Of course it is not necessary to believe that there is a per- 
manent something at all, but if it is believed, then the result 
will be as we have mentioned. 

If we believe that there is something permanent in the uni- 
verse, we may believe also that it is (c) One, or (d) Two, or 
(e) Many. If we believe (c) we are Monists; if we believe 
(d) we are Dualists; if we believe (e) we are Pluralist s. 
Thus, a thinker may be a materialist and at the same time 
a pluralist, as was Democritus of the Greeks ; or he may be 
a materialist, and at the same time be a monist, as was 
Thales, the first philosopher of the Greeks, who taught that 
everything comes from water, that water is the principle 
(and material, too) which all things in common possess and 
which is the abiding one at the bottom of all changes. Some 
combinations would be more difficult to make, although 
strange variations have occurred in the history of philos- 
ophy. 

The above types of philosophy have arisen in answer to 



122 An Introduction to Philosophy 

the problem of the nature of the world, i. e., the cosmo- 
logical, or, what we shall call the ontological problem. But 
there was another question that worried the Greeks, as we 
have seen, namely, that of man, or of the inner world. We 
have spoken of this as the problem of the Universal and the 
Particular, as the other is that of Permanence and Change. 
But we should keep it in mind that they are not two differ- 
ent problems, but the same problem applied to different 
subject matter. 

There are several ways in which man is the measure of all 
things, provided he is the measure at all. Socrates and 
Plato, the two great thinkers and teachers among the 
Greeks, were quick to see that the doctrine of Protagoras, 
the Sophist, was one of fundamental value, that its implica- 
tions from a social, religious, political, ethical, and scientific 
standpoint were of supreme moment. Is man the measure 
of truth? This raises the problem of logic and episte- 
mology, or of knowledge. Is man the measure of right 
and good? This, in turn, raises the problem of politics and 
ethics. Is man the measure of the beautiful? This is the 
problem of aesthetics. Thus, out of the teachings of the 
Sophists, that group of men who rose to meet the demands 
of the social life of Greece, to teach the young in the arts 
of persuasion so that they might "make the worse appear 
the better reason," came, in part, the first formulation of 
the interests, or points of view, or fields within which dis- 
cussions of a philosophical nature would take place. Their 
teachings, that is to say, gave origin to the problems of 
logic and epistemology, ethics and politics, and aesthetics. 
The problem of the nature of being, or the Ontological prob^ 
lem arose, as we have seen, in the earlier activities of Greek 
life. Therefore, our problems are: 

Being, Ontology, or Metaphysics ; 

Truth, Logic, Epistemology, or Theory of Knowledge ; 



The Problems of Philosophy 123 

Good, Ethics, or Politics (in the broad sense of social 
life); 

Beauty, or ^Esthetics. 1 

The various methods of dealing with these problems, the 
emphasis placed on one rather than another at any particu- 
lar period, are facts, among others, that determine the type 
of speculative thinking which we witness from time to time 
in the history of philosophy. Realism, Idealism, Empiri- 
cism, Rationalism — in fact, the various isms which often 
seem confusing are just characteristic ways of dealing with 
these fundamental problems. Every complete system of 
philosophy must consider all four of these fundamental 
questions mentioned above. Many philosophers, however, 
are interested along one line only ; but it is not a very se- 
rious task to arrive at a conclusion as to what his attitude 
would be in other fields, once we know his position in any 
one, so closely related are these fields. 2 

1 This classification of the problems of philosophy varies somewhat 
from that sometimes given. For example, metaphysics is sometimes 
treated as involving both ontology and epistemology. 

2 The scheme given below is intended to guide the student in acquiring 
a vocabulary, and to assist in orienting him in the apparent confusion of 
systems. It should not be memorized but may best be employed as an 
aid when occasion demands. By the time the text is finished he should 
have learned the systems and their relations and chief characteristics. 

Scheme of Problems. All investigations may be conducted from the 
three following points of view: 

A. Nature, or Reality. 

B. Knowledge. 

C. Conduct. 

The fundamental or ultimate problems of each are: 
Of Reality, 

The Ontological, which asks, What is the nature of reality? An- 
swers to this question lead to the following theories: 

Pluralism, which may be either materialistic or spiritualistic; 
Dualism, which holds to two fundamentals, mind and matter; 
Materialism, which asserts that there is one principle and that it is 
material; 



124 An Introduction to Philosophy 

REFERENCES 

Burnett, Early Greek Philosophy ; 
Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, Chapters XII, XIII ; 
Fullerton, G., Introduction to Philosophy, Part V; 
Hibben, J. G., Problems of Philosophy; 
Jerusalem, W., An Introduction to Philosophy, trans- 
lated by Sanders, 17-20; 
Kulpe, O., Introduction to Philosophy, 21-90; 
Leighton, J. A., The Field of Philosophy, 31-41; 
Paulsen, F., Introduction to Philosophy, 44-50; 
Perry, R. B., An Approach to Philosophy, 149-180; 
Sellars, R. W., Introduction to Philosophy. 



Idealism, which also holds to one principle which is spiritual; 
Of Knowledge, 

The nature of knowledge, different answers to which give origin to 

Realism, which asserts that knowledge is a copy of the object; 

Idealism, which asserts that knowledge is not a copy of the object 
but is an inner process; 

Instrumentalism, which asserts that knowledge is an adaptive 
process. 
The origin of knowledge, different answers to which give rise to 

Empiricism, which asserts that all knowledge comes from sense 
perception, from experience; 

Rationalism, which asserts that there are principles such as the 
axioms of mathematics which are not from experience, but are in- 
nate, and that reason and not sense is the source of knowledge; 

Instrumentalism, which asserts that knowledge comes to be in a 
biological process of adjustment and adaptation. 
Of Conduct, 3 

What is the good? The answers to this give rise to 

Utilitarianism, which asserts that it is conduct which brings the 
greatest happiness; 

Intuitionalism; good is innate. 

3 See Dewey and Tufts' Ethics for elaborate classification. 



CHAPTER IX 



PLATONIC IDEALISM 



1. Introduction. — One of the great systems of philosophy 
is idealism. It has attracted the greatest minds in the realm 
of philosophy and in one form or another it has been prom- 
inent from the days of Plato to our own. It attempts to 
give an answer to the problem of being, and from the nature 
of the answer, it offers a theory of knowledge, of ethics, of 
aesthetics, and of religion. The fundamental note in ideal- 
ism of all kinds is the priority of mind. The kind of mind, 
whether finite or infinite, universal or particular, makes no 
difference in the fundamental assumption. But some kind of 
mind, spirit, or idea is the primal thing in the universe. 
After the time of Plato and until as late as the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries of our era, idealism was called real- 
ism, meaning that ideas alone are real. So what was once 
realism is now idealism, and the former term is now applied 
to a different type of philosophy, which we shall consider 
later. 

2. Historical Setting of Idealism. — The fact that the 
fundamental note in idealism is the priority of mind, soul, 
spirit, or idea, gives one at the very outset a clue to the in- 
terests idealism serves. We have spoken earlier of the two 
tendencies running through Greek life and thought, one, the 
Olympic, hard-headed, scientific, materialistic ; the other, the 
Orphic, tender-minded, spiritualistic, religious, mystic. 
Even much earlier we saw that primitive man interprets his 

125 



126 An Introduction to Philosophy 

world in terms of souls, demons, and spirits — nature is ani- 
mated. Myths are spiritualistic, tilings come to be through 
the agency of gods, heroes, devils, spirits. Consequently 
idealism is deeply rooted in man's nature. It would not be 
an exaggeration to say that it is the first philosophy, for 
those primitive nature men who first reflected on the phe- 
nomena of experience, who first attempted to give an ac- 
count of how things came to be, were idealists. They spoke 
in terms of spirit and demon, explained on the only creative 
principle they knew, namely, man's ability to accomplish 
results, to effect changes, to make, to construct. So we 
may say that from primitive times to our own day it has 
been the chief philosophy. 

Our chief interest, however, is to show the conditions 
in historic times which have been conducive to the rise and 
prominence of idealism. In the first place, idealism has al- 
ways been an ally of religion, has been the background of 
great systems of conduct and ways of life. God and the 
soul are themes of deep significance in idealistic philosophy. 
This we might expect from the connection of religion with 
the Orphic mysteries ; and, after all, it is the continuation in 
historic times of primitive soul doctrines ; it is the philo- 
sophical side, the highly conscious aspects of religion and a 
"way of life." Thus it is in spirit a way of living, a method 
by which man may again be restored to "that blissful seat." 
This being the case, we shall find it in historic times to be 
connected with periods of breakdown, when men are looking 
for "a rock in a weary land, and a shelter in the times of 
the storm," when old landmarks are being swept away by 
wars, inventions, and, in short, by those agencies which 
figure in a reconstruction of the habits of life. When the 
problems of life become too serious, too overwhelming, ideal- 
ism ceases to be a rational philosophy and becomes mystical, 



Platonic Idealism 127 

a matter of faith. Such periods have occurred at times 
when men, unable to comprehend the changes about them, 
have given up rational behavior and have yielded to the de- 
mands of the heart. 

We have touched on the marvelous changes that were 
taking place in Greece about 400 B. C. The citizens were 
ruling, that is, there was democracy, and every man took his 
turn in political life, politics being his business. There 
arose a class of men, the Sophists, chief among which were 
Protagoras and Georgias, whose business it was to teach 
young men the art of speaking well in public, for this was 
essential to political preferment. The orator was the man 
among the Greeks at this time for such were the demands 
of political life. The individual counted. Therefore the 
doctrine of Protagoras that man is the measure of all things 
— whatever a man could "get away with" was legitimate — 
struck a sympathetic chord in Greek life. 

The Sophists were men who had travelled extensively, 
knew the customs of various peoples, knew that each people 
had its own method of meeting problems ; and this all tended 
to do away with the idea of the sanctity of law. When 
laws were changed from year to year, it is little wonder that 
men should not have respect for them, or not believe them 
divine when they knew the methods by which they were 
passed. It is not to be expected that their laws should be 
held sacred when one of their own number was selected to be 
the judge of them. There gradually grew up a distinction 
between nature and convention, between what is and what 
ought to be. The ordinary laws were the facts of custom 
and convention, but back of them were the laws of nature 
which were abiding. 

But while laws were thought of as conventions, the serious 
aspect of things began to appear when the same attitude 



128 An Introduction to Philosophy 

was carried over into morality. If laws are merely conven- 
tions, why not morality? Are moral customs conventions, 
too? Yes, this is so that moral conventions are nothing but 
inventions of the many to restrain the few, or of rulers who 
wish to chain their subjects. The Sophists, of course, were 
not the cause of this change in attitude, but were merely 
the reflection of it in the intellectual life of the times. Plato 
asserted that the whole state had turned Sophist, due, in 
great part, to the rapacity and unscrupulousness which 
characterized the dealing of one Greek state with another. 
If states are "crooked" it is certain that the tendency will 
come out in the private life of the people. Such conditions 
as we have briefly stated determined the problems of Plato 
but the solutions he offeredito them were determined largely 
by two great facts, namely, his social position, and the 
Orphic strain in Greek thought. 

It was Socrates, however, who first challenged the indi- 
vidualistic views of the Sophists, and who was first to dis- 
cern that their methods and beliefs would surely result in 
disaster; but it remained for his pupil, Plato, to formulate 
a definite philosophical theory to the contrary. The demos 
had condemned Socrates to death on the alleged grounds 
that he had corrupted the youth and had taught a strange 
religion. This rash act on the part of the people tended to 
make Plato more bitter towards them and their ability to 
manage affairs. He set about, consequently, with the defin- 
ite purpose of showing that individualism and change are 
philosophically unsound. He was especially interested in 
the ethical theory of the Sophists and the individualists of 
the time, and busied himself to show that a theory to the 
effect that "might makes right" is disastrous to any stable 
form of society. Consequently, ethics is his chief interest, 
the Republic his greatest work. 



Platonic Idealism 129 

3. Problems Considered by Plato. — Plato sought to solve 
certain problems which he thought to be at the bottom of 
the controversy between the permanence party and the 
change party, between the individualist and the universalist. 
He saw that an investigation into the nature of being was 
necessary if anything lasting was to be accomplished. 
Therefore, he inquires into the nature of that which is, be- 
lieving that if there is something permanent in the universe 
the arguments of the Sophists would be refuted. 

(a) The Metaphysical Problem. The permanent, im- 
mutable reality is idea, form, or type. We see particular 
things, men, for example, but they are not the reality, but 
participate in the reality, which is the type, man. The real 
is not any of the particular things of sense such as we see 
or hear, but it is the idea or form which causes the particu- 
lar thing. The real is the pattern after which all particular 
things are made. The idea, as Plato used the term idea, is 
not the commonsense idea which we think of as something in 
the head, but is on the outside and has existence whether 
we know anything about it or not. There is a world of 
ideas, types, forms, or patterns, which exists eternally and 
unchangeably above and beyond the world of sense percep- 
tion. This world of sense is a poor copy or imitation of the 
real world of ideas ; the former is a world of constant flux, 
but the latter is eternally fixed. What the common man be- 
lieves to be real, i. e., the things he sees and hears, is but a 
poor copy of the real, a bad imitation of what is true real- 
ity. What the Sophist and the democrat believed to be real, 
Plato taught, is only appearance. Their arguments, there- 
fore, are certainly faulty for no one would think of giving 
full attention to the copy when true reality could be found 
in case due diligence is given to the subject. 

The ideas themselves are in a certain order, with the idea 



130 An Introduction to Philosophy 

of the Good or God at the head. Thus the Good is the 
chief interest of Plato. Things earthly partake of the good 
in varying degrees, for God desires as many things to be 
like Him as possible. But just what the exact order of the 
ideal world is can not be stated accurately, but we can, 
thought Plato, make out some of them and their relations. 
It is the business of science or knowledge to investigate this 
matter in order that an exact statement of the relations of 
the ideas themselves as well as the precise connections be- 
tween ideas and earthly things may be made out. The im- 
portant matter from our standpoint is that the real world 
is a world of ideas at the head of which is the Good or God. 

It should be noticed that Plato finds a place for both 
permanence and change. The permanent is the idea, the 
changeable is the sense fact, the things of this world. He 
does not deny that his opponents, the democrats, the com- 
mon men, the Sophists, have no case at all, but he shows 
that their case is concerned with something that is not the 
real. He could have denied the reality of the things of sense 
in every respect as others have done, but he took the much 
wiser course of showing how the case of his opponents could 
be accounted for in a higher system. Instead of showing or 
attempting to show that the opponent had no case at all — 
a hazardous undertaking — Plato showed that the subject 
matter of their philosophy could be accounted for in a 
higher system as a small part of that system. 

(b) The Problem of Knowledge or Epistemology. A 
theory of reality and a theory of knowledge are closely re- 
lated ; so it became a part of Plato's duties in case he re- 
futed all the arguments of the Sophists and individualists 
to formulate a theory of knowledge which would square with 
what he considered the real to be. The doctrine of his oppo- 
nents, summarized, as we have said, in the maxim that man 



Platonic Idealism 131 

is the measure of things, derives all knowledge from percep- 
tion. The real is what you see, hear, taste and touch. But 
since it is clear that the senses are often deceptive we must 
have a more stable form of knowledge than that which we 
gain in perception. If sense knowledge be true knowledge, 
as the Sophists taught, then one man can be no wiser than 
any other; and indeed it is impossible for man to be any 
wiser than the animal for it can see and hear as well as man. 
Plato wonders why it is that Protagoras, the great teacher, 
should be paid to teach people provided he believed that man 
is the measure of all things, for if this is true any one else 
should know as much as Protagoras. 

Plato says, in this connection, in that great dialogue on 
knowledge, the Theaetetus, 

"I am charmed with his (Protagoras') doctrine, that what 
appears is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his 
book on Truth with the declaration that a pig or a dog-faced 
baboon, or some other yet stranger monster which has sensation, 
is the measure of all things; then he might have shown a mag- 
nificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at the 
outset that while we were reverencing him like a god for his 
wisdom, he was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his 
fellow men — would not this have produced an overwhelming 
effect? For if truth is only sensation, and no man can discern 
another's feelings better than he, or has any superior right to 
determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, as we 
have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and 
everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend, 
should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and in- 
struction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses 
have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wis- 
dom?" 1 

Thus Plato is not in sympathy with the Sophistic doc- 
trine that knowledge is sense perception. He does not deny 
that sense perception has a place in knowledge — it stimu- 
1 Plato, Theatetus, 161. Jowett Translation. 



132 An Introduction to Philosophy 

lates to knowledge, but is not itself knowledge. What then 
is knowledge? It is concerned with the ideas, and not with 
copies or particulars. It seemed clear to Plato that there 
are ideas which can never be derived from sense experience, 
such as the axioms of mathematics and the fundamental 
premises of logic. Equality, greater than, difference, iden- 
tity, and such as these can never be gained, thought Plato, 
by sense perception. Plato thought that, by showing that 
certain ideas such as we have mentioned could not be gained 
by sense perception, it would greatly weaken the case of 
those who urged that all knowledge is perception. That is, 
if certain bits of knowledge can be shown to have any other 
origin than through perception, it may be doubtful whether 
perception has much to do with knowledge at all. True 
knowledge comes as a result of the grasping of universals, 
ideas, forms, types, by the soul. The soul is active in order- 
ing and shaping the material which the senses supply in 
terms of the universals or types. To behold the idea it is 
necessary to get away from eyes and ears and to put our 
faith in reason only. The body "draws the soul down into 
the region of the changeable, where it wanders and is con- 
fused ; the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard 
when under their influence." 2 So the world of sense, the 
field of interest of the demos, is a field of unreality, illusions, 
and not worthy of the efforts of the real man. 

How does man reach the idea, how ever get at it, since 
the body with its senses tends to hold man down to the world 
of shadows? This question leads to 

(c) The Problem of the Soul. True knowledge is of 
eternal ideas ; and knowledge is the highest function of the 
soul. The soul knows these unchangeable ideas because it 
had a former existence up somewhere in the realm of ideas. 

2 Phsedo, p. 79. See also Republic, pp. 515 ff. 



Platonic Idealism 133 

The soul dwelt among these pure forms where it beheld them 
in their perfection — there it saw perfect circles, perfect jus- 
tice, perfect types of all kind. Here on earth it remembers 
these types, but they are somewhat dimmer and more washed 
out in memory than in reality ; and to be known again in 
their pure form requires the greatest intellectual effort on 
the part of man. In fact this is the greatest achievement 
man is capable of — to behold again in pure form the eternal 
ideas witnessed in the period of former existence of the 
soul. The very fact that we are able to speak of imperfect 
things involves a knowledge of that which is perfect ; of 
finite things, infinity ; of bad things, good. Such ideas could 
not have been reached in this world where the senses hold 
us down to the things about us but are possible only on the 
theory of a former perfect existence of the soul in a perfect 
realm. 

While the chief virtue of the soul is knowledge, rational 
insight, ability to comprehend the real ; the soul of man is 
also spirited, that is, affective, emotional. As the rational 
soul abides in the head and has wisdom as its virtue, the 
spirited element is found in the heart, and has courage as its 
virtue. There is also another type of soul life, low, to be 
sure, but present, which occupies the lower parts of the 
body, corresponding to the passions ; and whose virtues are 
temperance and obedience. This soul theory is well worked 
out in 

(d) Plato's Theory of the State. 3 The state is the 
individual "writ large." Corresponding to the three parts 
of the soul, Plato finds three kinds of people in the state, 
namely, the rulers who are the highest class, and who cor- 
respond to the head ; the soldiers or guardians of the state, 
who correspond to the heart; and the traders, merchants, 
8 See the Republic. 



134 An Introduction to Philosophy 

and laborers, who correspond to the lower and baser pas- 
sions of men. It is the business of the head to rule, of the 
heart to protect, and of the lower parts to obey and work. 
The head is the only means by which the eternal ideas, the 
immutable reality, can be reached; the only means of reach- 
ing the Good, the highest idea. What can a ruler do if he 
does not know the highest good? How can he know it if 
he is eternally mixed in petty strife, in immediate battles of 
politics? We see that Plato showed that the demos could 
not rule a state because they had not head for the purpose — 
they were those who were governed by the baser passions, 
those who ought to obey and serve, not govern. We see that 
Plato makes a strong case against the individualists and 
democrats when he shows that they have not intelligence 
enough to rule, since they are held down by the things of 
sense, and can not gain access to the true Good but must 
be blind to its nature. The philosopher is the only one ca- 
pable of ruling for he alone can get back again to that orig- 
inal home of the soul where he can view things as they truly 
are, where he can see the eternal and abiding Good. 

We see in every problem that Plato treated his chief pur- 
pose, namely, to refute the individualistic tendencies of his 
times. He shows that there is something permanent in the 
universe for the purpose of refuting the dominant idea of 
change ; he shows that the chief idea is the Good for the pur- 
pose of refuting the "might-right" theory ; he emphasizes 
the place of knowledge to show that the common people are 
incapable of governing themselves ; he places them in the dis- 
paraging position of occupying the lower regions below the 
midriff for the purpose of showing their inability of doing 
anything of higher value. In summary, his metaphysics, his 
epistemology, his psychology, and his political theory are all 
the outcome of definite social conditions which prevailed in 



Platonic Idealism 135 

his day. We may indeed think of Plato as a great lawyer 
who was pleading a case before the bar of man's intellect, 
the chief point at issue being permanence versus change, the 
one versus the many, the universal versus the particular. 
His vision in behalf of his client was world wide — he real- 
ized that an answer involved a consideration of the funda- 
mental problems of philosophy. 

We should expect to find Plato on the side of permanence. 
He was an aristocrat and possessed the time for the con- 
templation of the idea; he desired to see his own social class 
in that position of authority which it had formerly occupied, 
and no one was better able to pass judgment on the defects 
of Greek democracy than was Plato. 

The advocate of permanence is he whose "rights" have 
already been established ; the champions of change are those 
who are seeking a footing in the already established order 
of things. This principle applies to all the interests of man. 

REFERENCES 

Bakewell, Source Book in Ancient Philosophy, 86-103; 
Burnet, History of Greek Philosophy, 205-350; 
Dunning, W. A., History of Political Theories, 1-48; 
Leighton, J. A., The Field of Philosophy, Chapter V ; 
Pater, W., Plato and Platonism; 
Plato, Apology, Crito, Pjledo, Protagoras, The^ete- 

tus, and Republic, translated by Jowett ; 
Rogers, A. K., Student's History of Philosophy, 67-101 ; 
Taylor, A. E., Plato; 

Thilly, F., History of Philosophy, 40-94; 
Weber, A., History of Philosophy, 59-118 ; 
Windelband, W., History of Philosophy, 116-132. 



CHAPTER X 

PHILOSOPHY PROM THE DECLINE OF GREEK SPECULATION TO 
THE RENAISSANCE 

1. Introduction. — The purpose of this chapter is to show 
the main currents of life from the period which marks the 
death of Aristotle and the decline of Greek philosophy to 
the great revival of thought and life beginning about the 
time of Descartes (1596-1650). We can merely indicate 
some of the currents of this period, for it is very suggestive 
in many ways, but, on the whole, barren of any great free 
philosophical systems. The chapter intends to serve as a 
bridge to connect the long period between the two idealisms, 
Platonic, and Berkeleyan. As in the former system we found 
a cause to be pleaded, an emergency to be met, so in the 
latter we shall see definite reasons for the celebrated doc- 
trine, "esse est per dpi." We must know something of the 
tendencies of the times between 300 B. C. and 1600 A. D. 
to gain an adequate idea of the great flaring-up of specula- 
tive thinking beginning about the latter date. 

We have noticed the gradual breakdown of Greek social 
and political life during the time of Plato and of the at- 
tempt of Plato to meet the growing individualism and 
democracy of the period. His attempt failed for Greece 
soon became a subject state first of Macedon and in 146 
B. C, of Rome. Man could then find no consolation in being 
a member of a city state or of a social order that no longer 

136 



Decline of Greek Speculation to the Renaissance 137 

existed ; he could no longer find means of expression in the 
duties of citizenship and a guide of action in a religion which 
had been supported by a state. Man must have some 
principle, however, as a guide to life, and to find such a 
principle was the task of philosophy and religion for several 
centuries after the death of Aristotle. 

2. Nature of Philosophy after Plato and Aristotle. — ■ 
Philosophy came to be truly a "way of life." "Philosophy 
is not a theory for popular acceptance and designed for 
show ; it is not in words but in deeds" ; but it directs our 
lives, shows what ought to be done and what ought to be 
left undone, sits at the helm of life and guides the course 
amid dangers and troubles. When things have gone beyond 
the control of man as they had in Greek days, he may take 
several possible courses of action to satisfy the demands of 
life; for this is certain that man cannot live without some 
guiding principle, some type of philosophy. In the period 
just after the breakdown of Greek life, man sought a guid- 
ing principle within himself. Since the world had got the 
better of him, his plan was to get away from the world of 
the object and to the world of the subject. He found he 
could not control the world of objects but he had the belief 
that the world within was his own and that he could there 
find life abundantly. If life is within, thought the man of 
300 B. C, the world may go her course without disturbing 
me. Thus the philosophy of the early part of the period 
after Plato attempts to teach man how to live happily. 
There were different methods of living a life of happiness, 
a life within, and these methods give origin to the types of 
philosophy of the period. These we shall examine very 
briefly. 

(a) Epicureanism. About 306 B. C. Epicurus gathered 
about him in his garden at Athens a group of like-minded 



138 An Introduction to Philosophy 

individuals who were interested in finding a principle to 
guide life in those chaotic days. Their philosophy, there- 
fore, centers about ethics, and of a type which we know as 
hedonism, the doctrine that pleasure is the highest good. 1 
Epicurus, however, is careful to say that it is not the kind 
of pleasure that comes with the ungoverned exercise of the 
senses, for this may bring evil ; but rather the pleasures that 
come with friendship and balance of mind. It is more the 
pleasure that results from calm and quiet, the freedom from 
pain, worry and fear, that Epicurus has in mind. Fear, he 
thinks, has been the chief source of worry and discontent. 
This is for those who have not as yet seen the vision of the 
highest good. He consequently protests against religion 
because he believes it to be the source of fear, the chief 
source of worry among men. 

Epicureanism must have a philosophy, a means of inter- 
preting the world of facts so that its ethics might appear 
plausible. The first principle that Epicurus needs to estab^ 
lish is to undermine the idea of the immortality of the soul, 
for this, he thinks, is the basis of religious fear ; for if the 
soul perishes with the death of the body, surely there is no 
use to worry about the future life. The second point that 
he wants to make is that there are no gods to reward and 
punish man, to upset the calculations of life, or to send 
plagues and earthquakes. These points he establishes by 
the atomic hypothesis of Democritus — given atoms and the 
space they move in, then everything can be explained. The 
physical universe, the soul, everything are atoms in motion. 
We should not fear death and the gods but should lead a 
life of pleasure and calm amid our friends. This doctrine, 
simple, direct, requiring no great intellectual effort, ap- 

1 The various types of hedonism are not introduced in order to avoid 
confusion. 



Decline of Greek Speculation to the Renaissance 139 

pealed to many during the period of unrest and instability, 
(b) Stoicism. Another "way of life" was Stoicism, 
founded by Zeno (340-265 B. C). Stoicism and Epicurean- 
ism have many points in common, chief among which are the 
desire to escape from the disturbances and wants that are 
common to man, and to discipline the mind to find happiness 
and satisfaction within itself instead of in the world of af- 
fairs. But the Stoics developed a different metaphysical 
theory as a foundation for their beliefs and desires. They 
took the doctrine of Socrates that virtue is the highest good, 
denied the atomic doctrine of Democritus, and accepted the 
view of the unity of nature. "Reality is an organic whole, 
an intimate combination of form and matter, soul and body, 
through which one universal life pulsates." Thus, conform- 
ity to nature is the highest good. But conformity to nature 
involves a knowledge of nature ; and we may say that virtue 
is knowledge' — practical knowledge which grows out of the 
demands of conduct. Knowledge is the highest power of the 
soul, and standing over against reason or knowledge are 
emotion and desire, and instead of being, as Plato taught, 
parts of the soul, are diseases and imperfections of it. 
Therefore, the emotions must be destroyed, so that, in the 
end, the ethical ideal is complete freedom from the emotions 
and feelings — a following ever of the lead of reason. The 
true life is one that is free from all emotional agitation, cold 
to the world and to the things that lie about, rigorous and 
stern in the presence of all that we consider emotional and 
suggestive, and reminding one not a little of the passive, 
unemotional life of the American Indian in the presence of 
his enemies. Evil only is that which we regard as such, and 
though a thing may harm the body it can never reach and 
disturb the real self, that inner man which takes its origin 
from and has its being in the world soul. No joys are 



140 An Introduction to Philosophy 

equal to those that come to him whose mind is serene and 
sober, and no one can participate in these supreme joys 
whose thoughts and life are centered about the petty things 
of earth below. 

The Stoic doctrine of the omnipresence of God in the 
world, its emphasis on the inner law of man's nature, and 
the concept of self-denial, are points of likeness between it 
and Christianity, similarities which rendered easier the ac- 
ceptance of the doctrines of Jesus, which were now coming 
as a rival doctrine of a way of life. But Stoicism was too 
cold, and required too great an effort intellectually to ap- 
peal to the great majority of men of that time. A doctrine 
of expression rather than one of suppression makes a 
stronger appeal to man. 

(c) Mysticism.. In the struggle for a firm foundation 
amid decay men may give up rational methods of control, 
may forsake reason and resort to faith. Reason which had 
held a great place in Greek life had its day, while the 
demands of the heart had been in some ways cast aside. Man 
can no more live by knowledge alone than he can by bread, 
and it seems that a proper balance between knowledge and 
feeling is hard to reach. One age is wholly rationalistic; 
another is romantic. The pendulum always seems to swing 
to extremes. When knowledge becomes bankrupt, when it 
is unable to develop a type of society in which man is satis- 
fied, when, in other words, man has reached the limits of his 
achievements along any line, he may become mystical, ro- 
mantic, poetic. When the situation gets the better of him 
he quits thinking and becomes a poet, romancer, or mystic. 
Man generally becomes Orphic in his tendencies at the point 
of loss of control over the facts of his social and political 
life. 

About the beginning of the first century before Christ 



Decline of Greek Speculation to the Renaissance 14*1 

a close connection was being made between Greek thought 
and Oriental mysticism. The drift was towards Platonism 
and Pythagoreanism. The Orphic tradition, emphasizing 
the old soul ideas, and the evil and inferiority of matter ren- 
dered the soul of man the chief topic of philosophic interest ; 
and science, once so powerful a factor in Greek thought was 
looked upon as of no value for its subject matter was the 
root of all evil. Reality was discovered not by research, 
not by inquiry, but by revelation from above and by an 
ecstatic vision through the escape of the soul from the evils 
of the flesh. Reality and truth were not to be found by the 
methods of Socrates who considered it his business to give 
birth to clear ideas, nor by the method of experiment, nor 
even by the method of reason ; but reality and truth belong 
to him who throws his soul into unity with a divine power. 

Mysticism reached its most definite formulation in the 
neo-Platonism of Plotinus (250 A. D.). Neo-Platonism is 
the culmination of the working together of Greek philosophy 
and that of the Orient. It emphasizes the moral as against 
the scientific — it is truly a "way of life," made necessary by 
the breakdown of institutions during the centuries just be- 
fore and just after the birth of Christ. 

Stoicism failed to reach the masses — it was a religion or 
rather an ethics for the intellectual classes only ; and Epi- 
cureanism degenerated into the doctrine of "eat, drink, and 
be merry," which has never appealed to a great many men. 
To meet the need of the heart neo-Platonism also failed be- 
cause it was too abstract, it involved too much theory to be- 
come a religion of the people. 

The chief concept in neo-Platonism is God or as Plato 
spoke of it, the Good. God stands even behind and back of 
the ideas themselves and is not to be contemplated, is not the 
object of thought, but an object of mystical appreciation. 



142 An Introduction to Philosophy 

He is degraded when we limit Him within the confines of our 
finite ideas of truth, goodness, justice, and wisdom. We 
reach Him not by comprehension but by feeling. Matter is 
a falling away from God and has no existence, is not being. 

Plotinus, the greatest neo-Platonist, was ashamed that he 
possessed a body, so much so, indeed, that he would never 
mention the name of his parents. Man's only occupation 
consists not in the attempt to control the world but to get 
away from it and back to whence he came, namely, God. 
This he does by rising above the finite, by penetrating the 
universal ideas which underlie the world of concrete things. 
Then when the soul loses all thought, all desire, all activity, 
it comes into immediate union with God. 

It is clear that such a type of speculation is possible only 
when people have lost in the battles of life, when the affairs 
of the world are so overpowering that instead of mastering 
them through intelligence, they fall, like the Oriental and the 
primitive man, before the powers as a worshipper rather 
than as an investigator. When a nation loses its nerve, 
when it breaks asunder the only means it possesses for the 
control of nature and life, namely, intelligence, it becomes 
primitive, Oriental, Orphic. 

(d) Christianity. Men were interested in a way of life, 
and not in a system of philosophy. Consequently, Stoicism 
and neo-Platonism failed to meet the vital needs of the age, 
and both failed to become in any sense universal. Chris- 
tianity, on the other hand, in its beginnings was free from 
all speculations and offered a simple method of satisfying 
the demands of the heart. It appealed to the poor and to 
the non-intellectual classes as the other methods of life did 
not directly do because of their abstractness. Belief in God 
and in the power of Christ in renewing the life of the soul 



Decline of Greek Speculation to the Renaissance 143 

were the fundamental notes. Not a belief in any set system 
of doctrines, but a life of peace, happiness within, and right 
living, were the requisites. 

Christianity, at a later stage, however, shared many of 
the beliefs of neo-Platonism. In the first place they are 
both religious philosophies. They deal with God, the nature 
of sin, and the way of salvation. They both believe in reve- 
lation as the source of truth rather than reason, but they 
differ in that Christianity taught a historic revelation, a rev- 
elation once for all, whereas the neo-Platonist believed in 
individual and particular revelations which come to one in 
the moment of divine ecstasy. Both religions or philoso- 
phies were the offsprings of the same parents, namely, the 
Pythagorean, Platonic, and Orphic tendency, and both in- 
herited many of the characteristics of the parent. 

It was not long until the new religion took on the forms 
of the thought of the day. It could not expand except as it 
became identified with the modes of thinking which prevailed 
in the intellectual world at that time. Those of the more in- 
tellectual classes who became converts brought their old 
problems with them and expected a solution in terms of the 
new religion. Those who had been Stoics, Platonists and 
Pythagoreans came to the new religion with the problems 
of philosophy demanding solution ; and it was inevitable 
that changes in the new religion from primitive ideas to 
a philosophy should take place. Christianity had to be de- 
fended in its competition with other doctrines of the times, 
and this necessitated a formulation of the principles of the 
teachings of Christ, such as would appeal to the intellectual 
and cultural classes of the day. As time went on the apos- 
tolic tradition had to be defended against heresies which 
were constantly arising. These facts, then, forced the new 



144 An Introduction to Philosophy 

religion to take a definite position or attitude on certain 
doctrines and tended to render it a fixed and inflexible in- 
stitution. 

The fact that the new doctrine was forced to take a 
definite position on the great problems of the time had pow- 
erful influence on later thinking. By 400 A. D., partly 
through the efforts of the greatest of the churchmen, Au- 
gustine, the doctrines of the church became well established. 
The new dogmas or doctrines to become firmly established 
by Augustine and others before him are: one, the freedom of 
the will, much emphasized at first by Augustine, but later 
modified somewhat to fit his theory of the nature and func- 
tion of the church ; two, that there is salvation only through, 
the church, thus establishing the church as the greatest of 
institutions ; three, God created the world out of nothing, 
yet God is absolutely distinct from nature; four, evil is es- 
sential to the perfection of the world as shadows are to the 
beauty of the painting, and it comes about as a result of 
man's free will; five, man has fallen — "In Adam's fall we 
sinned all." Man is sinful and he can be saved only by 
God through the church. 

The church became the dominant institution of the middle 
ages. Within her realm all thinking, all action, occurred. 
This fact is easily accounted for in view of the decadent 
state of society at the beginning of the Christian era. The 
church with its supernatural sanctions was able to appeal 
to the emotional barbarian of the north whose culture was 
much less advanced than the decadent culture of the early 
middle ages. The quiet dignity, the overwhelming mystery, 
the strangeness of the language, the stateliness of the serv- 
ice, the matchless organization of the church, all appealed 
powerfully to the romantic Teuton whose life was one of 
pirating, foraging, and fighting. Moreover, all truth had 



Decline of Greek Speculation to the Renaissance 145 

been revealed — there was nothing to do but to learn what 
God in his mercy had already wrought. Consequently, dur- 
ing the early part of the middle ages Europe was learning 
the lessons that had been assigned, strong in the conviction 
that these lessons were all the truth. As the child does not 
stop to criticise the material of his text and the teaching 
of his masters, so did Europe study uncritically the lessons 
which the past had assigned. 

The lessons were the content of the neo-Platonic philos- 
ophy, compilations of ancient science, the inferior codes of 
the Roman laws, and the literature of the church fathers. 
All of this material was of the past, and the result was that 
the idea prevailed that all good things had already been 
done and man's business intellectually was to learn well the 
lessons of the past. But little progress could occur under 
the domination of such an idea, but the time came when the 
mediaeval pupil mastered his task and became able to use the 
material for the building of a more noble scientific and social 
world. That time was the period of the Renaissance. 

REFERENCES 

Augustine, The City of God, especially Bk. I; 

Berry, Short History of Astronomy ; 

Bury, History of Freedom of Thought; 

Cajori, History of Mathematics ; 

Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. I, Chapters IV, V, 
XX; 

Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Phi- 
losophers ; 

Draper, J. W., Intellectual Development of Europe, VII, 
IX, X, XI; 

Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition, articles on Neo- 
Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Christianity ; 

Epictetus, Golden Sayings ; 



146 An Introduction to Philosophy 

Erdmann, History of Philosophy, Vol. I, Part II; 

Haenack, A., History of Dogma; 

Hicks, R. D., Stoic and Epicurean; 

Marcus Aurelius, Meditations ; 

Murray, The Stoic Philosophy; 

Pater, W., Marius the Epicurean; 

Paulsen, F., System of Ethics, 65-115; 

Ramsay, W. M., The Church in the Roman Empire; 

Rashdall, H., Universities in Europe in the Middle Ages; 

Rogers, A. K., A Student's History of Philosophy, 119-197; 

Taylor, E. A., Epicurus ; 

Taylor, H. 0., The Medieval Mind; 

Thilly, F., History of Philosophy, 94-132; 

Vaughan, R. A., Hours with the Mystics; 

Weber, A., History of Philosophy, 140-235; 

Windelband, W., History of Philosophy, 155-337. 



CHAPTER XI 

PHILOSOPHY FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO BERKELEY 

1. Introductory. — The purpose of the preceding chapter 
is to keep intact the continuity of thought ; of the present 
one, to furnish a background for the second type of ideal- 
ism, namely, the subjective or Berkeley an. The historical 
background will make clear the purpose of this, in many 
ways, extraordinary type of thought, so absurd from a com- 
mon sense point of view, but so difficult of contradiction 
from a theoretical one. It will be shown that subjective 
idealism is a form of speculation which, in the new garb of 
the time in which it developed, goes back to the old anthro- 
pomorphic and animistic tendencies so rooted in man's na- 
ture, and that it arises out of a clash of tendencies in the 
interests of religion and for the preservation of the soul 
which came well nigh being forgotten in this period of 
revival. 

During the latter part of the middle ages, that is, begin- 
ning about 1100 and extending to 1400, marked advance 
was made in all lines of culture. Thinkers began to make 
their own contributions to the works of the past masters, 
ancient writings were restored to students, which were to be 
mastered before further advance could be made. Among 
the great centuries of history is the thirteenth. It was 
then that the works of Aristotle came into the hands of 
European students, making it possible for the first time for 
the student to come directly in contact with the best 

147 



148 An Introduction to Philosophy 

thought of Greece. Neo-Platonism and mysticism gave way 
to Aristotelianism, and Christianity became interpreted in 
terms of the latter. 

It was about 1200 that a distinction came to be made 
which has had powerful influence on later thought. In fact 
the controversy is with us to this day, modified to meet the 
conditions of modern life and thought. The distinction was 
that between the world of science on the one hand, and the 
world of faith on the other ; reason versus revelation, science 
versus religion. In the earlier stages of the controversy it 
was decided that reason was harmonious with faith as far 
as reason could go, but that a point is reached beyond which 
reason could not go ; and at this point faith steps in with 
its more ultimate principles. 1 Revelation was above reason, 
superior to it, and concerning it reason could make no judg- 
ments ; but that division, as Aquinas had made it, did not 
long remain. Reason insisted on freedom from the tram- 
mels of the church and at a much later period, due to the 
conquests which reason made in the realm of the physical 
sciences, reason became supreme and faith took a subordi- 
nate position, if indeed at times it figured at all. In fact the 
general tendency of this whole period well up to the begin- 
ning of the nineteenth century centers about the supremacy 
of reason. We shall inquire into some of the factors which 
tended to magnify reason at the expense of faith ; into some 
of the conditions, social, political, and philosophical, which 
brought about a change in worlds — the change, that is, 
from the other world, to this world. 

2. Influences Leading to the Breakdown of Faith. — We 
have now to consider some of the factors which figured in 

1 Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), who was the greatest writer of the 
Catholic Church and who to this day is its official philosopher, formu- 
lated the doctrine which led to the idea of "the two-fold truth." 



Philosophy from the Renaissance to Berkeley 149 

the shift of interest from the world beyond to this world. 
During the period of church supremacy man was "a pilgrim 
and a stranger here." The flesh and matter were sinful, 
and man's business was to live so that he might gain the 
rewards of the next world. Matter being evil, science which 
has matter as its subject and mundane things has no value 
or significance. But conditions were shaping themselves 
for a change in worlds, for the final triumph of science over 
faith. Some of these conditions we shall indicate in the 
following paragraphs. 

(a) The Crusades. The crusades, the holy wars be- 
tween the Christians and the Mohammedans, are important 
from the standpoint of philosophy because they resulted in 
the bringing back to the west the learning of the east, 
because of the geographical interest awakened, of the intro- 
duction of new customs which prevailed in other regions, and 
the resulting conflict between the ideas of the east and those 
of the west. The Christian west had believed the Moham- 
medan east to be a place of ignorance and darkness, but 
they found it to be far in advance of Christendom in science 
and philosophy. The east had, in fact, carried on the only 
work of a scientific nature since the time of the Greeks. 
The Arabians, while in search of the elixir of life 2 and the 

a One of the important results of the search for the elixer vitce was 
the effects of the principle implicit in the attempt, namely, that it is 
possible to relieve diseases by means of natural processes. Magic, bones, 
relics, and fetishes were thrown aside and material methods came into 
greater prominence. The idea of an indwelling spirit gave way to that 
of the influence of material on material. The practice of medicine in 
Christendom was done by saints and miracle workers. 

"Nothing could be more deplorable than the condition of southern 
Europe when it first felt the intellectual influence of the Arabians. An 
observance of certain ceremonials constituted a religious life. A chip 
of the true cross, some iron filings from the chain of Saint Peter, a 
tooth or a bone of a martyr, were held in adoration; the world was full 



150 An Introduction to Philosophy 

philosopher's stone, made important discoveries in chem- 
istry, e. g., the strong acids which laid the foundations of 
the science, and gun powder which had wonderful social and 
political results. Before the time of Djafar there was no 
known acid stronger than vinegar, and to him is given the 
honor of having first described aqua regia and nitric acid. 
Other discoveries, such as the preparation of alcohol, 
sulphuric acid, and phosphorus, were made by the students 
of the east. We can best get an idea of the extent of learn- 
ing in the east by a glance at the important works of Avi- 
cenna, one of the profoundest thinkers the east has pro- 
duced. Among them are: On the Utility and Advantage of 
Science, Of Health and Remedies, Canons of Physic, On As- 
tronomical Observations, Mathematical Theorems, Demon- 
stration of Collateral Lines on the Sphere, An Abridg- 
ment of Euclid, On Finity and Infinity, On Physics and 
Metaphysics, and An Encyclopaedia of Human Knowledge, 
in 20 volumes. Knowing the barrenness of European 



of stupendous miracles which these relics had performed." (Draper, 
The Intellectual Development of Europe, Vol. I, pp. 413-14. See also, 
Vol. II, pp. 112 ff.) Christendom had become animistic and mythical, 
had lost its grip on the world, and its desire was to give up this world 
for a better one beyond. The age of faith had a poor sense of the value 
of logic and the nature of evidence. This is well illustrated in miracle 
proofs, trials by ordeal, by battle, and a universal belief in supernatural 
agencies. If the character of a princess were assailed, she offered a 
champion; if the witch sinks she was innocent, if she floats she was in 
affiliation with the evil powers. Such facts well illustrate the type of 
mind against which the thought of the east came. That there was room 
for great improvement no one will question, and the improvement did 
take place in the growing importance of science and scientific method. 
The east had also the works of Aristotle. The west came in touch with 
them soon after the crusades, and, while condemning them at first, the 
church soon took them up and spoke of Aristotle as the "forerunner of 
Christ." 
The eastern influence was, as is evident, decidedly against faith. 



PhUosopJiz/ from the Renaissance to Berkeley 151 

thought at the time we can readily imagine the profound 
influence of the introduction into Europe of such knowledge. 

(b) Economic and Social Factors. The growth of towns 
and cities is one of the striking facts of the latter part of 
the middle ages. The growth of towns and the concomitant 
growth of trade and industry have much to do with cen- 
tering man's interests about the things of this world. It 
also works against isolation and the stagnation that results 
from it. Life and its interests become transformed, going 
from the ecclesiastical to the secular, from the other world 
to this one. A wealthy class came into existence, which 
joined the king against the nobles and feudal lords because 
such a union was of decided advantages to trade and indus- 
try. The feudal lords were ever jealous of the king, and 
as commercial classes came to prominence and influence they 
united with the regal authorities against the nobility. In 
this manner a connection was formed between government 
and business, the effects of which are still operative in our 
society. 

Medieval life made no provisions for the individual ; there 
was and could be no expression of individual wants and de- 
sires, for all was settled, man's career was thoroughly and 
rigorously mapped out once for all. But the growth of 
wealth changed all this ; it made possible the expression of 
such abilities as a man possessed in the business activities 
that were rapidly growing at the time. From the individ- 
ualism that was fostered by commercial life grew the 
movement towards nationalism in direct contradiction to the 
universal, authoritative finalism of the church. As the in- 
dividual grew in the face of problems to be solved by 
the demands of a commercial experience, so did groups and 
towns, and finally states grow to be rivals in the keen indus- 
trial struggles which characterized the age. Individualism 



152 An Introduction to Philosophy 

led to nationalism, and to the "self-determination of 
peoples." 

The intellectual aspect of the growth of commercialism 
can hardly be exaggerated. Inventions which increased 
wealth and made worldly success possible lessened the zeal 
for religion, but they did more than this — they favored an 
empirical attitude towards the affairs of life. Inventions 
which are made more or less by the trial and error method ; 
activities which are carried on to meet some present need, 
such as surveying or counting, all lead to results of greatest 
significance, namely, to the theoretical interpretation of 
these practical activities. Practice comes before theory and 
theory can not come de novo, but is built out of and upon 
the interests which practice dictates. Consequently, we see 
that the very life of the middle ages, especially the latter 
part of the period, contained the germ which was later to 
transform the outlook on the world, and the world itself. 

(c) The Growth of Science. The rapid strides in the 
field of natural science told against faith, and tended in gen- 
eral to a mechanical interpretation of the universe. This, of 
course, was disastrous to the church as it was then con- 
ceived, for those very elements which she condemned were 
being used to account for things which she accounted for 
on supernatural premises. The struggle between the church 
and science has been long and bitter, and each has con- 
tributed her martyrs. 

Most striking discoveries were made in astronomy. The 
Moors had been interested in this line of research for sev- 
eral centuries and from them interest in the subject was car- 
ried to the Christian world about the beginning of 1400. 
Improved instruments of investigation made possible added 
information. But the most important bit of work in as- 
tronomy was that done by Copernicus, a little more than 



Philosophy from the Renaissance to Berkeley 153 

four hundred years ago. He discovered facts which would 
not square with the prevailing theory, the Ptolemaic, which 
taught that the earth was the center of the system of 
planets, and offered in its stead the heliocentric theory 
which had been suggested by some of the earlier Greek 
thinkers, notably Aristarchus. This theory asserts that the 
sun and not the earth is the center of the system of heav- 
enly bodies. It is probably one of the most revolutionary 
hypotheses ever advanced, for it changed the whole method 
of looking at the world, a method which had grown up in 
the course of the centuries. All speculation up to the time 
of Copernicus had been made on the assumption that the 
earth was the center of the system, but when the earth was 
found to be but a small speck in the great system some of 
the dignity that had formerly belonged to it and its inhabi- 
tants was taken away. The hypothesis of Copernicus was 
more carefully and accurately verified by Galileo ; and later 
work by Newton and Laplace established the theory of a 
dynamic universe. 

Geographical discoveries were made, which tended to shift 
the attention of people to new topics, generated a spirit of 
adventure, and acquainted Europe with the customs of peo- 
ples heretofore unknown. Attention came to be centered on 
the things of this world rather than on heavenly matters. 

During the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries 
mathematics which the Arabs had learned from the Greeks 
came into Europe; but it was not until about 1630 that ad- 
vance was made by the Europeans. Descartes developed 
analytical geometry, Newton and Leibnitz, the calculus, and 
Newton and Laplace, mechanics. 

In the physical sciences important beginnings were made 
which tended to strengthen the case of reason. Sound, light, 
magnetism, and electricity were taking important places in 



154 An Introduction to Philosophy 

the discussions of physical nature. Pascal's work in the 
pressure of liquids, Bayle's in heat, Newton's in light, and, 
at a later time, Galvani and Volta (about 1775) who worked 
principally in electricity: all these brought about an atti- 
tude towards the physical world very different from that 
which prevailed in the age of faith when matter and the 
things of this world were thought of as "sinful." 

Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood (1628) 
and other discoveries concerning the glands and various 
parts of the body of both man and the lower animals, forti- 
fied the mechanical view of the nature of the organism. A 
mechanical universe and a mechanical human and animal 
body were vivid arguments against a view such as had pre- 
vailed at an earlier period. 

There were many other factors involved in the growth 
from authority and faith to reason which itself became a 
little later as authoritative and dogmatic as were medieval 
church dogmas, but we can do no more than mention them 
here. The revival of ancient literature brought the world 
into connection with the best thought of the Greeks, and 
students who were tired of the barrenness of medieval 
thought fell eagerly into the spirit of the ancient world. 
The Reformation, while not a cause of the growth of a new 
type of thinking, but rather the expression on the religious 
side of the same forces which were operating, is of decided 
interest to the student of philosophy in that it furnishes 
an example of the widespread operation of forces, of the 
effects of the mingling of different peoples of different 
ideals and temperaments, and greatest of all, that methods 
of looking at problems and values of life as well as methods 
of solving them are factors and facts which vary from time 
to time. It illustrates the difficulty of finding eternal prin- 
ciples, eternal values, and immutable ideas. 






Philosophy from the Renaissance to Berkeley 155 

3. The Philosophical Expression of the Period. — The 

Reformation is the expression of the growing individualism 
and the breakdown of authority on the religious side; the 
remarkable advance in astronomy, physics, chemistry, physi- 
ology, and the social sciences, is an expression of the same 
spirit in the world of science ; and various reform move- 
ments and increased interest in politics is evidence that the 
spirit of the age was finding expression in the fields of law 
and government. In all the affairs of life the attention was 
gradually shifting from the ecclesiastical to the secular 
realm ; and what is more, the very affairs of life were them- 
selves becoming secularized. In no department of activity 
is this better seen than in philosophy. Francis Bacon was 
a statesman and a lawyer ; Hobbes, a teacher ; Descartes, a 
soldier and a scientist ; Spinoza, a grinder of lenses ; and 
Leibnitz, almost everything — statesman, literary man, dip- 
lomat, mathematician, et cetera. Heretofore philosophy 
flourished only under the domination of the church ; and the 
very fact that non-churchmen took part as leaders in the 
thought of the day is a vivid example of the changed atti- 
tude. 

There were interesting movements in philosophy during 
the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, 
but we shall confine our sketch to the movement which was 
inaugurated with Francis Bacon. Bacon's chief importance 
for us is the emphasis on experimentation as the method by 
which knowledge is obtained. We must begin with particu- 
lars and build up a principle, Bacon taught, and not do as 
the Scholastics had done, namely, to accept principles on 
authority and to deduce from them conclusions as to what 
the facts must be. He taught that the aim of philosophy is 
service for the best interests of man and society, an early 
expression of what is today more and more emphasized, 



156 An Introduction to Philosophy 

namely, the socialization of science and philosophy. Bacon 
recognized the world of faith but he taught that reason has 
a definite job to do and that was service. He also recog- 
nized that, if we ever expect to arrive at true knowledge, we 
must rid ourselves of all prepossessions and prejudices which 
he called "Idols," and tackle problems in freedom from all 
trammels. We must free ourselves from the Idols of the 
Tribe, those fallacies common to man as man, such, for ex- 
ample as the tendency to interpret the world in terms of 
souls and spirits; and from the Idols of the Cave, prejudices 
due to education and former experience, if we wish to gain 
a true explanation of things. We must banish all presuppo- 
sitions and begin with the facts, and from these work up to 
general principles by gradual steps. How different this is 
from the attitude of authority, reverence for Idols, respect 
for general principles, which characterized the medieval 
period ! 

From Bacon's day onward emphasis has been placed on 
the method by which laws and principles are reached. The 
method of experimentation, that is the method of controlling 
the conditions under which observation occurs, has been 
constantly refined and instruments of various kinds have 
been devised and developed for the purpose of rendering ob- 
servation more accurate and making possible a more care- 
ful control of the data or elements under consideration. It 
is through such a development of an adequate technique that 
science has become such a factor in the development of our 
civilization ; it is largely responsible for the growing im- 
portance of reason over faith and for the conquest of the 
worldly over the heavenly. The older method against 
which Bacon reacted, the method of revelatio and auc- 
toritas, dictated in advance what the particulars must be. 
Fact must square with a principle which was known in ad- 



Philosophy from the Renaissance to Berkeley 157 

vance through revelation or by authority. The common 
story of the monk who thought he had discovered spots on 
the sun but who was told by his superior that the spots were 
in his eyes and not on the sun, because Aristotle had no- 
where spoken of sun spots, illustrates the method of regard- 
ing facts — that they were already accounted for since every- 
thing was known. 

Bacon was instrumental in bringing to consciousness the 
method which the scientist of his day employed. He sug- 
gested as a reason for the feeble influence of science and 
philosophy in his day the lack of an adequate method. The 
method heretofore had been either empirical or dogmatic. 
"The former, like ants, only heap up and use their store ; 
the latter, like spiders, spin out their own web. The bee, 
a mean between both, extracts matter from the flowers of 
the garden and the fields, but works and fashions it by its 
own efforts." The true method of philosophy and science, 
thought Bacon, resembles that of the bee, for it neither relies 
wholly on the powers of the mind, nor lays up in the memory 
a great many facts, but takes material and works it over 
in the understanding. 

Hobbes (1625), another Englishman, was greatly im- 
pressed with the growth of science, and the certainty of 
mathematics. He believed it to be possible to find a prin- 
ciple or set of principles from which all the facts of the 
universe could be deduced in the same manner as the proofs 
of geometry follow from the axioms. Philosophy for 
Hobbes was by no means the type of thing which the church 
believed it to be, the "handmaiden of faith," but he thought 
of it as the reasoned knowledge of effects from causes and 
causes from effects. This conception of the business of 
philosophy was wholly foreign to that view which tied it up 
with hidden powers, final causes, and ultimate realities. 



158 An Introduction to Philosophy 

When we consider what was being accomplished by 
science at the time of Hobbes, we should not be surprised 
to find that the principle which he thinks explains the world 
is motion. It is readily seen that this conception leads to 
a materialistic and mechanical view of the world. The 
scientists had applied the principle of motion to the physi- 
cal world with such success that Hobbes attempted to 
carry it over into life, the life of animals, and of man both 
individual and social. All life is nothing more, according 
to Hobbes, than motion, and to make his scheme complete 
he planned to work out the mechanical principle in the three 
fields of interest, namely, matter, man, and the state, or 
science, psychology and politics. Matter had already been 
treated mechanically by the great scientists of the time, but 
the contribution of Hobbes was that life which is more in- 
teresting than matter can be treated in precisely the same 
manner. Man and society, that is, psychology, sociology, 
politics, economics, et cetera, can be treated mechanically 
just as well as can matter. Interesting as are all the at- 
tempts made by Hobbes to interpret consciousness and so- 
ciety in terms of motion, we can not pursue them here ; but 
we stay by our purpose of pointing out that the world of 
reason was gradually gaining over the world of faith and 
that religion was taking a subordinate position. 

The materialistic philosophy of Hobbes was unable to 
account adequately for the soul, for consciousness, and for 
society. It worked well in the realm of the physical sciences 
but an age which had believed so thoroughly in religion 
could not so soon throw off the religious view of the uni- 
verse and espouse one so radically different. A place must 
be made for both the soul and science, for faith and rea- 
son, for mind and matter, for God and the world. This at- 
tempt was made by Descartes (1630). He showed that 



Philosophy from the Renaissance to Berkeley 159 

there is a bigger problem than that of science — that is, than 
the mechanical scientist of his day thought of it. He drew 
a sharp distinction between the soul and the body, mind and 
matter, a distinction which is a reflection of the middle age 
doctrine of this and the other world, the temporal and the 
spiritual, reason and faith, science and religion. He recog- 
nized that the self is an important factor in any situation 
which is concerned with truth and falsehood. Before this 
time the self as an agent in the matter of truth and false- 
hood had not been considered as of much importance; and, 
consequently, when Descartes recognized the individual con- 
sciousness as an agent in the truth-falsehood situation he 
expressed a doctrine which was soon to be seized upon and 
put to a much greater use than Descartes had made of it. 
Descartes believed as did Bacon that the mind must be free 
from all prejudices, but he furthermore thought that the 
clearness and distinctness of the idea is the test of its truth, 
or as Descartes says, "The first rule was, never to receive 
anything as a truth which I did not clearly know to be 
such." 3 

Descartes began his systematic thinking by doubting 
everything that had been taken as true. His point was to 
find some one thing at least which no one could possibly 
doubt, and from this one certain principle deduce the world 
of experience. The results of his efforts in this direction 
are summed up in the famous principle, "I think, therefore 
I am." Whatever else we may doubt we can not doubt that 
we think. Consciousness is the most certain thing in the 
universe. Thought becomes a fundamental fact of philoso- 
phy. 

But there are objects, there is matter, there is a world. 
Descartes had also to account for these facts of experience. 

* Torrey's translation of the Discourse on Method, part II, p. 46. 



160 An Introduction to Philosophy 

We shall not discuss the details of his arguments — how he 
gets from his own mind to God and the world outside, but 
he does this to his own satisfaction at least. What is of 
interest to us is that he finds two ultimates, two irreducibles, 
namely, mind and matter. The former, as has been sug- 
gested, is a survival of the faith side of the old church dis- 
pute in the latter middle ages, while the latter provides for 
the world of science which was constantly growing. Going 
still farther back in time, the mind side of the Cartesian 
dualism is a survival of the Orphic tendencies in early Greek 
thought, the matter side of the dualism representing the 
Olympic tradition. 

Descartes had left a chasm between mind and matter, two 
radically different things as he conceived them, and the 
problem of philosophers immediately succeeding Descartes 
was to bridge the gap between them. How these attempts 
were made and what was accomplished in that direction 
belong rather to the history of philosophy. But one at- 
tempt is especially interesting to us and gives rise to the 
second type of idealism — that of Berkeley, known as Sub- 
jective Idealism. 

REFERENCES 

Berry, A Short History of Astronomy, 76-409; 

Bury, A History of Freedom of Thought; 

Cambridge, Modern History, Vol. I, Chapters XV, XVI, 
XVII; 

Dessoir, M., Outlines of the History of Psychology; 

Draper, Intellectual Development of Europe, Vol. I, Chap- 
ter XIII, and Vol. II, Chapters V, VIII ; 

Foster, M., Lectures on the History of Physiology; 

Hoffding, H., History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. I, 3- 
206; 

Jacobs, J., The Story of Geographical Discovery ; 



Philosophy from the Renaissance to Berkeley 161 

Jenks, E., A Short History of English Law; 

Lecky, W. E. H., History of the Rise and Influence of Ra- 
tionalism in Europe ; 

Lindsay, T. M., History of the Reformation, Vol. I; 

Lodge, Sir O., Pioneers of Science; 

Muir, M. M. P., History of Biology; 

Rogers, A. K., Student's History of Philosophy, 223-251 ; 

Sidgwick, The Development of European Polity; 

Thilly, F., History of Philosophy, 227-250; 

Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences ; 

White, A. D., History of the Warfare of Science with 
Theology in Christendom ; 

Windelband, W., History of Philosophy, translated by 
Tufts, 348-425. 



CHAPTER XII 



SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM 



1. Introductory. — We have said that idealism operates on 
the principle of the priority of mind, soul, idea, or con- 
sciousness. The difference between the various types lies 
in the main in the different conceptions of the nature of 
consciousness. For subjective idealism consciousness is that 
of the individual, yours and mine. For objective idealism 
consciousness is something universal, absolute ; it is a spirit, 
mind, or soul in the absolute and universal sense. Objective 
idealism universalizes the individual consciousness. Whereas 
in subjective idealism all things are the content of the in- 
dividual consciousness, in objective idealism things are the 
content or expression of an absolute or universal mind. But 
in both cases the primary assumption is that mind in some 
form is the chief concept in the universe. 

We should bear in mind that idealism is both a theory of 
reality and a theory of knowledge, both an ontological and 
an epistemological theory. As a theory of reality it asserts 
that the essence of things is mind or spirit, and as a theory 
of knowledge it teaches that things exist only in knowledge 
or consciousness, and that consciousness is constitutive of 
knowledge or things. As to the origin of knowledge ideal- 
ism may be empirical or rationalistic, or both. 

There is a vast difference between the idealism of Plato 
and that of Berkeley, but there are many points in common 

162 



Subjective Idealism 163 

between them. Not the least of these is the fact that they 
both have a common ancestor, the Orphic tradition in Greek 
speculation. Platonic idealism grew up to meet the individ- 
ualistic and materialistic tendencies of his age as did sub- 
jective idealism to meet the demands of the heart against 
the scientific and materialistic tendencies in the time of 
Berkeley. Plato combatted the individualistic tendencies, 
as we have seen, by the doctrine of universals or fixed types 
which serve as patterns for all the particular things of this 
world. Chief of these Platonic types was the idea of the 
Good or God. Berkeley was primarily a man of the church, 
and sought to show that all the achievements of science 
could be accounted for in terms of religion. Descartes had 
made the way somewhat clear for Berkeley, for the latter 
had but to accept one aspect of the Cartesian dualism, 
namely, the mental or thought side, to render his victory 
complete. The scientist, however, had been interested only 
in the matter side of the dualism of Descartes, and the re- 
sult of such a procedure was to render materialism and 
mechanism supreme. Descartes had attempted to find a place 
for both matter and mind, but in finding a place for both, he 
created an equally difficult question as to their connection. 
With a dualistic system, a system which begins with two 
principles, mind and matter, at least three possibilities arise 
in reference to the relation that may obtain between them. 
One aspect of the dualism may be emphasized to the exclu- 
sion of the other, that is, one may be considered the ulti- 
mate, and the other interpreted in its terms. Then again, 
both may be true ultimates which work together in some 
form of parallelism. The third possibility is that both may 
be factors in a larger, more inclusive whole, and that neither 
is an ultimate except for purposes of discussion and for the 



164 An Introduction to Philosophy 

organization of experience. Of these possibilities Berkeley 
chose the mind aspect for emphasis, and interpreted matter 
in terms of mind. 

2. Berkeley's Problem. — The rapid growth of the ma- 
terialistic conception of the universe due in a large degree 
by the conquests of science, led to a reconstruction of re- 
ligion. All the philosophers of the early modern period 
were interested in the religious problem, but they considered 
it in the light of reason rather than faith. Natural re- 
ligion which taught that revelation is in harmony with rea- 
son, and Deism which thought of God as an intelligent cre- 
ator were the prevailing conceptions in religious specula- 
tions. But Berkeley attempted something quite different. 
He attempted to show that the world is a mental or spiritual 
world. In this manner he got rid of matter altogether. 

We may state Berkeley's problem thus : How can a ma- 
terialistic, scientific world be interpreted in terms of relig- 
ion? Science may perform wonders in the realm of matter, 
but if it can be shown that the very stuff that science works 
with is in its very nature menial, then materialism such as 
Hobbes advocated must fall to the ground. 

It is necessary to keep before us the fact that from early 
Greek days onward the mental was the god-like. The mental 
was connected with the soul, the spirit, the ghost, the Good, 
with God. Matter was evil ; it was matter that resisted the 
spirit, the soul, the mental; it was the burden of creation. 
Aristotle so regarded matter — it was recalcitrant, resisted 
the form or the idea ; Plotinus had an extremely poor opin- 
ion of matter ; and, in fact, the general tradition of philoso- 
phy was adverse to matter. Now, if matter can be ex- 
plained in terms of mind, if, that is, matter becomes spirit- 
ual, then science becomes spiritualized, and all is saved for 
religion or soul. The great achievements of science would 



Subjective Idealism 165 

after all be an expression of the soul of man, a soul which, 
as Plato said, had come from the realm of perfect forms, 
perfect justice, perfect science, perfect good. 

3. The Scientist's Material. — The scientist works with 
definite stuff, data, material. Certain categories are es- 
sential to any scientific progress whatever, such as time, 
space, mass, and motion. Geometry which played such an 
important role in determining the method of science, deals 
with space; astronomy, in which the greatest conquests had 
been made, deals in part with time and motion; and the idea 
of cause, so essential in science, was, in the early stages of 
scientific discovery, closely tied up with mass. The centi- 
meter, the gram, and the second, the fundamental categories 
or concepts of our present day physics, illustrate the space, 
mass, and time needs of physical science. Given these, the 
scientist believes he can construct a world. Democritus 
needed atoms and the space they move in, and Newton the 
same "givens," in order to build quite a stately universe. 
For the materialistic philosopher or scientist, philosophy 
is the doctrine of the motion of bodies ; but Berkeley be- 
lieved that he had taken the foundation from the material- 
istic structure. 

4. Berkeley's Solution. — The briefest statement of the 
solution of the materialistic and atheistic problem is that 
the stuff and the categories of science are reduced to mind, 
they are mental, and hence spiritual. If space and matter 
are mental then science is mental and not material for space 
and matter constitute the stuff that science deals with. 
Berkeley believed that his solution answered a great many 
of the difficulties that had arisen in the speculations of the 
past, such as "whether corporeal substance can think," 
"whether matter is infinitely divisible," and "how it oper- 
ates on spirit." He believed, too, that he had overcome 



166 An Introduction to Philosophy 

scepticism. "So long as we attribute real existence to un- 
thinking things * * * it is not only impossible for us 
to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking 
thing, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see phi- 
losophers distrust their senses, and doubt the existence of 
heaven and earth, of everything they see and feel, even of 
their own bodies." * Of matter which has been the material 
of the scientist Berkeley further says, "it has been the main 
pillar of Scepticism," and on it "have been raised all the 
impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion." He thinks 
that if the cornerstone of matter can be removed "the whole 
fabric can not but choose to fall to the ground insomuch 
that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular con- 
sideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Athe- 
ists." In this manner does Berkeley, the advocate of re- 
ligion, plead as did Plato, the advocate of permanence, two 
thousand years before. 

How does Berkeley go about the solution? This is the 
most interesting portion of his work. We shall begin with 
space. Berkeley anticipates the objections which will be 
raised against (his arguments and consequently answers 
them in advance. "It will be objected," he said, "that we 
see things actually without or at a distance from us, and 
which consequently do not exist in the mind ; it being absurd 
that those things which we see at the distance of several 
miles, should be as near to us as our own thoughts." 2 
Berkeley gives two answers to this objection. The first is 
that in dreams we seem to see things at a distance when 
there is no outside reality which causes the idea of the thing. 
The second, and more important, answer is that given in his 

>A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. 88. 
"Treatise, Sec. 42. 



Subjective Idealism 167 

New Theory of Vision, a work which, in many respects, is 
modern in tone. He shows that we do not see distance at 
all, but what we get through the senses are sensations of 
color, touch, and tension. When things are said to be seen 
in the distance we mean, says Berkeley, that in order to 
reach the thing certain muscular movements must take 
place. Vision is nothing more than a sign by which a color 
sensation stands for a sensation of movement. 

We do not see space, distance, but we have only sensa- 
tions which are signs of other sensations to be had in the 
future. Since our sensations are ours, that is, within us 
and not outside, what we know as space is within and not 
something on the outside. 

Matter, "the main pillar of Scepticism," is also shown to 
be mental. The distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities had already been made, especially by John Locke 
who worked about the same time as Berkeley. Secondary 
qualities are those which depend upon the one perceiving, 
such as colors, odors, and tastes. If there were no eyes 
there would be no colors, no ears no sounds, et cetera. Pri- 
mary qualities are those that do not depend upon the one 
perceiving, but are those that are essential to the existence 
of the object itself, such as mass, extension, and motion. 
Primary qualities are in the object; secondary are in the 
subject or depend upon the subject. Berkeley became sus- 
picious of the so-called primary qualities. He believed that 
if secondary qualities depend upon the individual primary 
qualities do also ; or rather he questioned the existence of 
any primary qualities at all. Remove from a body its quali- 
ties and there is nothing left — its color, shape, et cetera, are 
the body, and these depend upon the one who is perceiving. 

Locke had taught that all we know comes through the 



168 An Introduction to Philosophy 

senses, but he thought that there is something he knew not 
what, but which he called substance to which qualities be- 
long. Color, sound, taste, and all secondary qualities are, 
Locke thought, dependent upon the subject, andj of course, 
are learned in experience. Primary qualities, however, while 
learned through experience, belong to something, they are in 
something or on something, some background which holds 
qualities together. This background or substratum he 
called substance. Now, Berkeley also believed that all our 
knowledge comes through the senses, and he naturally raised 
the question as to what was the basis or foundation for the 
idea of substance. He found that there is no basis for it at 
all and consequently rejected it as a fiction of the imagina- 
tion. Abstract ideas, such as the idea of substance, are the 
source of innumerable philosophic woes, thought Berkeley, 
and a consideration of them led him to his famous statement 
concerning the ailment of philosophers: "Upon the whole, 
I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, 
of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, 
and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to 
themselves — they have first raised a dust and then complain 
we can not see." Every idea is a concrete fact and if we 
can not find an image back of the idea we can be sure that 
there is no idea at all. 

Thus there is no such idea as substance for qualities to 
belong to and the result is that there are only qualities. If 
there are only qualities they exist only for a perceiving 
mind. That is, to be is to be perceived. This is the bur- 
den of Berkeley's discussion of matter: "esse est percipi." 
He asks us to try to talk about or to reason about matter 
or anything else ; then, when we reason about it, or talk 
about it, we are perceiving it. He also asks us to tell what 



Subjective Idealism 169 

we mean by the existence of an object or matter which is 
not perceived or known. If we attempt to tell what we 
mean by the existence of an object which is not known, he 
can reply that the very fact that we are discussing it indi- 
cates that it is in our mind. 

There can be nothing on the outside that corresponds to 
our ideas, nothing like them on the outside of which they 
are resemblances or copies ; for there is nothing like an idea 
except another idea. "An idea can be like nothing; a color 
or figure can be like nothing but another color or figure. If 
we look but never so little into our own thoughts, we shall 
find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except be- 
tween our ideas." If these so-called external things are 
perceivable then they are ideas, if they are not perceivable 
"I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a color is 
like something which is invisible ; hard or soft like something 
intangible ; and so of the rest." 3 

Let us recount briefly what Berkeley believed he had done. 
In the first place, although we are not following the order 
of his arguments, he, following Locke, criticises the idea of 
substance, showing that there is no such idea: for there is 
no idea which does not originate in the senses. In the next 
place he reduces all primary qualities to secondary, that is, 
primary qualities as well as secondary belong to or depend 
upon the individual who perceives them. What is spoken 
of as matter Berkeley reduces to qualities which depend 
upon a perceiving, knowing mind. Consequently, what 
science deals with, mass, motion, time, space, are ideas in 
the mind ; so that science becomes spiritualized, dematerial- 
ized, and the problem of the scientists is a lesser problem of 
the religious philosopher. Science is shown to be not all, 
•The Treatise, Sec. 8. 



170 An Introduction to Philosophy 

not able to explain the universe, but to be one aspect of a 
larger universe, one part in a larger whole, which is to be 
explained spiritually. 

REFERENCES 

Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous; 
Eraser, A. C, Berkeley's Works ; 

Hume, D., An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; 
Jerusalem, W., An Introduction to Philosophy, translated 

by Sanders, 81-83 ; 
Leighton, J. A., The Field of Philosophy, 178-182; 

Mill, J. S., An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's 

Philosophy, Chapters X-XIII; 
Perry, R. B., An Approach to Philosophy, 267-306; 
Rogers, A. K., Modern Philosophy, 61-87, and History of 

Philosophy, 346-365 ; 
Russell, B., The Problems of Philosophy, Chapter IV; 
Thilly, F., History of Philosophy, 325-345 ; 
Weber, A., History of Philosophy, 391-399. 



CHAPTER XIII 



OBJECTIVE IDEALISM 



1. Introduction. — We have seen that Berkeley reduced 
the world of science to spirit or mind, but this mind was 
the mind of the individual knower. Such a view which 
makes the objective world depend upon the individual 
knower does not make a powerful appeal to men, for a 
more stable and permanent world is demanded. There was 
a defect in Berkeley's philosophy which was soon discovered 
by David Hume, who immediately succeeded Berkeley in 
English philosophy. Berkeley had said that matter is 
nothing more than a series or group of sensations. Hume 
admitted this, but he went one step further and said that 
mind, too, is nothing but a series or group of sensations. In 
other words, Hume did for mind precisely what Berkeley did 
for matter. Both the world of the spirit and the world of 
science are left by Hume as a series of sense impressions ; 
and if Berkeley rendered a sad blow to matter, "the pillar 
of scepticism," Hume rendered an equally sad one to spirit, 
the bulwark of religion. Hume's destructive work marked 
an epoch in English empirical philosophy, and made neces- 
sary a reconstruction of all that had been done hitherto in 
philosophy. When we remember that all religion and 
science had been reduced to a series of individual sense im- 
pressions, we readily see that a readjustment must be made 
or philosophy becomes bankrupt. 

Hume's chief attack against science is made through an 
analysis of the idea of causation. He assumes that Berke- 

171 



172 An Introduction to Philosophy 

ley is correct in the theory that every idea must go back to 
some sense impression. Every object of knowledge is either 
an impression or an idea, the difference being the "degrees 
of force and liveliness with which they strike upon the 
mind." Impressions are what we call perceptions, the con- 
sciousness of things immediately present, while ideas are 
the consciousness of things not present to the senses. All 
ideas go back to impressions, all knowledge originates in 
the senses. How does Hume apply this doctrine to the idea 
of cause? He does it by asking us to tell the impression 
which is at the source of the idea. Can we see cause, or 
hear it, or taste it? No, what we see is one thing or event 
following or succeeding another, but the chief factor, 
namely, necessary connection, we can never see or in any 
way learn through sense perception. Cause, therefore, is 
nothing more than custom or habit. We become accus- 
tomed to seeing things together or otherwise experiencing 
them simultaneously or successively, and we say that one 
is the cause or the effect of the other. In this way one of 
the fundamental categories of science is destroyed, neces- 
sary connection being reduced to habitual association of 
ideas. 

The self, soul, or spirit is disposed of in a similar man- 
ner. He asks of us to point out the impression that gives 
us the idea of soul, spirit, or mind. Since this can not be 
done, but only some particular perception such as "heat or 
cold, light or shade, love and hate, pain and pleasure," 
Hume concludes that what Berkeley calls "mind" or "spirit" 
is merely a group of such perceptions. Consequently the 
world as Hume left it is a sorry one for both science and 
religion. 

2. What Objective Idealism Is. — We can best understand 
what objective idealism is by keeping in mind Berkeley's 
subjective idealism. The latter asserts that the world is 



Objective Idealism 173 

the individual's idea, that to be is to be perceived by some 
mind. The world is within; it is a group of impressions 
and ideas. Objective idealism is intended to remedy the de- 
fects of subjective idealism by removing, the world from 
the mind of the individual thinker and making it the idea of 
a greater mind, a universal mind, a God mind. The pur- 
pose is the same in both cases — to subordinate science to 
faith, or to interpret materialism in terms of spiritualism; 
but whereas Berkeley had done so with the individual mind, 
objective idealism attempts the same thing on a larger 
scale — it universalizes the individual. The world is not my 
idea, says objective idealism, but is the idea of a greater 
mind, of which my finite mind in some way partakes. As 
art is an idea objectified, rendered tangible and visible; so 
is nature and the world at large the objectification of a 
divine or universal mind. As far as the individual knower 
is concerned this type of idealism is objective, but from the 
point of view of the universal mind things depend upon it 
as they do in the subjectivistic type as represented in 
Berkeley. 

Speaking in terms of the outline at the end of Chapter 
VIII, we may say that objective idealism is a theory of 
knowledge and also a theory of reality. The real is a sys- 
tem of ideas which is the product of a superhuman creative 
intelligence. Knowledge, in one sense of the term, is just the 
process of creation, of making reality. From another point 
of view knowledge is insight into the system of reality made 
possible by a divine creative mind. Human knowledge in the 
Kantian sense is the process of constructing a world of 
objects out of the raw material furnished by the senses, 1 

1 The student should understand that every type of philosophy must 
take account of all the problems of experience. We have not attempted, 
for example, to state the theory of conduct involved in Hobbes' material- 
istic philosophy, yet materialism has its politics, its religion, and its 
ethics. 



174 An Introduction to Philosophy 

3. Problems Which Led to Objective Idealism. 2 — We 
seen that objective idealism is the result of the attempt to 
universalize the mind of the individual knower. What were 
some of the problems which rendered such a course neces- 
sary ? 

In the first place Hume had shown how unstable is the 
position of empiricism — that when carried to its logical con- 
clusions it leads to skepticism. 3 Yet there are truths in 
empiricism that can not be thrown aside. Consequently, 
empiricism must be reckoned with in any attempt to give 
an adequate view of the world. 

We remember, too, that from Descartes to the time of 
Kant (fl. about 1775), reason was one of the great factors 
in life. Reason had won great victories in the realm of 
science and it became the controlling factor in the philoso- 
phy of the period between 1650 and 1750, in the great sys- 
tems of Leibnitz and Spinoza — systems of rationalism 
which bear witness to the powers of man's intellect, and to 
the influence on the mind of the certainty of mathematics 
and of the achievements of science. Reason became the 
lord and master of the universe, and made claims which ap- 

2 We can not go tar into the details of objective idealism in this in- 
troductory treatment of the subject. We shall state the doctrine briefly 
as it is found in Kant's philosophy, for this is the foundation of all 
future developments of this type of idealism. The most complete state- 
ment of it is found in the works of Hegel who flourished about 1820. 
Kant is an objective idealist only in a certain sense, but inasmuch as he 
marks the starting point of all the great idealistic systems, and of the 
idealistic movement which began about the close of 1700, an understand- 
ing of the problems which he attempted to solve and of the solutions he 
offered -should be possessed by every student of philosophy. The ro- 
mantic movement in philosophy is another offshoot of the Kantian 
philosophy, but it goes far back to the Orphic tradition and to primi- 
tive animism. We shall have to omit a treatment of this altogether. 
We can barely mention that it arose as one aspect of the general awaken- 
ing which is represented on the political side by the French Revolution. 

8 That is, empiricism as formulated by the early English thinkers. 



Objective Idealism 175 

peared extravagant to some, such as its ability to reach ul- 
timate and eternal truth. The results of such a tendency 
must be taken up in the new philosophy of idealism launched 
by Immanuel Kant. 

Then religion and faith came in for consideration. Re- 
ligion which had occupied the attention of the philosophers 
throughout the period from Descartes to Kant had suffered 
in the war between it and science, but it would not down; 
and the problems of God, Freedom, and Immortality are 
the chief interests for the Kantian philosophy. As has 
been remarked, idealism is always an ally of religion, of 
permanence, of purpose, of teleology; and with Kant as 
with Berkeley, the ruling interest is religion. So strongly 
impressed with religion was Kant that he was willing to 
sacrifice reason for faith. "I had to destroy reason in 
order to make a place for faith." 

The problem of science must also be considered, for as 
we have seen, science, the product of reason, had become 
strong and bold. It laid claim to all creation, and all dif- 
ficulties of whatsoever kind must be tried at the bar of rea- 
son by the methods of science. The method of deduction as 
found in geometry and that of hypothesis as practiced by 
the great astronomers dominated intellectual activity. It 
was essential, therefore, that the new philosophy find a 
place for science and mathematics. 

Briefly, the following are the chief problems which entered 
into the thinking of Kant in his efforts to formulate a sys- 
tem which would give each its proper place; problems, 
moreover, which were fiercely contested during the years 
before Kant : 

(a) Empiricism — a doctrine as to the origin of knowl- 
edge, which asserts that all knowledge comes from 
experience and is based on sense perception ; 

(b) Rationalism, which asserts the supremacy of reason 



176 An Introduction to Philosophy 

and its ability to solve all the problems of the uni- 
verse ; 

(c) Religion, once supreme, but at the time of Kant and. 
before, a loser in the struggle with reason ; 

(d) Science and mathematics — the field in which reason 
had wrought its wonders. 

4. Kant's Solution of These Problems. — Kant's philoso- 
phy is extremely important for several reasons, the chief 
one being the stimulation towards further developments in 
philosophic theories. Another reason for the importance 
of his philosophy is its synthetic character; all the threads 
of thought which had figured in the life of the intellectual 
world from the time of Bacon and Descartes to his own time 
are taken up and given a place in his system. The Kantian 
system represents in modern times what Plato's did in an- 
cient — the synthesis of all the currents which the intellec- 
tual life of the people had developed. Kant's efforts, how- 
ever, fared better than Plato's for the modern idealist lived 
in a more stable society which permitted development and 
criticism which were denied the work of the ancient sage. 

Of the currents which entered Kant's thinking we have 
mentioned empiricism, a subject to be treated more at length 
in our next chapter. Here we may say that the movement 
began with the English monks in the latter part of the 
middle ages, and that, on the whole, it may be characterized 
as a theory concerning the origin of knowledge. It asserts 
that experience is fundamental, that authority unless based 
on experience is a vain and empty show, and that knowledge 
is built out of sense material gained by observation of the 
facts of nature. But Hume had shown how fickle is the 
foundation of empiricism as this had been treated by its ad- 
vocates. He showed that if empiricism is true the position 
of the soul as well as that of matter is shallow and unstable. 



Objective Idealism 177 

Kant felt the necessity of a more stable theory of knowledge 
than empiricism offered, but he felt also that empiricism 
contained an element of truth; and with this in mind he 
offered his famous theory of the relation of experience to 
knowledge. He asserted that all knowledge comes not from 
experience but through or with experience. "There can be 
no doubt whatever," he says, "that all our knowledge be- 
gins with experience. But, although all our knowledge be- 
gins with experience, it by no means follows that it all 
originates from experience. For it may well be that ex- 
perience is itself made up of two elements, one received 
through impressions of sense, and the other supplied from 
itself by our faculty of knowledge on occasion of these im- 
pressions." Here we find the kernel of one aspect of Kant's 
thinking. There are two elements in experience, one that 
which the empiricists had defended, and which Kant called 
the matter or stuff of experience, and the other the form of 
experience, which is furnished by the mind itself. The forms 
of experience are the contribution which Kant makes to the 
philosophy of the time. Locke and others had taught that 
the mind is as a blank piece of paper; but Kant found that 
it is a complex affair made up of forms, patterns, or molds 
which receive and fashion the material that is handed to it 
by the senses. It is a blank as far as knowledge is con- 
cerned, that is true, but it stands ready as a mill to grind 
any grist brought to it by the customers which are the sense 
organs — to grind any grist, that is, that it has forms, 
molds, or machinery for grinding; for there may be grists 
which it cannot grind due to lack of machinery for the pur- 
pose. 

Kant finds that there is a kind of knowledge which is inde- 
pendent of all experience whatever, and he calls this a priori 
knowledge to distinguish it from a 'posteriori knowledge 



178 An Introduction to Philosophy 

which has its source in experience. Thus we see that there 
are two sources of knowledge, one experience which answers 
the demands of empiricism; the other, not in experience at 
all, but in the very nature and constitution of the mind it- 
self. Empiricism thus finds a place in the Kantian system 
but it is a subordinate one and is not the chief factor in 
knowledge as Locke and others had taught. 

The rationalistic element takes a prominent place in the 
Kantian philosophy. That such would be the case is evi- 
dent from the remarkable conquests of reason, a brief sur- 
vey of which we have offered in an earlier section. Never in 
the history of thought had reason claimed more and never 
were its conquests greater. The systems of philosophy that 
arose with Leibnitz and Spinoza, the Enlightenment which 
had such a strong grip on the life of England and France, 
and which is so clearly seen in the literature of the period, 
as in Pope, are all witnesses of the exalted opinions concern- 
ing the power of reason. 

Kant, accordingly, found it essential to make a place for 
reason and its results in that system which he considered 
of equal importance from the standpoint of philosophy as 
was the Copernican astronomy from the standpoint of 
science. Whether the "Copernican revolution" in philoso- 
phy has been as significant as the real one in astronomy 
might be open to question, but this is true that Kant re- 
stated the problems of philosophy and set in motion forces 
that are operative to this day. 

The Critique of Pure Reason is Kant's chief work. In 
this he attempts to answer the problems set by rationalism 
by assigning to reason the limits within which it could suc- 
cessfully operate. His method consisted in discovering the 
forms or molds which the mind possesses, of invoicing the 
mind to arrive at a knowledge of its stock in trade; and 



Objective Idealism 179 

having discovered this, of showing that it can operate only 
to the extent of its endowment. Without going into the 
details of his theory we may say that he finds the mind in 
possession of four sets of categories or forms which operate 
on the stuff furnished by the senses. These forms are quan- 
tity, quality, relation, and modality. These correspond 
roughly with the principal parts of speech, those means we 
employ in our thinking and conversation. In the same way 
that if we speak or hold a conversation at all we must do 
so in the parts of speech of our language, so, if we think at 
all, must we use the categories or the forms of thought. 
That is, we can not think in terms of any part of speech 
which we do not possess, but to think at all we must employ 
those which we have developed. In the same way, Kant 
thought that all thinking to occur at all must occur in 
terms of these four fundamental categories or thought forms 
which are innate, in the mind from the beginning, and in 
no way dependent upon experience. Empiricism, there- 
fore, is wrong, Kant thinks, in asserting that all knowledge 
is from experience, and that the mind is as a blank piece of 
paper. Rationalism is also wrong in asserting that reason 
is able to answer all the problems of life for reason can only 
operate on the stuff which the senses bring to it, and can 
then only operate in keeping with the forms or machinery 
which the understanding possesses. The leather, so to 
speak, which goes into the factory comes out in the form of 
shoes because the machinery of the factory is made for pre- 
cisely that purpose — the making of shoes. In the same 
manner the raw stuff that comes in through the senses is 
turned out in the form of objects of knowledge because the 
machinery of the mind is knowledge machinery. 

Kant changed the relation that had obtained between 
knowledge and the object. "In metaphysical speculations 



180 An Introduction to Philosophy 

it has always been assumed that our knowledge must con- 
form to objects; but every attempt from this point of view 
to extend our knowledge of objects a priori by means of 
conceptions had ended in failure. The time has now come 
to ask whether better progress may not be made by sup- 
posing that objects must conform to our knowledge." Em- 
piricism had taught that our ideas are copies of the object 
outside, but Kant showed that the object is a product of 
the machinery of the mind — that we make or construct ob- 
jects. The object is our innate forms pressed or stamped 
upon the material of sense. Objects are ideas in the sense 
that they are constructed by the machinery of the mind. 

Now, it is evident that reason can not operate in the 
field of man's greatest interest, namely, the field of reli- 
gion. God, Freedom, and Immortality, Kant urged, are the 
supreme interests of man and they can not be treated from 
the point of view of reason for reason can deal only with the 
material which the senses furnish and they provide no ma- 
terial in the religious realm. Again, the categories of the 
mind are rational categories, forms of reason, such as cause 
and effect, substance, et cetera. Therefore neither the 
senses nor the intellect can deal with the religious problem, 
the problem of chief interest from the Kantian standpoint. 
Reason, as we have suggested, in the hands of the Enlighten- 
ers, the rationalists, was supreme in every sphere of inter- 
est, but Kant limited reason, showed what its field is, and 
in what field it could operate successfully, in order to make 
a place for faith. Reason can work in the world of space 
and time, of cause and effect, of motion and rest : that is, in 
the world of science, but it is unable to function in that 
higher realm, the realm of duty, of morality, and religion. 
Idealism, in the hands of Kant, takes its old place as the 
defender and ally of religion. The old struggle between re- 



Objective Idealism 181 

ligion and science was settled by Kant in favor of the for- 
mer when reason took the subordinate position of the fac- 
ulty which deals with the spatial, the temporal, and the 
material. The doctrine of the "two-fold truth" was settled 
again, not indeed as the earlier thinkers had settled it, for 
reason and faith belong for Kant to two wholly distinct 
worlds. 

Reason can not prove the existence of God as Descartes 
had thought, but Kant thinks that even this is an advantage 
for if reason can not prove God's existence it is also unable 
to prove that He does not exist. "I cannot share the opin- 
ion, so frequently expressed by excellent and thoughtful men 
who * * * indulge in a hope that the future would 
supply us with evident demonstration of the two cardinal 
propositions of pure reason, that there is a God, and that 
there is a future life. I am certain on the contrary that 
this will never be the case." 4 But our moral will, our prac- 
tical reason, demands God. It is necessary to postulate 
freedom in order to satisfy the demands of the moral law. 
The good for Kant is the Good Will; and we are to act in 
every case as if we should be willing that our act become a 
universal law. Are we tempted to kill? Ask this question 
and govern your conduct accordingly : Are you willing 
that every one else do the same tiling? 

Reason operates in one realm, religion and morality in 
another. By destroying reason or limiting it, Kant limits 
the field of science — there is a point beyond which reason 
can not go. But why is science in its own sphere so cer- 
tain? Why the certainty of mathematics? These were 
great problems, for mathematics had been the model of 
procedure. Descartes believed that to be true which was 
clear and distinct, and the axioms of geometry greatly im- 
4 Critique of Pure Reason. Muller's Translation, p. 741. 



18& An Introduction to Philosophy 

pressed him. Why, asks Kant, the certainty of mathe- 
matics? How is it possible that we can make judgments 
that are true beyond experience? Kant saw that on Bacon's 
principles of induction this could not be the case and he 
sought to answer for the certainty of mathematics and 
science, and for the fact that we are able to make judgments 
that go beyond experience. He answers it briefly in this 
way: the forms of sense (space and time) and understand- 
ing (the categories) dictate what the object must be. In 
order to have any experience whatever it is necessary that 
experience take place in the forms of sense and the under- 
standing. Mathematics is certain and our ideas fit nature 
because space is a form of sense, we see things spatially be- 
cause space is the condition of our seeing anything at all. 
So with cause and effect which Hume had reduced to habit 
or custom. Cause is a category of the understanding and 
to have experience at all means that this experience is 
ground out through the category of cause. Nature and 
ideas agree, not because ideas are a copy of nature, but 
because nature is made by ideas or forms. Consequently 
we can render judgments which are valid beyond experience 
because to have any experience at all means that the ex- 
perience will be rational and scientific. 

Such, briefly, is the method employed by Kant to meet 
the problems which the age had set for him — those of em- 
piricism, rationalism, and religion. But he makes it clear 
that we never know things as they are in themselves, but 
know them only through the glasses of space, time, and the 
categories of the understanding. What things are in them- 
selves we can never know, for to know means that the ma- 
terial becomes categorized. The thing-in-itself became the 
center of much controversy and led to various interpreta- 
tions in the hands of later idealists. In Hegel's system the 



Objective Idealism 183 

universe, as we witness it, is the product of an absolute 
spirit — all objects are ideas made tangible and visible. We 
have, therefore, objective idealism which asserts that ob- 
jects are the product of a mind — in Kant, in one sense, it is 
the mind of man, in Hegel and others the mind of an ab- 
solute intelligence or spirit ; but for all types of idealism the 
fundamental fact must be kept in mind that consciousness, 
spirit, soul, and consequently religion are the supreme cate- 
gories of life. 

REFERENCES 

Fullerton, G., Introduction to Philosophy; 

Green, T. H., Prolegomena to Ethics ; 

Jevons, F. B., Philosophy — What is it?, Chapter II; 

Kant, Critique of Pure Reason; 

Kuelpe, O., Introduction to Philosophy, 194-207; 

Paulsen, F., Introduction to Philosophy, 334 ff. ; 

Perry, R. B., An Approach to Philosophy, 349-395, The 
Present Conflict of Ideals, Chapter XVI, Present Phil- 
osophical Tendencies, 113-197; 

Rogers, A. K., Modern Philosophy, 139-221 ; 

Royce, J., Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 101-135, 190-228, 
Part II, Chapters X-XI ; 

Thilly, F., History of Philosophy, 391-431 ; 

Wallace, Kant, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics ; 

Watson, Selections from Kant; 

Weber, A., History of Philosophy, 345-535; 

Wenley, R. M., An Outline of Kant's Critique of Pure Rea- 
son; 

Windelband, W., History of Philosophy, translated by 
Tufts, 529-623. 



CHAPTER XIV 



EMPIRICISM 



1. Introduction. — Empiricism is the name given to the 
characteristic thought of the English people. We should 
not get the impression that all English thinkers have been 
empiricists in the sense we are using the term but the note 
that runs through almost all of the great thinkers of the 
English speaking countries is the empirical or the practical. 
As soon as the conditions of the times permitted an ex- 
pression of the trend of the English mind we witness the 
attitude of the man who has a definite thing to be done in 
this world, a particular problem to be solved, and a prac- 
tical method of solving it. 

The earliest expression of empiricism is to be found in 
the attitude of the English in the conflict between realism 
and nominalism in the latter part of the middle ages. John 
of Salisbury in the twelfth, Roger Bacon in the thirteenth, 
and Duns Scotus and William of Oakham in the fourteenth 
century, express the general trend and bias of the English 
mind. "The real beginning of English philosophy is to be 
dated from Bacon's break with Scolasticism. The Scho- 
lastic philosophy was not national; it represents the com- 
mon intellectual effort of Christian Europe." * "The Eng- 
lish language may be said to have become for the first time 
the vehicle of philosophical literature by the publication of 
Bacon's Advancement of Learning, in 1605 * * * Na- 
1 Seth, English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy, p. 10. 

184 



Empiricism 185 

tional characteristics are never so strongly marked in 
science and philosophy as in other branches of literature, 
and their influence takes longer in making itself felt." It is 
true that it is more difficult to mark characteristics in 
philosophy and science, but in the case of empiricism and 
English speculation the case is not so difficult as in many 
others. 

Empiricism centers about a theory of knowledge, an epi- 
stemology ; while continental thought has usually been more 
concerned with the ontological problem, or reality. We 
shall turn to some aspects of English life in order to form 
a better notion of the empirical attitude. 

2. English Activities Practical. — A brief glance at the 
method of meeting problems will suffice to illustrate the type 
of people whose characteristic philosophy is empiricism. 
The reformation movement which swept Europe during the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was met in England in the 
manner characteristic of the people. There was no radical 
breaking away, no throwing aside of past experience, but' 
a gradual bending of the old to meet the new. The English 
scholars sought by a careful study of the New Testament 
and of the early Christian writers the true meaning and 
character of the church, so that error might be avoided 
and modified habits of action set up. In the matter of the 
formation of the Church of England, also, they acted wholly 
in response to the practical aspects of the situation — Henry 
VIII desired to perpetuate his line with a male heir, and 
sought a divorce and when this was denied by the pope, par- 
liament proclaimed the king "the only Supreme Head on 
Earth of the Church of England." The practical, rational- 
istic method of life as against a supernaturalistic and mys- 
tical, is well exemplified in the "ordinance Concerning the 
Times of Assembling at Church," written under the influ- 



186 An Introduction to Philosophy 

ence of Calvin (1547). "That the temples be closed except 
during the hours of service, in order that no one shall enter 
therein out of hours, impelled thereto by superstition ; and 
if any one be found engaged in any special act of worship 
therein or nearby, he shall be admonished; if it be found to 
be of a superstitious nature * * * then he shall be 
chastized." 

The English people developed into a nation of sailors in 
their struggles against the naval power of Spain. Becom- 
ing accustomed to sea life they developed into great traders 
with foreign peoples, organized great corporations or com- 
panies, such as the East India Company, for commercial 
purposes, made possible the return of the gold that had 
been for two thousand years flowing out of Europe to Orien- 
tal countries, and became leaders in the exploration and set- 
tlement of the Western continent. Such a life of trade made 
necessary by the nature of the country fostered the ten- 
dencies already present in the people, tendencies which were 
present when the early seamen of the northland ventured 
from their native homes and took up their abode on the 
island to the westward. 

In matters of government the same practical nature is 
present. The doctrine of "divine right" never had quite 
the hold on England that it had in continental countries. 
They preferred to develop a government on an empirical 
rather than on an absolute basis ; and the progress towards 
democracy in that country is marked by the gradual ex- 
tension to other classes, generally if not always the lower 
classes, of rights which in their origins applied only to 
higher classes. It is true that the idea of "divine right" 
was held by some of the English sovereigns, notably the 
Stuarts, but the people apparently did not take the idea 
very seriously, for under Cromwell they put the king to 



Empiricism 187 

death, and finally invited William and Mary to come as 
rulers, under the banner "Pro religione et lihertate." The 
idea of "divine right" having died in the "revolution" of 
1688, the monarchy was deprived of its "divine" sanction, 
and this fact gave rise to a school of practical philosophers 
who sought to explain and justify the new theories of civil 
government which had found expression in the Bill of Rights 
which was reaffirmed at the crowning of William and Mary. 

3. Factors Conditioning Empiricism. — We have now to 
inquire into some of the conditions which are and have been 
operative in the production of the type of thinking called 
empiricism, or practical philosophy. What are some of the 
factors which have entered into the life of the English 
people, which determine in part their type of philosophical 
inquiries? It is a poor explanation to assert that "the 
genius of a people" is such and such, or that their "natural 
makeup" impels them to a certain type of thought ; for such 
statements do not solve a problem but set another one. 
People do have tendencies to act, which have been inherited 
in the long race history of struggle, and the methods by 
which these tendencies are satisfied vary with conditions. 

The early people of England were rovers of the sea, dar- 
ing, and adventurous, loving excitement and novelty. The 
country being an island offered opportunities for the further 
development of this nature in channels of trade and com- 
merce. Such a life brings people in touch with remote cus- 
toms, keeps worn off the rough edges due to isolation, ren- 
ders their experience more or less of an adventure, makes for 
opportunism and individualism, but tends towards a com- 
mon sympathy due to common tasks to be accomplished. 

That the island was remote from the seat of authority 
both religious and political had considerable bearing on 
shaping the character of the people. While a Roman prov- 



188 An Introduction to Philosophy 

ince it was more or less independent because little or no 
supervision could be exercised. Far from Rome, the seat of 
religious authority, the people could be free to a greater de- 
gree than was possible in those countries nearby. The geo- 
graphical location of the country coupled with the tenden- 
cies of the original rovers are by no means small factors in 
the development of the characteristic philosophy of the 
people. 

4. General Characteristics of Empiricism. — In its limited 
sense empiricism is a term applied to that theory of knowl- 
edge which asserts that "there is nothing in the intellect 
which was not formerly in sense" ; but in a more general way 
it signifies the practical attitude which we have briefly 
sketched. It means to be the opponent of all authority from 
an outside source ; it starts with the demand that all Idols, 
as Bacon was accustomed to calling our prejudices, be dis- 
missed, and that we start with an open and frank mind to 
the facts of nature. Observation and experimentation are 
the only sources of knowledge, for, as was urged by those 
who opposed the a prioristic or innate theory of knowledge 
as this was held by Descartes and other thinkers of his type, 
the a prioristic, innate, or authoritative view was the chief 
source and support of bad institutions — social, political, 
religious, educational. The idea of the seat of authority is 
uppermost in the empirical philosophy. Innate ideas, those 
born with us or planted in us in the beginning by a benefi- 
cent creator, permit of no reform or modification. They 
are there once for all. We remember that Descartes had 
said that the test of the reality of the object is the clearness 
of the idea, and that Kant had taught that the mind is en- 
dowed with a set of categories that determine in advance 
what our world must be. On the other hand the empiricist 
urged that no movements tending towards reform could ever 



Empiricism 189 

fructify on such a theory. John Stuart Mill wrote his logic 
as a social document — a significant fact which shows vividly 
how theories even apparently remote from life influence our 
behavior. In this connection Mill says, "The System of 
Logic supplies what was much wanted, a text book of the 
opposite doctrine (to the German, or a priori view of hu- 
man knowledge, and of human faculties) — that which de- 
rives all knowledge from experience, and all moral and in- 
tellectual qualities principally from the direction given to 
associations. * * * The notion that truths external 
to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, in- 
dependently of observation and experience, is, I am per- 
suaded, in these times, the great intellectual support of 
false doctrines and bad institutions. * * * There 
never was such an instrument devised for consecrating all 
deep seated prejudices." 2 

Empiricism is the doctrine of the school of Locke and 
Bentham as opposed to German transcendentalism ; it is the 
doctrine of the socializing of science, of political and social 
reform, and of testing things by their use and efficacy in the 
problems of science, religion, and politics. It was Bacon 
who emphasized the social aspects of science and who at- 
tempted to make it useful. Knowledge is power; it gives 
us control over the elements of the situation so that they 
may be directed ; and intelligence, the best available, ought 
to be applied to the social order. "There is another great 
and powerful cause why the sciences have made but little 
progress, which is this : It is not possible to run a course 
aright when the goal itself has not been rightly placed." 3 
The scientist, thought Bacon, sees only to the end of his 
own nose and fails to sense the social directions and bear- 

* Autobiography, p. 225. 
8 Novum Organum, i, 81. 



190 An Introduction to Philosophy 

ings of his researches. Locke, Bentham, the Mills, and many 
social and political reformers of England founded their 
efforts on the empirical philosophy and that type of psy- 
chology which harmonizes with it, namely, associationism. 
Utilitarianism, the ethical aspect of empiricism, asserted 
that "the greatest good to the greatest number and every 
one to count as one" is the principle which would solve the 
social problems of the times. 

Empiricism, as is readily seen, is the philosophy of a prac- 
tical people in their efforts to solve the practical problems 
which confronted them. It is not a cloistered philosophy 
for professors and for the socially elite, but it is a weapon 
of social betterment ; it is not a system for eternal con- 
templation, but a weapon of offense and defense ; it is a 
philosophy of the people in, their efforts to secure the 
"greatest happiness for the greatest number." 

5. Empiricism and the Philosophical Disciplines. — The 
problems of philosophy, as we have observed, are generally 
grouped under the headings of theory of reality, theory of 
knowledge, theory of conduct, and theory of beauty. We 
have discussed idealism as a theory of reality and as a 
theory of knowledge, but we have omitted the theory of 
conduct involved in it. We have now to consider empiricism 
as it works out in the fields of reality, knowledge, and con- 
duct. We shall omit the theory of beauty for this has never 
figured so prominently in philosophy as the other three. 

(a) Empiricism and Reality. Empiricism in the early 
stages, e. g., in Bacon and Locke, differs from later em- 
piricism as to the nature of reality. For the former, reality 
is the commonsense objective world which we see and hear; 
it is a "given," static world, ruled by laws the discovery of 
which is the mission of science. We should remember that 
it was a difficult matter to surrender the idea of authority 



Empiricism 191 

which all past thinking and living had accepted. Although 
Bacon and other empiricists fought bravely against the 
idea of authority, they failed to see that they were substi- 
tuting one form of it for another. The older authority had 
its seat in another world, and the empiricists have the honor 
of at least removing the seat of authority to this world. 
Instead of a divine or heavenly order which dictates our 
earthly policies, they substituted "objective nature" which 
has the same power of compulsion and occupies the same 
position as a dictator of our thoughts and life. The differ- 
ence is that the former is invisible and intangible, while the 
latter can at least be seen and handled. The real for the 
philosopher of the church and the Platonist is not the world 
of common sense here below, but the world beyond the skies ; 
the real world is not the scene of our actions here below for 
this world below is but a poor imitation or second hand 
copy of that eternal reality that exists somewhere in that 
mysterious realm of perfect forms where all is harmony and 
under the domination of the Good; the real for objective 
idealism is the Idea, that eternal scroll which is unrolling 
itself in the life and institutions of man, that Great Author- 
ity (a magnification of Kings and Kaisers), which plays the 
cosmic drama which poor, humble man beholds as a charmed 
spectator. For empiricism, however, the real is the world 
of blood and grime, of sweat and toil, of stick and clay — 
common, indeed so much so that it is often passed over in 
philosophy as unworthy of consideration in thoughts con- 
cerning the nature of "ultimate realit}^." The real for em- 
piricism is the world in which man is active, but it is a 
world of compulsion and authority nevertheless ; for man 
had become so habituated to the acceptance of something 
which must dictate. Matter or nature is the dictator to 
which ideas must conform, and of which they are copies ; 



192 An Introduction to Philosophy 

but the dictator is earthly, it is more democratic for it re- 
sides at least in man's world of space and time. 

This world of objects behaves in a definite way, it acts in 
accordance with laws, and it is the business of science, ac- 
cording to the teaching of empiricism, to discover these 
habitual ways of the behavior of objects. Empiricism had 
a definite way or method of discovering the nature of reality 
— that is, reality as the common world of man's interests. 
Objects are operating in a system ruled by natural law, and 
the laws of the behavior of objects can be discovered, not 
by the authoritative methods of the Scholastics nor by the 
deductive methods of Descartes and the idealists, but by the 
human methods of trial and error, of hypothesis, of experi- 
mentation, of induction. The empiricists thought of deduc- 
tion as the method of authority, a reflection of dogmatic 
days when man expected a principle or modus operandi to 
be vouchsafed him by some miraculous dispensation of 
Providence or by some power whose authority could not be 
questioned. But induction, the method of one seeking in- 
formation from the facts, the method of the common man 
in his daily activities as well as of the scientist in the most 
recondite experimental investigations, is the method of the 
democrat and reformer. Consequently, we see Bacon em- 
phasizing the method of discovering how things act so 
that society will profit, so that people will be benefited in 
their endeavors ; and later we see John Stuart Mill perform- 
ing for empiricism what Aristotle did for authority, per- 
forming for induction, that is to say, what Aristotle did 
for deduction. "As the Aristotelian logic states the meth- 
ods of argumentation, Mill's logic states the method of ex- 
perimentation," the method of determining the causes and 
effects of phenomena. This is what science is for the em- 
piricist — the discovery of the causal relations ; and when 



Empiricism 193 

we know these relations we know how to behave in the pres- 
ence of the phenomena. 

The real world for the empiricist is just this world of 
catalogued things, this world of causally determined things. 
He discovers causes by looking for them just as he discov- 
ers anything else; but he looks under controlled conditions. 
John Stuart Mill stated the methods of research, the in- 
ductive methods, and shows how the scientist, the man who 
discovers what reality is, has always employed them in all 
his investigations. 

For the later empiricists, especially after Darwin, the 
nature of reality differed from the conception which pre- 
vailed among the earlier leaders of the movement, such as 
Bacon, Locke, and Hume. Locke thought of the real as 
the objective common sense world; Hume, following to their 
logical conclusions the doctrines of ideas as held by Locke 
and Berkeley, reduced reality, material and spiritual, to 
groups of sensations ; but with the later empiricists reality 
became a series of changes which could be explained natur- 
ally. A genetic treatment of the world became possible, 
a treatment, moreover, which is natural, and which seeks 
to avoid the pitfalls of supernaturalism which, by its very 
nature, precludes the application of scientific method. Re- 
ality is in constant change, an idea much akin to the early 
conception of Heracleitus of the Greeks, and of Aristotle in 
his genetic treatment of the problems of psychology and 
biology. The conception of change, of growth, of evolu- 
tion has been the most powerful factor in the intellectual 
life of the last half century — a conception which resulted 
from an application of the methods of research to the prac- 
tical affairs of this world. 

(b) Empiricism and Knowledge or Epistemology. From 
the time of Bacon to our own, empiricism has regarded 



194 An Introduction to Philosophy 

knowledge as for something 1 . "Knowledge is power," and 
is not a luxury added to man that he may contemplate the 
"eternal plan of things." Of John Stuart Mill, Lord Mor- 
ley has said that he "recognized the social destination of 
knowledge, and kept the elevation of the great art of social 
existence ever before him, as the ultimate end of all specu- 
lative activity." 

But as has been said empiricism is primarily a theory of 
the origin, extent, and validity of knowledge — it is an epi- 
stemological theory. Where does knowledge come from, how 
is it gained, to what does it apply, and what validates 
knowledge? These are problems which empiricism seeks to 
answer, and these answers determine its name. Descartes 
had said that the mind possesses innate ideas, ideas born 
with us and in no way depending upon experience for their 
origin. Such, for example, are the axioms of geometry, the 
idea of cause, of existence, of self, et cetera. From the time 
of Locke (1690, the date of the publication of his chief 
work, Essay Concerning Human Understanding), the episte- 
mological problem has been of central interest in philosophy. 

The empirical theory of knowledge is best stated by 
Locke in the Essay, and we shall confine our treatment to 
this. There is one aim, however, that runs through all of 
Locke's work — the Letters on Toleration, The Treatises on 
Government, Thoughts on Education, The Reasonableness 
of Christianity, and the Essay — to show the emptiness in 
the idle following of traditional opinions and assumptions 
which take the place of honest intellectual effort and inves- 
tigation. All his works, too, show that philosophy is an 
undertaking for the good of society, and not a far-fetched 
scheme for the delight of subtle minds. They are an at- 
tack on tradition, on authority, and mysticism in religion, 
government, and knowledge. Locke was a man in the world 



Empiricism 195 

of affairs, active in the life of his time, and interested in the 
solution of the problems of his age. He was not the tra- 
ditional Scholastic, far from the interests of the world, 
who viewed it "under the form of eternity," but like almost 
all his nation, a plain, practical man who sees in philosophy 
a method of making a better world. 

What is the source of knowledge? How far does it 
reach? What are the criteria for distinguishing real knowl- 
edge from that which is illusory? These are fundamental 
questions in the epistcmology of empiricism, and in fact, of 
all theories of knowledge. As to the source or origin of 
knowledge Locke is sure that it is not in innate ideas. He 
calls this the lazy man's method of accounting for the origin 
of any bit of knowledge that could not be doubted as soon 
as understood, such as the axioms of geometry. "When 
men have found some general proposition that could not be 
doubted as soon as understood, it was a short and easy way 
to conclude them innate. This being once received, it 
eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the 
inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once styled 
innate. * * * Nor is it a small power it gives one man 
over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of 
principles and teacher of unquestionable truths ; and to 
make a man swallow that for an innate principle which may 
serve to his purpose who teacheth them." 4 For Locke as 
for Mill later, innate ideas are the source of deep seated 
prejudices and bad institutions. Practically, therefore, as 
well as theoretically it is of great value to determine the 
status of so-called innate ideas. Locke is strongly against 
them and offers many arguments in support of his position. 
He takes such supposed examples of innate ideas as "it is 
impossible for a thing to be and not to be" and argues that 
4 Essay, Bk. I, Ch. IV, 24. 



196 An Introduction to Philosophy 






they are not innate for "it is evident that all children and 
idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them ; 
and the want of that is enough to destroy that universal 
assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all 
innate truths." One would think, Locke asserts, that chil- 
dren and savages who are least corrupted by custom or 
borrowed opinions would show the existence of such ideas 
more clearly than any one else ; but as a matter of fact 
they are not found in them at all. Locke claims that there 
are no innate practical or moral principles either — that is, 
none which is universally received. Every moral custom of 
one time and place might be violated in another. Universal- 
ity, the criterion employed by Locke in determining the ex- 
istence of innate ideas, is wanting in the case of every axiom 
of science or morality. 

Since there are no innate ideas the question naturally 
comes, Where and how do we get knowledge? Every man 
is conscious that he thinks and that what he thinks about 
and with are ideas, and the question is, How did they get 
there? "Let us then suppose the mind to be white paper, 
rid of all characters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be 
furnished? * * * To this I answer in one word, from 
experience ; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from 
that it ultimately derives itself." 5 The source of our 
knowledge of external objects is sensation, but there is an- 
other fountain, namely, reflection, the perception of the 
operation of our mind as it is employed about the ideas it 
has gained from sensation. "These, when we have taken a 
full survey of them, and their several modes, combinations 
and relations we shall find to contain all our whole stock of 
ideas." 6 

6 Essay, Bk. II, Ch. I, 1, 2. 
6 Essay, Bk. II, Ch. XI, 17. 



Empiricism 197 

Having discovered the origin of ideas in experience, Locke 
seeks to answer the second question, namely, the extent of 
knowledge. Why is it essential that such a question be an- 
swered? It must be answered because it will indicate the 
limits of our ability to know ; the answer will make it clear 
that we are limited in our ability to know. We can know 
about things which experience vouches for, and concerning 
what is beyond experience, if such there be, it is idle to 
speculate. We are conversant only with ideas, and these 
ultimately come through sensation. Consequently, all of 
our knowledge consists of relations between sensations and 
ideas gained by reflection on the material furnished by the 
senses — knowledge goes as far as experience goes and no 
farther. 

There are many criticisms to be urged against Locke's 
theory of knowledge, some of them fatal, but it is not our 
purpose to offer criticisms but to state facts. The essen- 
tial thing is that this theory is an attempt to make philoso- 
phy practical, to take it from the dusty walls and make it 
a force in the world of affairs, to show that all reforms are 
based ultimately on some theory of life, and that institu- 
tions are always founded on some theory of values. The 
immediate motif of Locke here is to find a philosophical jus- 
tification for liberalism in government and toleration in 
religion ; and to accomplish his purposes he feels that it is 
necessary to go to the bottom of the problem of knowledge 
for a statement of its origin, extent, and certainty. 

(c) Empiricism and Conduct. The third field, the others 
being the nature of reality and of knowledge, is conduct or 
ethics. We have taken Locke as an example in our dis- 
cussions of knowledge, and for the purpose of the theory of 
conduct which was developed by the empiricists we shall 
consider the Utilitarians. Utilitarianism is the ethical as- 



198 An Introduction to Philosophy 

pect of the "practical" philosophy. It did not take its 
origin as such with the earlier empiricists, that is with Ba- 
con and Locke, but came at a later time — the time of Ben- 
tham, and the Mills, during the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Locke and Hume each had an ethical theory in 
which pleasure, pain, and sympathy figured respectively; 
but when we come to the Benthamites or the "Philosophical 
Radicals" as the Utilitarians are sometimes called, we see 
the ethical interest the chief one. For Jeremy Bentham 
ethics is a means of social reform, it is a platform, a doc- 
trine, a gospel. Bentham was interested primarily in three 
reform movements, namely, that of the law, of the methods 
of punishment, and of the English constitution. His watch- 
word was utility, or the greatest happiness to the greatest 
number, and it is to his credit largely that the Reform Bill 
of 1832 was passed. Bentham thought that the principle of 
utility should apply not merely to a local community but 
that it should apply universally — that every man of any land 
should come in for equal consideration with every other man. 

For Bentham, what is the standard of morality? What 
determines whether an act is good or bad? Bentham an- 
swers that the general happiness is the standard, and that 
the moral quality of any act "is determined by its pleasant 
or painful consequences, so far as these enter into the in- 
tention of the agent. The motive has nothing to do with the 
morality of the action, and is in all cases self interest." 7 
The thing that counts in action is the result, the conse- 
quences, and not the intent for "the road to hell is paved 
with good intentions." It is by their fruits that ye shall 
know them, and Bentham would gladly subscribe to the 
text to the effect that faith without works is dead. 

Bentham also added to the hedonistic or happiness ethics 
T Seth, English Philosophers, p. 242. 



Empiricism 199 

the so-called "hedonic calculus'* — the necessity of an exact 
calculation of the results of actions as a guide to right con- 
duct. We must weigh pleasures and pains and always act 
so that the resultant will be a surplus of pleasure over pain, 
pleasure and pain being the two great masters of man's 
life. We must take into account the intensity, the duration, 
the certainty, the nearness or remoteness, the barrenness in 
painful results, and the fruitfulness in further pleasures, of 
every act so that the surplus of pleasure may always be 
maintained. The assumption is that all pleasures are of the 
same quality and that they differ only in quantity or 
amount. The right act in every case is that which will bring 
the greatest amount of pleasure, the kind being the same in 
all cases. 

But it is in the writing of John Stuart Mill that we find 
the best statements of the ethics of utility. Mill admired 
Bentham, possibly because of the methods of the latter 
rather than for his doctrines. He says of Bentham, "It is 
by his method chiefly that Bentham justly earned a position 
in moral science analogous to that of Bacon in physical. 
It is because he was the first to enter into the right mode of 
working ethical problems, though he worked many of them, 
as did Bacon in physical, on insufficient data." 8 Mill and 
Bentham agree on the general principle of utility. The 
fundamental principle of morality is to be found in utility, 
or the influence of action on happiness. Mill, however, dif- 
fers from Bentham in many respects. Self interest is the 
motive force of conduct from Bentham's standpoint, an idea 
impressed upon him by the social and political life of his 
day; but Mill thinks "conscience," a man's desire to be con- 
sistent with himself, for the sake of his own conscience, is 
a force which impels to action. Utility is, indeed, the ulti- 
* Dif sertations, ii, 462. 



200 An Introduction to Philosophy 

mate appeal in all ethical questions, "but it must be utility 
in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of 
man as a progressive being." 

Mill draws a distinction between pleasures, which Bentham 
did not make. They are qualitatively different, not merely 
quantitatively different. This distinction had long ago 
been made by Plato and other Greek moralists, and Mill 
takes the same position as did Plato, that the pleasures of 
the mind are superior to those of the body. 

It will be remembered that Bentham thought that con- 
sequences alone count ; but Mill believed that there is an in- 
ternal sanction of right conduct, namely, the sense of duty. 
Results alone must be supplemented by the sense of duty or 
obligation. 

That Mill believed the ethics of utility in harmony with 
the best moral teachings of the past is evident from such 
statements : "As between his own happiness and that of 
others, utilitarianism requires the individual to be as strictly 
impartial as a benevolent and disinterested spectator. In 
the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete 
spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done 
by, and to love your neighbor as yourself constitute the 
ideal perfection of utilitarian morality." 9 Mill believes 
that utilitarianism teaches that a man may and even must 
sacrifice his own greatest good for the greatest good of 
others. 

Utilitarianism made strong appeal to the people of the 
early half of the nineteenth century due in part to its ap- 
parent simplicity. It took no great intellectual effort to 
comprehend the doctrine as is the case with many ethical 
theories. That the general happiness is desirable seemed to 
be a self-evident truth and can not be explained except, as 

6 Quoted from Seth, Op. cit., p. 256. 



Empiricism 201 

Mill says, "that each person, so far as he believes it to be 
attainable, desires his own happiness." He believed, it ap- 
pears, that if each person desires his own happiness that all 
persons will desire the general happiness. The apparent 
self-evidence of the principle of utility made it the powerful 
weapon it was in the problems of social and political life. 
The utilitarians, to repeat, were men of affairs, members of 
parliament, officers, and reformers during the first part of 
the last century. 

6. Empiricism in Science. — The scientific movement 
which we have sketched in earlier sections is directly con- 
nected with empiricism and the practical. In this connec- 
tion, however, we wish to indicate some of the effects of 
empiricism, not on the physical sciences, but on the bio- 
logical. Men first begin the investigation of nature and 
subject it to laws. This happened in Greek philosophy 
where the thinkers of the early days were investigators of 
physical phenomena. Later they became interested in man 
and in things alive. After the renaissance we find a simi- 
lar movement — the physical sciences came first in astronomy 
and physics, and later the social sciences received their 
share of attention. The social sciences have been rather 
slow in making their appearance, and in securing to them- 
selves a definite subject matter and method. The inductive 
and experimental methods were applied to the objective 
world long before they dominated the social sciences. Mind 
and society have been the last of the sciences to be treated 
inductively and experimentally, and of the two society as 
treated in sociology is the last. . In the sciences that deal 
with life, especially psychology and sociology, the method 
consisted in deducing from some "self-evident" principle a 
set of conclusions which constituted "classified knowledge" 
or science. 



202 An Introduction to Philosophy 

Empiricism has its characteristic psychology as it has 
its ethics, logic, religion, and theory of reality. It is just 
such a psychology as would be needed for the general spirit 
of the revolt against authority, and for the establishing of 
a democracy in government, industry, and other interests. 
This psychology is called associationism, or the association 
psychology. It originated with Aristotle a little more than 
three hundred years before Christ but it did not become a 
powerful social force until much later — until the time of 
Hobbes, Locke, Hartley, Hume, James, and John Stuart 
Mill. The substance of the doctrine is that the mind begins 
as a blank, that all it has comes through the sense organs, 
and by means of the laws of association of ideas — contigu- 
ity, similarity, et cetera — all the complex mental processes 
can be accounted for. 

From the social point of view this psychological doctrine, 
as an instrument of reform, means that all men are created 
equal, that is, they all begin life mentally as a blank, and 
that it is possible to make of people precisely what is de- 
sired, since what they know comes through the senses, and 
is combined in definitely known ways, i. e., according to the 
laws of association. If we would have people know the good, 
for example, it is only necessary that they be placed in 
such an environment where ideas of this kind will be the only 
ones they can ever gain in experience. In education, like- 
wise, this theory offers great possibilities, and was employed 
by its advocates in their efforts at educational reconstruc- 
tion and reform. 

But it is in the realm of biology that empiricism scored 
its greatest success. The results of empirical methods di- 
rected towards biology have been of greatest significance in 
the development of recent thought and action. The revolu- 
tion in the thought world wrought by the application of the 



Empiricism 203 

inductive methods to the field of life is somewhat like the 
revolution that occurred after Copernicus and the heliocen- 
tric astronomy. We shall next consider the doctrine of evo- 
lution and its influence on modern thought. 

REFERENCES 

Aikins, H. A., The Philosophy of Hume; 

Bentham, J., Principles of Morals and Legislation; 

Devey, J., Bacon's Novum Organum; 

Draper, J. W., The Intellectual Development of Europe, 

Chapters IX, X, XI ; 
Fullerton, G., Introduction to Philosophy, Chapter XV; 
Hobhouse, L. T., Morals in Evolution; 
Hoffding, H., History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. I, 375- 

449; 
Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; 
Knight, W., Hume; 

Kuelpe, 0., Introduction to Philosophy, 187-207; 
Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding; 
Mill, James, Analysis of the Human Mind ; 
Mill, J. S., Logic, and Utilitarianism; 
Paulsen, F., Introduction to Philosophy, 384-389; 
Robertson, G. C, Hobbes ; 
Rogers, A. K., Modern Philosophy, 87-129; 
Russell, J. E., The Philosophy of Locke; 
Thilly, F., History of Philosophy, 255-269, 307-361, 516- 

547; 
Weale, B. L. P., The Conflict of Colour, Introduction. 



CHAPTER XV 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION 



1. Introduction. — The doctrine of evolution is an out- 
growth of the scientific, empirical attitude which has char- 
acterized the thought of the English people. It could flour- 
ish only on a soil which had been prepared by criticism and 
scientific research, for it represents a temper so wholly 
foreign to the idea of authority which prevailed earlier 
that even if the doctrine had been proposed at the time of 
Bacon and Hobbes it is probable that it would have failed 
for want of a sufficient background. Although the evolu- 
tionary idea had been proposed at a much earlier time than 
that of Wallace and Darwin, it shared the fate of many 
other ideas which have appeared before the time was ripe 
for carrying them into practice and for validating them ex- 
perimentally. The idea of development was present in the 
thinking of some of the romantic idealists of the latter part 
of the eighteenth century, but it is to Darwin and Wallace 
that we trace the main thread of the doctrine. The work 
of Darwin covered the field of biology, but, once having em- 
ployed the method in the biological field, it is a short step 
to make use of the same methods in all the departments of 
human interest. If development occurs in the animal king- 
dom, if nature weeds out animals and plants to meet the 
needs of the conditions against which they have to struggle 
and in which they must live, why can not the same be true of 
institutions, of religions, of moral and ethical theories, and 

204 



The Doctrine of Evolution 205 

of systems of philosophy? Darwin's great contribution for 
the student of philosophy is his emphasis on the historical 
method of attacking 1 problems. The earlier thinkers were 
interested merely in what is; time meant little or nothing to 
them, but they desired to see things in their eternal aspects. 
Although Newton dealt with the phenomena of this world he 
dealt with them mechanically so that time meant nothing 
more than eternal change in the same phenomena which did 
not change. Darwin, on the other hand, emphasized the 
change in the phenomena themselves. There is a vast differ- 
ence between change which takes place according to me- 
chanical laws and that change which, while it occurs accord- 
ing to laws, displays the subject matter itself as under- 
going modification. Change in the Darwinian sense means 
change of the latter kind. The naturalistic and intellectu- 
alistic attitude of mind that characterized the thinking of 
the English people from the time of Bacon to the present 
was developed in close touch with the facts of nature and of 
mind, in the practical, common sense meaning of these 
terms ; but it was a nature of the fixed kind, one given once 
for all, and there to be known or copied by a mind which 
was equally given and fixed. Nature became the dictator, 
nature took the place of a fixed church and a fixed state ; 
and just as the humble worshipper fell before the dignitaries 
of the church in his quest for the remission of his sins, or as 
the subject fell before the throne of his king to beg his 
favors, so did the philosopher-scientist yield homage to his 
lord and master, matter or nature. But as was the case in 
the days of the Sophists, when things began to change, man 
in a measure lost his respect for them and ceased to pay 
homage to them, and, what is more important, he began 
to control them. When Darwin taught that things have a 
history he exploded the idea of an authoritative nature that 



206 An Introduction to Philosophy 

dictates to man his methods of action ; he taught us to con- 
trol nature, not to obey her ; not to fall a trembling suppli- 
cant before her altar, but to steal upon her unawares, so to 
speak, and direct her course so that things would come 
about as a result of conscious and purposive directing of 
her forces in a short time, which otherwise, in the prodi- 
gality of nature, would require ages. 

2. History of Evolution. — The word evolution is one in 
common use and this fact renders its meaning more or less 
ambiguous. We shall use it to include the general doctrine 
of change and growth as well as in the narrower biological 
sense. As is usually the case with most of our ideas we find 
the concept of development in Greek thought. It was Hera- 
cleitus, sometimes called the "flowing philosopher," who 
taught in developmental terms back in the sixth century 
before Christ. He is called the champion of change, the 
great problem of his age being that of permanence versus 
change. "You can not step twice into the same river," 
says Heracleitus, "for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon 
you." Of himself he says, "I was once shrub, fish, girl and 
boy." But, as is well known, the Greeks had no means of 
testing out their theories ; they lacked the machinery of sci- 
entific investigation, and the idea of development perished 
through want of verification by experimental inquiry. 

Aristotle (386-322 B. C.) was next to make development 
a fundamental category of science and philosophy, but he 
applied the idea more to the growth and decay of existing 
things. An oak tree, for example, is a series of growths 
and decays ; but there is no attempt at an explanation of the 
origin of the tree. The real for Aristotle is a graded series 
of real things, but each member of the series is fixed, cut 
off as with a sharp knife from all the rest. 

After Aristotle and the decline of Greek thought nothing 



The Doctrine of Evolution 207 

more came of the development idea until the rise of the 
romantic movement at the close of the eighteenth and in 
the early part of the nineteenth centuries. From 1800 to 
1835 many works were produced which greatly stimulated 
the historical method. "General literature, Roman law, 
medieval traditions, and institutions, classical philology, 
oriental literature, comparative philology, and at last Chris- 
tian theology itself, are assailed after the historical 
fashion, and one research leads to another." x Such 
researches as were made in the fields above mentioned 
emphasized the fact that things grow in response to factors 
such as we have enumerated in our earlier chapters — food, 
war, climate, et cetera. They indicated the fact which is 
finding expression in our institutions today that civilization 
is an achievement, that institutions have been won at the 
cost of innumerable sacrifices, that language is not some- 
thing which has been handed over by a beneficent creator as 
a gift to man, but is something that has a history, that 
states do not come about as a result of a rational contract 
by which men agree to surrender some liberties so that they 
may be more secure in others, but that they are the result of 
struggle and compromise, of much blood and little brain — 
in short, that things have come to be what they are, and 
that the past is wrapped up vitally with all that we are and 
possess. 

In science as well the evolutionary attitude was becoming 
manifest. Geology in the hands of Lyell greatly cleared 
the way for the Darwinian movement. Instead of catas- 
trophes which the older geologists employed to account for 
the earth's surface Lyell substituted processes of a less 
startling but of a more persistent nature. He showed that 
the crust of the earth has had a history as Kant and La- 
1 Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 282. 



208 An Introduction to Philosophy 

place had shown in reference to the solar system. When we 
remember that geology attempts to explain "what both pre- 
scientific and even intellectual men have in mind when they 
speak of creation" we get an idea of the importance of the 
application of scientific method to this field. Creation in- 
cluded the earth as the habitat of man, of beast, and of 
plant. These problems have always been the center of in- 
terest, and have been the subject of religious speculation and 
explanation from the earliest times to the present. The 
drama of creation plays an important role in our theo- 
logical speculations and forms the basis of a long and inter- 
esting series of myths ; and when these matters, heretofore 
considered as within the confines of theology, are submitted 
to a naturalistic explanation, we can readily imagine the 
disturbances that would result in the intellectual world. 
From the time of Plato species were thought of as fixed, 
classes were established, and ideas or forms created once for 
all. The church took up the idea of fixity, emphasized the 
reality and permanence of universals, types, or species, and 
the result was that the Darwinian conception met opposi- 
tion from the church, especially in the early days of the 
movement. The attitude of the church towards the reality 
of universals and the fixity of species or forms is well illus- 
trated in the struggle between realism and nominalism dur- 
ing the latter part of the middle ages. The nominalistic 
side was championed by the English churchmen, and in these 
early struggles we get a glimpse at the practical attitude of 
the English mind. When species were shown by Darwin to 
have a history the intellectual revolution was almost com- 
plete. 

In other fields of science discoveries were made and hypoth- 
eses advanced which rendered more plausible the Darwin- 
ian hypothesis. The Malthusian principle that population 



The Doctrine of Evolution 209 

increases more rapidly than the food supply had its bearing 
in bringing to the attention of thoughtful men the idea of 
struggle in the life of people for food and consequently for 
existence. Von Baer's investigations in embryology showed 
the close relationship that exists between the human embryo 
in its various stages of existence and development and the 
types of animals in the ascending scale, through the piscan, 
the amphibian, et cetera, to man. The classificatory work 
of Agassiz showed the close relationship that exists between 
the lower and the higher forms of animal life, especially 
from the standpoints of skeletal formations and organs of 
the body. These researches all tended to strengthen a natu- 
ralistic interpretation of the facts of organic life, and sug- 
gested a similar method for social phenomena. 

3. Darwin's Theory. — Darwin attempted to find a true 
cause, a vera causa, for the facts which had been explained 
or accounted for on religious and supernaturalistic bases. 
In other words he sought a scientific explanation, a natural 
chain of causes which could be verified experimentally, and 
which would make reasonable all the facts which he labored 
with. He was interested in biology, that field which was es- 
pecially difficult to handle scientifically, and which had been 
the special field of supernatural interests. 

Darwin was impressed with the idea of struggle in the 
political economy of Malthus, and with the facts of selection 
in the breeding of better and different types of animals. It 
occurred to Darwin that if man is able to select certain 
traits or characteristics and make them dominant by care- 
ful breeding of animals which possess the desired traits, that 
it is possible that nature on a larger scale selects such traits 
as are essential in meeting the conditions against which the 
organism must struggle in order to live. Since more ani- 
mals and plants are produced than the environment will 



210 An Introduction to Philosophy 

support, some of them must of necessity be weeded out while 
others will survive in the struggle that necessarily ensues. 
Those that are best fitted to meet the demands of the en- 
vironment will survive as a matter of course and will repro- 
duce their kind, while the weaker or less fit ones will perish. 

Such a chain of thought led Darwin to three of the essen- 
tial principles of his doctrine, namely, struggle, selection, 
and survival of the fittest. There are other essentials, how- 
ever, one of which is variation. How does it happen that 
organisms differ in the first place? Darwin saw that every 
organism even those of the same species differs from every 
other one. Why this is so is not so important as the fact 
that it is so. In these variations some of the species will be 
better equipped to cope with life and its problems than are 
others, and will survive and hand down to the future genera- 
tions successful variations. But in explaining how varia- 
tions occur Darwin is not so much interested. He begins 
with variations as a fact of experience, and suggests that 
they are the result of chance. Thus chance variations form 
another essential element in the Darwinian hypothesis. Ac- 
cidental variations, as is readily seen, are very essential, for 
if they did not occur there would be nothing for nature to 
select from. 

Summarizing the chief points in the Darwinian theory we 
may say that in the first place variations must occur; sec- 
ond, there must be a struggle between individuals of the 
species and between different species for survival ; third, that 
nature selects those of the species that are able to cope with 
her, that are able to adjust to the demands of the environ- 
ment; and fourth, that those characteristics which have 
proved valuable are handed down to the offspring of the 
successful competitors in the struggle for existence. 

Thus, we observe, Darwin furnished a method by which 



The Doctrine of Evolution 211 

evolution had actually taken place. Lyell and others had 
shown that it is a fact that it actually does occur, but there 
is a vast difference obviously between the fact that evolution 
has taken place and the method by which it has taken place. 
It is not our purpose to criticise the method although many 
biologists, while they recognize the general principle of evo- 
lution, are not in sympathy with the method proposed by 
Darwin. It is difficult to deny the facts, such, for example, 
as the similarities in skeletal structure pointed out by 
Agassiz ; or the existence of vestigial organs such as the ap- 
pendix and the hundred other apparently useless portions 
of the body ; or the facts of embryology which show that the 
vertebrate embryo recapitulates the process of animal evo- 
lution ; and the facts of paleontology, an example of which 
is the work of Huxley in sketching the stages through which 
the present horse has passed. While these facts are admit- 
ted the method by which they came to be what they are is in 
question. But this much remains and this is the important 
matter for the student of philosophy, namely, that develop- 
ment or evolution has occurred. 

4. Evolution in Other Fields. — We have seen that Dar- 
winism is a theory of biological evolution. It was not long, 
however, after the publication of the "Origin of Species" in 
1859, that the evolutionary method was applied to other 
interests. Things began to be tested by their use in meet- 
ing the problems and conditions against which they were 
set ; institutions were treated as means of meeting problems ; 
history became a study not of bare events chiefly of a war- 
like nature, but of institutions and activities as expressions 
and manifestations of the needs and purposes of the age in 
which they flourished; and in every department of interest, 
in sociology, in economics, in government, and even in re- 
ligion itself, the evolutionary method was applied and start- 



212 An Introduction to Philosophy 

ling results followed. Philosophy did not long remain un- 
touched by the evolutionary doctrine. It was natural that 
much criticism should arise as a result of treating time-hon- 
ored institutions and dogmas as means of adjusting man and 
his surroundings, whether social or physical. Some types of 
philosophy came forth in their eternal aspects to overthrow 
the new doctrine, but it was not long until these very types 
which claimed to discuss things in their permanent and abso- 
lute aspects were submitted to the evolutionary operation 
with the result that they themselves were shown to possess 
many ancient appendices which should, in the interests of 
the organism, be removed ; and by heroic, though by some- 
times fatal surgery, philosophy came out purified and took 
her place as one of the means of making this life more valu- 
able and noble. 

The evolutionary method was applied to the various phil- 
osophical interests which we have spoken of, namely, epi- 
stemology, reality, ethics, and aesthetics. These interests 
were among the last to be attacked by the method, but now 
problems of this type as well as those of the other social 
sciences are usually if not always attacked from the evolu- 
tionary standpoint. 

In our succeeding chapters we shall follow the tendency 
to solve certain problems of the social sciences, one of which 
is philosophy, by the evolutionary method. 

REFERENCES 

Bailey, L. H., The Survival of the Unlike, Chapters II, 
XIX; 

Clodd, E., The Story of Creation, and Pioneers in Evolu- 
tion; 

Darwin, Origin of Species, and Descent of Man; 

Deniker, J., The Races of Man; 



The Doctrine of Evolution 813 

Hoffding, H., The Influence of the Conception of Evolu- 
tion on Modern Philosophy, in Darwin and Modern 
Science, edited by Seward; 

Jones, F. W., Arboreal Man, Chapter I; 

Kellogg, V., Darwinism To-day ; 

LeConte, J., Evolution and its Relation to Religious 
Thought ; 

Lull, R. S., The Evolution of the Earth and its In- 
habitants ; 

Seward, A. C, Darwin and Modern Science, especially 
papers of C. Bougie, C. Lloyd Morgan, Hoffding, P. 
N. Waggett, Jane E. Harrison, P. Gile, J. B. Bury, 
and J. G. Fraser ; 

Wright, G. F., Origin and Antiquity of Man, Chapter 
XIII. 



CHAPTER XVI 

EVOLUTION IN DISCIPLINES RELATED TO PHILOSOPHY 

1. Introduction. — The evolutionary doctrine has, as we 
have said, entered every field of intellectual interest, and the 
student of recent and contemporary thought can not com- 
prehend such endeavors except in terms of the evolutionary 
hypothesis. It is essential also to bear in mind that this 
conception is primarily a result of the empirical mind and 
the empirical methods of thought which we have empha- 
sized in earlier chapters. We have attempted to emphasize 
the empirical attitude for it seems evident that it is the 
most fruitful of all types of philosophy. Not that classical 
empiricism as formulated by Bacon and Locke, worked out 
by Hume, and later taken up by Bentham and the Mills, is 
a philosophy which is not open to serious criticism from a 
technical point of view; but the attitude of the empiricist 
is, we believe, the most fruitful for the solution of problems 
which are valuable in man's experience. Empiricism is valu- 
able not so much for the formal theory which has been 
advocated by its adherents but for the stimulation of recent 
students to other types of thinking closely related in spirit 
to it. These related types of thought avoid many of the 
technical difficulties of the older empiricism and at the same 
time retain the valuable aspects of it. In the earlier days 
of the empirical movement there was a groping after prin- 
ciples which have since been more clearly defined, more elab- 
orately worked out, and more carefully systematized. 

One of the chief difficulties which haunted the earlier em- 

214 



Evolution in Disciplines Related to Philosophy 215 

piricist and one which he never completely solved was the 
problem of the relation of mind and matter left to philos- 
ophy by Descartes. Empiricism was never able to offer an 
adequate solution of the relation between the two apparently 
different things, but usually spoke of mind as copying things 
or nature which was given and fixed once for all. Ideas, it 
thought and taught, were copies of things. Thus empiri- 
cism left two worlds — that of ideas and that of things — 
standing one against the other with little or no connection 
between them. This difficulty arose as a result of the habit 
of mind of considering something as an authority. Empiri- 
cism, it will be remembered, is democratic and took its origin 
in a revolt against the authority of Scholastic reasoning of 
the middle ages, against fixed principles, and, in fact, 
against all forms of authority. But in so doing it became 
tangled with another form of authority in the nature of 
matter, and struggle as it would it could never free itself 
from the compulsion of its master. But empiricism needed 
this difficulty corrected, and a correction of this led to one 
of the profound developments of recent philosophy. Evolu- 
tion in the biological sense is an offshoot of empiricism in 
the realm of science as Utilitarianism is in the field of ethics, 
and our purpose now is to indicate the influence of evolution 
on certain of the disciplines closely related to philosophy. 
We shall not attempt an elaborate treatment but select a 
field or two more for the purposes of examples. 

2. Evolution and Psychology. — The doctrine of evolution 
had a profound effect on psychology in at least two direc- 
tions, namely, in the scope or extent of the subject matter 
of the science, and in the nature of the subject matter 
itself. The animal mind came in for its share in psycholog- 
ical discussions and the new science of comparative psy- 
chology came into existence. 

The evolutionary doctrine had emphasized the close physi- 



216 An Introduction to Philosophy 

cal relationship that exists between man and the lower ani- 
mals and the question naturally occurred to Darwin and 
especially to psychologists following him, Are they alike 
psychologically? They have similar sense organs, and since 
the sense organs are, according to the old empirical theory 
of knowledge, the gateways of all knowledge, is it not neces- 
sary that man and the lower animals have in common many 
mental traits? In the "Descent of Man" Darwin considers 
the several instincts, the emotions, and the higher processes 
such as reasoning, and beliefs even of a religious nature, and 
affirms that these are common alike to man and to many of 
the lower animals. He shows that love and hate, fear, jeal- 
ousy, courage, curiosity, sympathy, reverence, fidelity, at- 
tention, memory, imagination, reasoning, progressive de- 
velopment, self-consciousness, language, and the sense of 
beauty are common possessions of man and many of the 
lower animals. It is evident that such conclusions would 
stimulate research on the part of men interested in the evo- 
lutionary theory and its psychological bearings ; and the 
conclusions reached by Darwin have been the subject mat- 
ter of many an experimental inquiry since his day. Dar- 
win's generalizations in many cases have been found too 
sweeping and founded on insufficient evidence. 

A closer definition of the terms of psychology has come 
about as a result of the Darwinian movement. For exam- 
ple, the term intelligence, has undergone careful and scru- 
pulous study with a view to determining criteria for its 
presence. Darwin was far too anthropomorphic in his in- 
terpretations of animal behavior. This is one of the serious 
difficulties even today ; for the tendency to interpret mat- 
ters in terms of man's own experiences is, as we have seen, 
deeply rooted in his nature. Consequently, in the beginnings 
of new sciences, we tend to interpret phenomena in terms of 



Evolution in Disciplines Related to Philosophy 217 

what is best known to us, namely, our own behavior, our own 
desires, longing's, purposes, and aspirations. Such terms as 
emotion, instinct, will, intelligence, feeling, knowing, and, in 
short, the whole vocabulary of psychology has undergone 
refinement and revision. 

Human psychology has profited greatly from the Dar- 
winian movement. Once the science was defined as the 
"science of the soul," or the "science of consciousness as 
such" ; but the evolutionary method changed this manner of 
stating the nature of human psychology. Instead of a 
structural view, a sort of anatomy of the "mind," the chief 
purpose of which was to describe, analyze, and build up out 
of the elements which analysis displayed a "science of men- 
tal activities," the evolutionary method attacked the prob- 
lems rather from a functional viewpoint, from the side of 
the physiology of the "mind" rather than from the anatomi- 
cal. Instead of describing the new hypothesis rendered the 
business of the science as that of telling the use of the 
"mind," working on the correct assumption that a thing is 
what it does. 

Not so much attention is now given to what the "mind" 
contains, but much more to what it is good for; not so 
much attention is now given to the analysis of an emotion, 
but more is given to the search for methods of their control 
and proper ordering. Perception, memory, imagination, as- 
sociation, judgment, and reasoning are all treated not as 
"faculties" of a mysterious and secluded entity called the 
"mind," but as instruments for guiding action. The "mind" 
as a result of the Darwinian theory becomes a functional 
and not a structural affair. It is something that aids in 
meeting the problems of the organism in adjusting the en- 
vironment to itself and itself to the environment. As hands, 
hoofs, horns, fins, nails, tails, and teeth have come to be in 



218 An Introduction to Philosophy 

the play of the organism and the environment ; so has the 
"mind," and not as has been taught as a luxury given to 
man for the purpose of eternal contemplation of the mys- 
teries and beauties of the universe. It is there for use and 
is not a donation but an achievement wrested from nature 
in the mutual play of natural forces. 

The method of treatment of the subject matter of psy- 
chology has likewise been revolutionized. Genetic is a word 
used to indicate that the subject matter of psychology has a 
history — both that of the individual and of society. The 
individual begins life with a group or system of pathways 
in the nervous system already formed. When these are 
stimulated the individual is said to react instinctively; and 
we have learned to treat the higher forms of behavior as 
based upon and growing out of these fundamental race 
habits which the individual inherits in the form of preformed 
nervous pathways. Darwin gave but scant attention to the 
instincts but later psychologists make them fundamental in 
the life of the individual and of society. Social psychology, 
another science which is largely the result of Darwin's 
work, makes of the instincts the fountain springs of all our 
elaborate behavior. Curiosity, flight, pugnacity, self-abase- 
ment, self-elation, the parental instinct, and repulsion — 
these, says a modern social psychologist, 1 are at the root 
of all our complex modes of action. Through automatic, 
reflex and instinctive behavior we come historically to a 
type which we may call conscious, using "conscious" as an 
adjective to describe that type of action which occurs when 
the other types fail to meet the needs of the organism, and 
which is further characterized by delay in the response to 
the stimulus which calls it forth. 

Darwinism, it is evident, has so influenced psychology that 

1 McDougall, Social Psychology. 



Evolution in Disciplines Related to Philosophy 219 

whereas it was once the "science of the soul," it now takes 
its place among the common earthly things as the "science 
of behavior." 

3. Evolution in Political Theory. — Every philosophical 
theory involves a theory of the state and from Plato's day 
to our own the great thinkers have usually stated the type 
of theory of the state which follows from the nature of their 
speculation. For Aristotle, indeed, ethics is subordinate to 
politics, and Plato made political theory the most important 
side of his speculations. His greatest work is the Republic, 
a book which has influenced political thought more than any 
other which has ever been written. "Utopias," "Ideal So- 
cieties," and "Cities of God" have engaged the attention of 
the keenest intellects the world has produced. The New At- 
lantis of Bacon, the Leviathan of Hobbes, the Civil Govern- 
ment of Locke are works which have come from the hands 
of empiricists in the realm of political theory. It is evident 
that a theory of the state, its nature and functions, is 
highly significant and important for man lives and has his 
existence in some form of political organization. Peace con- 
ferences and leagues of nations are the most recent expres- 
sions of what men think of states and their functions. 

Our immediate purpose is to show the influence of the doc- 
trine of evolution on political theory. Many volumes have 
been written on this topic and we can but indicate some of 
the main phases. Since Darwin's time there has been a con^- 
stant revision and restatement of the nature of the influence 
of evolution on politics. The first important treatment of 
this subject from the evolutionary point of view came from 
Herbert Spencer, who worked for about forty years on his 
"Synthetic Philosophy." Spencer thought that he had dis- 
covered the general principle or formula of evolution, and 
having discovered it, he grouped about it all the intellectual 



220 An Introduction to Philosophy 

achievements and interests of man. Sociology, politics, ethics, 
psychology, et cetera, are all expressions of this universal 
formula. They all illustrate, as Spencer tries to show, the 
operation of the general formula which sounds formidable 
but which is simple when understood. Spencer's definition or 
formula of evolution is : "Evolution is an integration of mat- 
ter and concomitant dissipation of motion ; during which 
the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity 
to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the 
retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation." 2 It 
is but little wonder that, upon reading the definition for the 
first time, we sympathize with the sentiment of the student 
who suggested that the universe must have heaved a sigh of 
relief when it heard from the lips of Spencer the method by 
which it came to be what it is ; but after all the essence of 
the formula is that development has occurred through in- 
creasing diversity and interdependence of structure and 
function. The organism breaks up into smaller parts func- 
tionally and structurally, but these parts are more and more 
dependent one on the other as they break up or differentiate. 

With the general formula before us, the formula discov- 
ered, Spencer thinks, inductively, an attempt is made to ex- 
hibit it deductively, to show, that is to say, that every 
evolving phenomenon exhibits three characteristic features, 
namely, integration, differentiation, and determination. 
Since this is the way evolution has occurred, what theory of 
the state follows from it? It is evident that, if the prin- 
ciple is true, society is a growth, and the state is something 
that has come to be. Spencer finds that a military era came 
early, and this has been succeeded by the industrial. The 
military era, the era of authority, should, therefore, give 

2 First principles, p. 396. 



Evolution in Disciplines Related to Philosophy 221 

way to the industrial; and from this the conclusion is 
reached that the state should not interfere in the life of its 
citizens. If the state or any other external authority inter- 
feres, the rights of the individual are taken away and his 
equal chance is gone. Spencer thought that every individual 
has rights limited only by the equal freedom of others and 
that any interference on the part of the state would limit 
the rights of the individual. His doctrine, therefore, is 
known as the laissez faire doctrine of the state — the hands 
off or let alone theory, a sort of Monroe Doctrine applied to 
the state itself. 

We must not forget that the Utilitarians worked for 
freedom and against the authority of the state, but Spencer 
found what appeared to him a philosophical justification of 
the doctrine of non-interference. Freedom of speech, of as- 
sembly, the repeal of ancient laws against the laborer were 
demanded as essential to the natural development of society. 
Darwin emphasized natural selection as one of the elements 
in the determination of present forms ; and as the state is 
constituted, Spencer urges, it is not natural, but an artificial 
construct which actually prevents the free play of natural 
forces. The state, Spencer thought, should follow natural 
lines, that is, should let alone. Nature is thwarted when 
artificial regulations are made which limit the natural ten- 
dencies of man. Turn people loose and nature will do the 
rest for them, give them free play and nature will see to it 
that things will turn out well ; for if nature is able to pro- 
duce man by the play of her forces she is able to take care 
of him after he is produced if man will but allow her to run 
her course. If each man in society exerted his full natural 
rights, if all restrictions were thrown off, then a Harmony 
beneficial to all would be inevitable; for nature will select 



222 An Introduction to Philosophy 

those best able to cope with her, and all would then be the 
product of natural and not of artificial conditions such as 
we find in the state as now organized. 

Justice, the chief concept in Plato's Republic, means for 
Spencer adjustment, equilibrium, and balancing between the 
individual and others. In sub-human justice there is an in- 
evitable coincidence of benefits a,nd merits — aggressions are 
immediately punished as in revenge. Each animal is sub- 
ject to its own nature and to the results of its own conduct. 
There is added in human conduct the principle that we 
ought to refrain from so interfering with the conduct of 
others that the balance between nature and consequences is 
disturbed, that is to say, nature should take her course and 
the state should not interfere educationally or otherwise. 
Plato found justice to consist in order between classes, but 
to this Spencer adds harmony between nature and the indi- 
vidual and society. 

It is evident that mechanical forces are greatly stressed 
by Spencer. While he does introduce such terms as "benev- 
olence" and "sympathy," it is clear that, since these are 
the result of mechanical forces, mechanism or the blind 
forces of nature play an altogether too significant role in 
the political life of the race. Thinkers who succeeded Spen- 
cer, were quick to discern the errors involved in his too me- 
chanical conception, and set about to give a more adequate 
interpretation of the spirit of the evolutionary doctrine. 
Others, on the contrary, carried the Darwinian theory of 
struggle to extremes, to limits not contemplated by the 
spirit of the theory, in the development of a doctrine which 
has been extremely important in our day, namely, the doc- 
trine that right is the will of the strongest. In such a de- 
velopment the very spirit of the evolutionary theory is 
killed ; democracy, the equal opportunity of one with all, the 



Evolution in Disciplines Related to Philosophy 223 

true spirit of the evolutionary doctrine, is regarded as the 
theory of weaklings ; Christianity, the religion of the con- 
trite heart, the spirit of Utilitarianism as Mill put it, the 
religion of the democrat, is the religion of slaves. 3 But it is 
not our purpose to trace the evolutionary doctrine as it was 
worked out in such extreme forms due to an erroneous con- 
ception of it, but to confine ourselves to the political think- 
ers who attempted to interpret the theory in its true spirit 
— to those, that is, who make consciousness or intelligence a 
factor in evolution. 

Thomas Huxley combats the false optimism that is in- 
volved in a theory that teaches that nature will take care 
of her own, that blind forces will produce if unmolested an 
ideal society in which harmony and justice will rule supreme. 
More in the true spirit, he believed that consciousness is for 
something. It is a tool for the fighting of the very forces 
which Spencer thought would produce the ideal. Nature is 
in part evil ; we all possess some of the tiger and the ape ; 
strife, evil, are cold hard facts ; and the business of man is 
not to sit idly by and wait for nature to do what he may 
do more quickly. We must fight the very world order itself 
— the evil and strife in it and must not rest content with the 
doctrine that asserts that "God's in his heaven, all's well 
with the world," or that "nature provides a way." Such a 
doctrine is for the lazy man for nature has provided us with 
means for helping her, for directing her forces, for aiding 
the evolutionary process by substituting for natural selec- 
tion an artificial type based upon intelligent foresight. In 
short, intelligence is itself creative. Intelligence must see 
that equal opportunities are open to all. It is irony, thinks 
Huxley, to say there is a free field for all unless the handi- 

8 See Nietzsche, Will to Power, Beyond Good and Evil. His chief 
works appeared between 1873 and 1889. 



224 An Introduction to Philosophy 

caps of children are removed; and one of the functions of 
the state is to repress all anti-social tendencies so that the 
beneficent desires and capacities of citizens may be fur- 
thered. The state then instead of being a detriment is neces- 
sary to freedom, for it represents intelligence as a force in 
evolution, as a factor in the struggle for existence and 
thence to freedom. 4 



REFERENCES 

Angela, J. R., Psychology; 

Baltzell, W. J., History of Music, Introduction; 

Bury, J. B., History of Freedom of Thought; 

Colvin and Bagley, Human Behavior; 

Dewey, J., How We Think ; 

Durkheim, La division du travail social; 

Grosse, The Beginnings of Art; 

Hall, G. S., Adolescence ; 

♦Darwinism provoked a great deal of discussion of a political nature. 
We have barely indicated some of the doctrines. David Ritchie, Thomas 
Hill Green, and Prince Kropotkin have done interesting work in this 
field. Kropotkin emphasizes mutual aid as a factor in evolution. From 
the beginning of life, he believes, co-operation and self-sacrifice have oc- 
curred on the part of the individual for the group. As we have indicated 
in an early chapter these factors have tended towards socializing man. 

Darwinism has been the basis of much discussion in religion. It was 
in this field that the doctrine met its first serious opposition. But since 
both religion and the evolutionary hypothesis have become better under- 
stood the opposition in this direction has largely subsided. 

The evolutionary theory has also been worked out in education, and to- 
day our educational theories are founded on the evolutionary basis. 

Even the most authoritative of the sciences have yielded to the evolu- 
tionary hypothesis. Once the axioms of mathematics and the so-called 
laws of thought reigned as the most elemental and unchangeable con- 
cepts; but at this time the most advanced work in mathematics is being 
accomplished in a revision of the axioms, and no first-rate mathematician 
claims objective validity for them. The laws of thought are regarded 
now as functional concepts, as methods of handling things in a process 
of growth. 



Evolution in Disciplines Related to Philosophy 225 

Jerusalem, W., Introduction to Philosophy, 276-285 ; 

McDougall, W., Body and Mind; 

Marett, R. R., Anthropology; 

Mead, G. H., The Meaning of the Psychical ; 

Moore, Origin and Nature of Life ; 

O'Shea, M. V., Dynamic Factors in Education; 

Parry, The Evolution of the Art of Music ; 

Perry, R. B., An Approach to Philosophy, 53-114; 

Reinach, S., Apollo, Chapter I; 

Ribot, Th., The Psychology of the Emotions ; 

Small, A. W., The Meaning of Social Science; 

Spencer, H., Sociology; 

Thorndike, E. L., Animal Intelligence, and Educational 

Psychology ; 
Washburn, M. F., Animal Mind; 
Watson, J. B., Behavior, An Introduction to Comparative 

Psychology. 



CHAPTER XVII 

EVOLUTION AND THE DISCIPLINES OF PHILOSOPHY 

1. Introduction. — We have now to consider the influence 
of the evolutionary hypothesis on the various disciplines 
which go to make up philosophy proper, namely, ethics or 
conduct, aesthetics or beauty, epistemology or knowledge, and 
reality. Psychology, sociology, and politics, while once 
included in philosophy proper, have broken from the par- 
ental ties and have set up housekeeping for themselves ; but 
the continuity and interdependence of experience is such 
that a question in any of the fields of interest involves a 
theory in every other field. It may require a longer time 
for the effects of speculation and research to be felt in some 
fields than in others, but in due season all interests reflect 
the changed note discerned in a more susceptible field. For 
example, the evolutionary doctrine was felt very early in re- 
ligion, but it was a long time before the spirit of the doc- 
trine was carried over into logical theory. In fact it is 
doubtful whether or not it has been carried over at all by a 
great many contemporary philosophers. Habits of thought 
continue as do others long after we do lip service to newer 
methods and conditions. Men had become too accustomed 
to speak in terms of fixity and finality, of absolute and 
eternal — following the absolute idealism of the German phi- 
losophers — to adjust to a philosophy of change, of experi- 
ment, of hazard, of something to be done by the common 
man. When empiricism came to full fruitage in the evolu- 

226 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 227 

tionary and instrumental philosophy, even though it has a 
history reaching from the latter part of the middle ages, 
and indeed, even from the Greeks, it found a large part of 
the intellectual world still holding to some form of the doc- 
trine of authority: some to "axioms" based on "intuition," 
some to "divine right" to rule or absolutism in government, 
some to fixed and immutable "laws" of nature, some to fixed 
"laws" of thought, some to an "unchangeable" in religion. 
These favorite phantoms of unchangeability and authority 
still haunt the intellectual life of many of our people. We 
have just witnessed the physical overthrow of one form of 
absolutism and finality, that in government, and the conse- 
quences of the downfall of finality in this field will doubtless 
be reflected and felt in other forms of intellectual and social 
life. 

2. Evolution and Conduct. — Evolution has influenced 
ethics or that type of human conduct which is thought of as 
good or bad, right or wrong, especially in two directions : 
in the method of dealing with moral problems, and in bring- 
ing about a change in the meaning of good and bad, right 
and wrong. As to method of study the historical or genetic 
has taken the place of the older method of analyzing con- 
cepts and determining from the analysis what one should 
do. Good is something, according to the older idea, which 
is discovered by a vision. From the evolutionary standpoint 
the chief interest is to determine how such concepts as good 
and bad came to be, the conditions which gave them birth. 
The evolutionist believes that if he can determine conditions 
in the life of moral beings, which gave significance to such 
concepts, we can make use of knowledge so gained in the 
solution of our own moral and social problems. 

Instead of a "moral sense" planted in man at the be- 
ginning which dictates action, the evolutionist seeks to find 



228 An Introduction to Philosophy 

the conditions which, when operative, result in the founda- 
tion of such an idea; instead of "conscience," "that little 
spark in the breast" which we are cautioned to keep alive, 
as a thing unique and unitary, the evolutionist attempts to 
account for the facts on the basis of conditions which the 
race had to face in the struggle which resulted in the achiev- 
ing of values. It accounts for "intuitive" judgments on the 
basis of race habits which have been built up in the course 
of the ages before the reflective type of consciousness be- 
came effective in the removal of difficulties. Reflective con- 
sciousness, that is to say, that type of consciousness which is 
involved in judging and reasoning, is a later development; 
and long before it appeared the race acted on lower levels 
of mentality, such as the reflex or the instinctive. Thus 
"intuitive" judgments are frequently correct because the 
larger part of the years of the race lies back of them. The 
older method was analytic and deductive; the newer, his- 
torical and empirical. To know a thing, the new doctrine 
teaches, we must know how it came to be. "It" was not al- 
ways and "it" may be something else tomorrow. Origin and 
validity can not be separated. 

The best way to become acquainted with the method of 
the evolutionary philosopher is to take an example. Let us 
take such an idea as justice. The older method of getting 
at this notion is well illustrated in one of Plato's dialogues. 
Justice was considered as a gift from the gods. Man had 
been created in common with all creatures and to each 
species was given some means of getting on in the world. 
To the birds were given wings for flight, to certain animals, 
horns and feet, to others, a keen sense of smell, to others, 
swiftness of foot, and so on ; but when the gods came to men, 
almost all the "gifts" had been given over, and it took seri- 
ous thinking to find something left which could be given man 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 229 

so that he could get on in the world. In a happy moment, 
after long and serious meditation, Zeus, the father of gods 
and men, hit upon the idea of giving man the sense of jus- 
tice. Though man was weak in comparison with other ani- 
mals, this, the most powerful of all weapons, would render 
him able to cope with all the vicissitudes of his surroundings. 
Thus justice is a gift of the gods. 

But the evolutionary thinker wishes to give an interpre- 
tation based on natural conditions, believing that such an in- 
terpretation will magnify the conception and render it more 
valuable. In the first stage of its development it is neither 
moral nor social but purely reflex and instinctive. It is the 
immediate response that an individual makes when attacked 
or injured. This is the stage of revenge, a seeming para- 
doxical starting point for the sense of justice. The second 
stage corresponds to revenge deferred to some later time. 
In the first stage the reaction is immediate, a blow, a kick, 
or some form of act which restores equilibrium or balance 
between the parties ; but in the second stage, due to the in- 
tervention of a higher form of consciousness, "getting even" 
is delayed, and it frequently takes the form of community 
retaliation or blood feud. This stage is what we may call 
the stage of equivalence — an eye for an eye, and a tooth for 
a tooth. Examples are to be found in the Old Testament, 
in the code of Hammurabi, and in the experiences of children 
and of peoples of low culture today. 

In fact, about the interpretation of the word equivalence 
could be written a large part of the history of the growth of 
justice. To begin with, as we have seen, it means like for 
like, blow for blow, and tooth for tooth; but it came to be 
later that instead of like for like, an exact equivalence, sub- 
stitution could be made, such as wergeld or a price paid in 
cases of homicide. Today if a man commits a crime 



230 An Introduction to Philosophy 

"against the peace and dignity of the state," he may satisfy 
the demands of the state against him by the payment of a 
fine. The penal codes of our states are largely made up of 
a catalog of the offenses against the state and the amount 
of money that it takes to appease the outraged populace. 
Insurance companies have set values on eyes, legs, feet, 
hands, et cetera with the result that one may "cash in" al- 
most any organ that may happen to be lost or injured in 
the course of life. Damages in civil cases well illustrate the 
idea of equivalence ; but with the difference that in modern 
life a standard of measure, namely, money, is used. 

But equally interesting is the growth of the idea of the 
persons and classes to whom justice is to be rendered. In 
early society a man had no justice outside of his own group, 
being an outlaw from the standpoint of all other groups. 
Within his own group he is treated somewhat as an indi- 
vidual but as between groups there prevailed the same no- 
tions that prevail today among nations — the nation as a 
whole is responsible for acts of its people, and guilty and 
innocent suffer alike. Justice, that is, in early society was 
a joint or group matter — all suffered or benefited by the 
acts of the individuals of the group, and the individual got 
his own measure only within his group since no other group 
owed him anything. Among the Germans at the time of 
Caesar this was the case. "Latrocina nullam habent vr\r 
famian qu\ce extra fines cujusque cizntatis ftunt." But the 
Greeks considered themselves more or less morally obligated 
to the barbarians as did the Romans to hostes or foreigners. 
The Latin word hostes, which means foreigner, is also the 
word for enemy, hostile, et cetera. This indicates the point 
that those outside the group are considered as both enemies 
and foreigners — no justice is due such. From this stand- 
point the evolution of the idea of justice centers about its 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 231 

extension — to whom does it apply? Progress along this line 
has consisted in widening the area of the group and ex- 
tending to all members the same duties and benefits. Begin- 
ning with the clan or group of blood kin which grew into 
a federation, then into a state, we see a gradual widening of 
the size of the group to which privileges and obligations ex- 
tend. We are witnessing in our own day the attempt to ex- 
tend the idea of justice to all peoples and nations — interna- 
tional justice, world justice. In the early days of our own 
country one of the great problems was to secure a national 
consciousness, to get people in the Northwest Territory, for 
example, to think in terms of the people of Georgia, or vice 
versa. But today the United States is, for we have de- 
veloped a sense of national solidarity. But it can not be 
said that there has as yet developed a sense of international 
justice. The old idea that treaties should be based on com- 
promise and not on justice is firmly rooted in man's experi- 
ence. But there are those high in political authority as 
well as many ethical thinkers who see the problem of inter- 
national justice, and who are urging its acceptance as a 
working principle in world relationships. 

In primitive society there is little differentiation of labor, 
little that gives origin to "classes" ; but as society becomes 
complex and more interdependent, classes grow up based on 
the work each does in the group or state — some are labor- 
ers or producers, some are fighters, and some are rulers. 
These are the three classes that Plato discusses in the Re- 
public. Plato thought that justice would prevail if each 
class remained in its place and performed what it by nature 
was fitted to do. Justice, that is, consisted in Order, a 
proper balance and harmony between the classes, which 
would result when each class did its own work. But in our 
complex life a man may be a member of several groups. We 



An Introduction to Philosophy 

are all members of the state, a political group, the type 
which we have just discussed; but we are more than mem- 
bers of political units, and this creates the great problem 
of justice between classes. We are lawyers and churchmen, 
we are capitalists and laborers, we are teachers and farm- 
ers, and we can be members of the thousand other classes in 
our social life. When we study ethics from the evolutionary 
standpoint we find that ideas such as "family" or "justice" 
are not such as can be disposed of with an explanation that 
they are gifts of the gods, but we learn that they are ideas 
still in the making, still to be interpreted and reinterpreted 
in every new situation that arises. What was "justice" in 
primitive group life or in medieval days might be considered 
rank injustice now. Justice is coming to be more and more 
a social matter; the idea of social or community responsi- 
bility for sickness, for low wages, for pensions for the old, 
et cetera, is gradually growing. What is justice to the 
laborer? What is a "fair share"? How much should capi- 
tal receive from the earnings of a concern in which both 
capital and labor are involved? Such questions as these in- 
volve the question of justice between classes and they in- 
volve the employment of the term "justice" not as a fixed 
concept but as a shifting instrumental one for the solution 
of problems. 

Justice is also treated by the evolutionary thinker from 
the standpoint of the means by which it is secured. Begin- 
ning with primitive retaliation and blood feuds, it evolves 
through ordeals in which the gods determine the winner or 
the "just" one, and finally to organized courts of law and 
equity for the determination of cases. Retaliation is an 
expensive method especially when whole groups are involved, 
and this is usually the case. Between members of the same 
group various means are devised for giving to the individual 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 233 

what is due him. When justice was looked upon as a su- 
pernatural matter, ordeals, as by fire or by water or by 
battle, were the means employed. But with the growth of 
intelligence and naturalistic conceptions, human agencies 
were devised in the nature of courts for the settling of dis- 
putes between members of the group, and between members 
of different groups. But in our system of courts there sur- 
vive many primitive customs. We have failed to formulate 
an adequate international tribunal for the settling of inter- 
national disputes, but this is rapidly coming to be. Such 
a tribunal can only be effective when an international con- 
sciousness and conscience are sufficiently developed to sup- 
port such an institution. Until these are developed, the 
method of primitive retaliation and blood revenge will be 
employed. Until some form of international organization is 
effected, founded not on "balance of power," but on public 
sentiment, wars such as we have just lived through will be 
the result of disputes. 

The evolutionary method of studying such a concept as 
"justice" displays it in its setting among the events and 
activities of common life. The method shows us how it 
came to be and what it means in the case in question ; but 
it does not and can never show us what justice is as such. 
It teaches us that justice (and we are using "justice" as 
an example) is a growing, instrumental concept; it is an 
ideal which, when apparently attained in any case, moves 
forward growing as it moves, and constantly leading us to 
better and nobler achievements. The philosopher of evolu- 
tion fails to find an eternal and an abiding "justice" writ- 
ten in golden letters across the sky, but he finds it as an 
adjective which characterizes a type of human action; he 
finds it as a human affair, steeped in the dew of human 
passion and desire, red with the blood of men, earthly and 



234< An Introduction to Philosophy 

lowly of parentage, born of revenge but tempered with in- 
telligence. He finds not Justice Absolute, because this is a 
survival of autocracy and finality; but he discovers justice 
relative, justice functional, justice empirical, instrumental, 
democratic. 

Having spoken of the attitude of the evolutionary philos- 
opher to a concrete case, namely, "justice," we wish to in- 
dicate the method of treating morality, i. e., conduct which 
we judge as good or bad, right or wrong. He begins with 
the simplest forms of behavior of a psychological nature, 
such as instinctive, those race habits which have a history ; 
and he shows how, on these forms of action, conduct of a 
higher order originates, conduct which is moral, i. e., con- 
duct which is valued as a good, which is chosen. Morality 
is considered as a natural growth, as "called out or stimu- 
lated by certain necessities of individual and social exist- 
ence" ; not as a donation, but to repeat, as an achievement. 
It is a house not eternal in the heavens as Plato taught, but 
one made with human hands. 

Having found the first stages of morality in instinctive 
behavior the evolutionary philosopher traces its growth 
through a second stage in which conduct becomes more ra- 
tional, more social, and more moral. Out of the instincts 
to fight, for food, et cetera, grows intelligence or more ra- 
tional ways of satisfying them than are possible on the 
basis of blind responses. For the purpose of satisfying food 
desires man becomes agricultural, and takes to trade and 
commerce. At the same time he is rationalizing his con- 
duct, assisting him the better to gain what he desires, he is 
creating new ends of action, he is changing the kind of 
objects he wants, and what is more, he is creating himself. 
The creation of objects of value is the complementary pro- 
cess of creating a self, the self being reflected in the very 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 235 

objects he chooses. Man becomes more social as he ad- 
vances. We have seen that the social life of the race is 
founded on the maternal instinct which becomes, in the nat- 
ural course of events, extended to other objects than the 
child. The necessity for mutual support, for co-operation, 
brought men together and tended to render them more so- 
cial. Finally, when the methods of action which have been 
established, methods which have proved valuable in meet- 
ing the problems of the race, are sought consciously and 
chosen we have moral action in the strictest sense of the 
term. 

Right and good, from the evolutionary viewpoint, are 
not "absolute and eternal essences independent of human 
opinion or volition," but rather are factors in a moral life 
which is in constant need of revision and reformation ; and 
as factors, they themselves are concepts which change with 
the circumstances of life. As the moral self is shifting, 
changing, renewing, enlarging, and as right and good are 
elements in the life of moral agents, they change with the 
changes in the moral self. Good and right are born in the 
process of moral deliberation, of moral choice, and at the 
same time and in the same process is born the moral self. 
We do not begin, that is, with a moral self full blown, with 
good and right as set, fixed and eternal; but more lowly as 
the little child, we create our moral selves in judgments 
which give origin to right and good. Since this process of 
creation is never complete, the elements in it, self, good, 
right, are not finished and final, but are renewed and re- 
vitalized at the solution of every new difficulty. It is this 
type of moral life, thinks the evolutionist, that is genuinely 
progressive, which points the way "to the kingdom of man," 
which shall also be an ideal social order — a "kingdom of 
God." 



236 An Introduction to Philosophy 

3. Evolution and ^Esthetics. — The older view, 1 that 
which in political life is authority and divine right; in ethics, 
right and good as fixed and immutable; in knowledge, truth 
eternal; in science, fixed species and inexorable law; in re- 
ligion, church infallible, considered beauty as having a resi- 
dence in that Absolute World of Perfect Forms where it 
shone forth of its own light to make bright the substitutes 
of it that, through some miraculous dispensation of Provi- 
dence, had fallen to earth below to gladden the hearts of 
"fallen" man. 

But the evolutionary conception is that neither has 
beauty "fallen," nor has man, but that both are gradually 
coming to be in a never ceasing process of creation. Beauty, 
like good, truth, and all such concepts, is of humble paren- 
tage, but that this is so is a silent witness of man's greatness. 

How did the aesthetic interest arise? The evolutionary 
thinker seeks the origin of any interest he investigates, and 
having found it, he shows the chief stages in its develop- 
ment. In this way he accounts for the phenomenon in ques- 
tion naturally and historically. In telling how it came to be 
he is also telling conditions which make for its success or 
failure, so that one who reads intelligently can assist in the 
inauguration of such conditions as will favor or deter 
such features as command his interest. There is a good deal 
of agreement as to the origin of the aesthetic feeling. It 
arises in a superabundance of life, in play, of which it ever 
remains a part. 2 It differs from the other forms of play in 
the materials employed and the direction which the impulse 

1 Many aesthetic theories had been advanced before the rise of the 
evolutionary doctrine. We can not mention them here, much less dis- 
cuss them. See references at the end of the chapter. 

z The student should acquaint himself with the various theories of 
play, especially those of Groos, Spencer, and Hall. 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 237 

takes. Even though the aesthetic feeling originates in play, 
how does it happen to become creative, how does play as mo- 
tion become creation play? Dancing, the evolutionist 
answers, is the first form of art ; it includes the expending of 
motor energy and aesthetic creation ; and is found among all 
peoples of all climes ; is symbolical, meaning war, peace, 
hunting, harvest, birth, death, marriage; and is, as is evi- 
dent, connected with the vital life activities of the people 
such as food-getting activities, and marriage. But dancing 
included two other rudimentary arts, namely, music and 
poetry. The rhythm of the dance leads to both. 

The evolutionary scientist and philosopher must find a 
use for things, for whatever is must have had a value in the 
race struggles else they would not have survived. Beauty is 
disinterested, non utilitarian — thus the problem for the evo- 
lutionist. Why was the aesthetic feeling evolved? The in- 
tellectual activity is easily accounted for, for it is con- 
cerned with practical things, and the same is true of relig- 
ion, morality, and social life. But why the aesthetic? Dar- 
win accounts for it on the theory of sex selection — the pref- 
erence on the part of the female for the most skilful, most 
beautiful, most graceful, most highly colored, and most 
beautiful singers among the males. Therefore beauty was 
at a premium for the ugly members of the species died be- 
cause no females would mate with them. There are certain 
objections to this theory which render it untenable. It is 
better to say that art originally had utilitarian aspects. 
This can be shown, it seems, when we think of the comple- 
mentary relation that exists between hearing and music, and 
that it is valuable to man and to the lower animals alike to 
be able to distinguish the sounds of objects for the purposes 
of action. The dance being a social matter and being also 
an activity which favored concerted movement which would 



238 An Introduction to Philosophy 

be valuable in attack, et cetera, it is evident that it would 
possess utilitarian value. 

What of the development of the aesthetic feeling? There 
are two lines of interest involved here: first, the progressive 
development towards individualism ; second, the development 
along the line of what is considered beautiful or what is the 
beautiful object. From the first standpoint we find in 
aesthetics what we find in morality and in all lines of interest, 
religious, political, and the rest that aesthetics is first a group 
affair. A conglomerate of religion, aesthetics, ethics, logic, 
politics, science, and all the rest, is embodied in the term 
custom, and as we have suggested, progress has always con- 
sisted in threading out these separate interests, the render- 
ing definite of the indefinite, and the disintegration of the in- 
tegrated. ^Esthetics is one element of the mass and prog- 
ress in this line has consisted in the gradual separating of 
the aesthetic interest from the rest and of the differentiation 
of interests in the aesthetic mass itself. ^Esthetics was orig- 
inally social; dancing, a collective manifestation, "regulated 
and safeguarded by tradition, later on by laws, as in the 
Greek republics, and later still subject to the influence of 
fancy and individual caprice" ; poetry is common property, 
belonging to the clan or group as a whole — there were no 
copyrights in those days ; music is social, a community mat- 
ter, regulated by the state and an instrument of education. 3 

The first objects to be considered beautiful are human 
beings. The line of development from this standpoint con- 
sists in the gradual withdrawing from the human object and 
extending the idea to embrace everything. "Human beings 

8 We have not discussed the plastic arts but the same principles are 
involved here as in the arts dealing with motion. In the former, "the 
work is at once architecture, sculpture, and painting, forming an in- 
separable whole, as to dancing, poetry, and music." 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 239 

began by thinking that beautiful which resembled them- 
selves. The Australian woman admired the Australian man, 
and the Fuegian man the Fuegian woman. Primitive aesthe- 
tics have a strictly specific character, and their relations 
with the sexual instinct are evident." 4 

The stage in advance of the human form as the beautiful 
object is reached when ornaments are added to the body — 
the first step in the direction which resulted in the idea of 
nature as beautiful. 

This extension is analogous to that which has taken place 
in the moral and social life when maternal love became trans- 
ferred to objects other than the child. Ornaments and all 
objects which came in contact with the body became the 
objects of the aesthetic feeling. All forms of art tended to 
become dehumanized or rather nature tended to become hu- 
manized in artistic productions. We see poetry at first as 
a conglomerate of epic, lyric, and dramatic, all directed to- 
wards man, "exclusively human." Nature played but little 
part in the Iliad and other epics ; but much centered about 
gods and superhuman characters. At a later time the com- 
mon man came in for his share of aesthetic consideration. 
We may state the order of the appearance of other than 
human objects in art somewhat as follows: first, animals 
which in general were closely connected with man, and which 
were used for food or for companions ; second, the vegetable 
world, due probably to the food interests attached thereto ; 
and third, the inorganic world, to nature itself. Concerning 
nature itself interesting facts are in evidence, which show 
the tendency to make man and his interests supreme — facts 
which harmonize with the anthropomorphic interpretations 
of the world, which we have already considered. When 
nature is first treated in art it is cultivated nature, nature 
4 Ribot, The Psychology of the Emotions, p. 342. 



240 An Introduction to Philosophy 

close to man, nature molded to man's needs ; but later, much 
later indeed, the wild, the stormy, the trackless, the violent, 
came to be considered beautiful. Such scenery as is found 
in Switzerland had no attractions for the Romans, 5 but it 
was something to be avoided, due possibly to the long race 
experience which associated the wild aspects of nature with 
evil spirits. 

The evolutionist, as appears evident, shows how beautiful 
objects come to be. He is not interested in beauty as such, 
an eternal, fixed beauty, for to him there is no such thing; 
but he is interested in giving an account of the birth of 
beautiful objects, how man creates in this field, as he does, 
in the sphere of morality, a world to which is applicable the, 
adjective beautiful. Beautiful expresses one of the ways of 
reacting, one of the instruments of behavior in the world of 
experience. Beautiful and ugly are categories, predicates 
to be applied to subjects, which are born out of that undif- 
ferentiated mass which is all man's world, or which is, as 
James says of the world of the child, "a big, booming, buz- 
zing confusion." 

4. Evolution and Knowledge. 6 — Knowledge, logic, episte- 
mology, were among the last of the interests to become 
affected by the evolutionary doctrine. For twenty years 
after the publication of the Origin of Species nothing was 
done in logic from the evolutionary standpoint; and even 
after a paper appeared which indicated somewhat the new 
directions and bearings which logic should take, little if 
any notice was taken of it until near the close of the nine- 

6 "Csesar, when crossing the Alps, composed a treatise on grammar to 
beguile the tedium of the journey." Ribot, op. cit., 346. 

8 The intimate relation between knowledge and reality, epistemology 
and ontology, makes it impossible to speak of one apart from the other. 
Instead of a section devoted to each we shall speak of both under the 
heading above. 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 241 

teenth century when William James and others called atten- 
tion to it in ways which brought it to the notice of the intel- 
lectual public. 

To understand the change in the knowledge problem 
brought about by the evolutionary hypothesis, one must 
have some idea of the general trend of doctrine before the 
time of James and Dewey. There were two current theories 
of knowledge, the empirical and the idealistic, both of which 
we have briefly touched upon. The latter, however, is the 
doctrine which was held by the great majority of philos- 
ophers. After we have cleared the ground by indicating 
what the problems of logic or knowledge are, we shall return 
to these two types of theory for the purpose of showing just 
what changes were brought about by the new movement. 

Locke, in the famous Essay on the Human Understand- 
ing, set the problem of knowledge as that of determining the 
origin, the extent, and the validity of knowledge. We may 
state the problem somewhat as follows : what is knowledge, 
and what is the relation between knowledge and its ob- 
ject, or the relation between knowledge and reality? It was 
in the discussion of the relation between knowledge and reality 
that Locke met his most serious difficulties, because of the 
peculiar conception he had of what reality means ; and it is 
for the reason that knowledge involves reality that we are 
throwing the knowledge-reality problem together. How is 
knowledge attained? The question implies that there is a 
method by which knowledge is made possible. That method 
we call the judgment which involves subject, predicate, and 
copula, all of which are ideas. In discussing the knowledge- 
reality problem we shall pursue the following order: What 
is the agent of knowledge or what are the means for bring- 
ing it about? An answer to this question will involve a dis- 
cussion of the judgment which consists of subject, predicate, 



242 An Introduction to Philosophy 

and copula. What is the relation between knowledge and 
reality? This question involves a theory of the nature of 
ideas and of things. When is knowledge said to be true? 
An answer to this involves a theory as to the nature of 
truth. 

We have already indicated in our discussions on the in- 
fluence of the evolutionary doctrine on psychology some of 
the facts of the origin and development of knowledge. To 
them we wish to add that knowledge, as is true of morality 
and beauty, has a history. It takes its origin in primitive 
needs and grows out of the instinct of curiosity which in 
turn runs back to vital processes as we have suggested in the 
"Psychological Background." [The categories of thought, 
the parts of speech of logic, so to speak, have evolved out 
of difficulties to be met, and are present with us now as 
means which we have achieved for the purpose of meeting 
problems which we can not solve reflexly, instinctively, or 
on other levels of behavior. Since knowing grew out of 
needs, it always, though seemingly this may not be the case, 
keeps in close contact with the practical affairs of life. 
Knowing, biologically considered, is a means of making ad- 
justments, of ironing out the difficulties into which the or- 
ganism and its environment have fallen. Knowing, then, 
happens in a process which is more complex — in the process 
of living; it comes to be now and then and is not some- 
thing that goes on all the time. Thinking is always a task 
and will be avoided when possible, for thinking is rather 
recent in the history of the race. The newly formed or 
recently acquired methods of action are not so well stamped 
in the organism and it usually takes the lines of least re- 
sistance in the actions it performs. 

Leaving the historical side of the matter for the present 
we shall turn to the theories we mentioned above, namely, 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 243 

empiricism and idealism. The logic of empiricism as well 
as that of idealism teaches that knowledge comes about in 
the judgment — that it is the agent or vehicle of knowledge, 
but these logics differ as to what is involved in the judgment. 
Empiricism teaches that there is a real world of fixed things 
on the outside and that ideas of these outside things are 
stamped on the mind which is at the beginning of life a 
blank. In other words, empiricism is a dualistic theory, 
taking two ultimates, mind and matter. Historically it goes 
immediately to Descartes who emphasized the radical dif- 
ference between the two ultimates ; but indirectly the dualis- 
tic conception is as old as philosophy itself, and is but a 
reflection of the older dualism of this and the other world, 
of the visible and the invisible, and of the psyche and the 
world soul. As we have said, dualism is a reflection of the 
idea of authority which has so possessed the mind of 
man. 

But what are the logical difficulties in such a conception? 
If we say that knowledge is involved in the judgment, and 
that the judgment is made up of ideas — one idea the sub- 
ject, the other the predicate — then we have said that know- 
ledge is dealing with ideas only and not with things on the 
outside. We are never dealing with things in thinking but 
only with ideas of things. We always like to feel that we are 
doing business at first hand and not through the mediation 
of ideas ; but empiricism, since it teaches that we think with 
ideas which are copies of things, can not logically permit us 
to have direct access to things in knowledge. This is one 
of the chief difficulties Locke has to meet. He said that all 
our knowledge consists in the agreement of ideas ; but he 
soon found out that things which are outside, and which 
actually should figure in knowledge were left out. To 
remedy this defect he said later that in addition to agree- 



244 An Introduction to Philosophy 

ment between ideas knowledge consists also in the agreement 
of an idea with a thing. But how an idea which is mental 
(according to empiricism) could agree with something that 
is wholly different, namely, a thing, Locke could not answer. 
Things are in space and time, but ideas are not — according 
to the theory — and how such utterly different things could 
agree is a problem. Then, if they actually could or did 
agree, how are we to know it? What is the test which can 
be applied for agreement and disagreement of an idea with 
a thing? They can not agree in size, in shape, in color, and, 
in fact, in any of the ways we have in mind when we say 
that one thing agrees with another. 

Empiricism teaches that truth is precisely the agreement 
of either ideas with themselves or of ideas with things ; but 
if what we have said is true, empiricism is unable to give an 
adequate account of truth. In the first case we are dealing 
with copies and not with things directly ; and in the second, 
we can never tell what "agreement" means and when it has 
taken place if it ever does take place. 

In summary, let us point out precisely the difficulties of 
empiricism as a theory of knowledge. First, it begins with 
two fixed, unchangeable ultimates — mind and matter. Sec- 
ond, it asserts that knowledge is the agreement of ideas with 
each other, in which case we are not dealing with nature or 
things at all, and consequently, have left out one of our ul- 
timates. Third, it then asserts (for it is essential that 
knowledge should somehow or other be connected with 
things) that knowledge consists in the agreement between 
an idea and a thing; and in this case we can never tell when 
the agreement takes place ; and furthermore, it is impossible 
for ideas and things to disagree, for, according to the 
theory, ideas are copies of things. This means that empiri- 
cism can not account for the fact of error. Every theory 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 245 

of knowledge must make a place for error, for, as is evident, 
error seems to be as industrious as truth. 

Consequently, if knowledge actually does take place, if 
there is such an activity, thing, or relation as knowledge, 
empiricism fails to give an account of it which is free from 
contradictions. The moral is, as the stories in our school 
readers say, don't begin with fixed things, for they beguileth 
one into inconsistencies. 

Idealism was the more important doctrine from the num- 
ber of followers, and from the standpoint of intricacies and 
subtleties. Empiricism is the "plain" man's theory, while 
idealism is the theory of the schooled philosopher. Idealism 
has always been an ally of religion, and its history is long 
and interesting. Beginning in one of its forms with Plato, 
modified in Berkeley to the subjectivistic type, coming again 
in Kant and later German thinkers as objective idealism, and 
still later in romanticism — a history which we have briefly 
sketched — it is present with us to this day as one of the 
competitors in the philosophical arena. And in stating the 
knowledge-reality solution that it offers we shall be doing 
violence to many technical variations, for our statements 
are more or less general and are not the views of any par- 
ticular idealist. 

The fundamental principle in all types of idealism is that 
consciousness, mind, soul, in some form or other, is the chief 
thing in the universe. That is, one thing, consciousness, is 
primary, and not two, consciousness and things, as empiri- 
cism teaches. This consciousness may be that of the indi- 
vidual as Berkeley held, or it may be that of an Absolute, as 
recent idealists following Hegel, the German philosopher, 
teach. In our treatment we shall be concerned with knowl- 
edge in the system of absolute idealists — those who think of 
the universe as the expression of an absolute mind. 



246 An Introduction to Philosophy 

With this general postulate or principle of idealism be- 
fore us we shall state the doctrine of the judgment, of the 
relation between knowledge and reality, and of truth. The 
idealist believes with the empiricist, that knowledge, hu- 
manly considered, is involved in the judgment, or that the 
judgment is the vehicle of knowledge, the judgment being, 
from this standpoint, the application to reality of an idea. 
We must keep in mind that the chief thing in the universe 
is consciousness, that is, absolute mind, and that it is the 
real, other things being merely appearance. Real reality 
is this great system which is the manifestation of the abso- 
lute mind, or which, indeed, is the absolute mind. It is not 
the simple things we see and hear and taste, but it is a 
comprehensive system shot through with absolute intelli- 
gence. 

We must understand where the idea comes from that we 
apply to reality — this real reality, and not the things of 
sense. The idealist tells us that we get the idea which we 
use as the predicate of the judgment from a great number 
of individual experiences — that the idea of flag, for ex- 
ample, is gained and built up after a great many experiences 
with things of various kinds which we later call "flag.'* The 
idea is a sort of composite photograph gained by the ex- 
perience of a great many particulars. These particular 
things are the things we see and hear, such as a chair, a 
hat, a song, et cetera — that is we later call them chairs, 
hats, and songs. The judgment, in the light of what has 
been said, may be described as a process by which we at- 
tribute to a system of reality which is the manifestation of 
a universal mind a predicate which we as individuals have 
gained in our experiences with a world of particular things. 
Let us examine this a little more closely. We have the fol- 
lowing elements to deal with: reality, that great system; 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 247 

ideas which we have gained in our experience with the world 
which is not the real world, so that our ideas would not be 
ideas of the real, but of the world of appearance only. Then 
when we make a judgment we are applying to this great 
system of reality an idea which is one based on experience 
with appearance only in the hope that we may in some mys- 
terious way arrive at knowledge. The judgment, therefore, 
from the standpoint of the assumptions of the idealist, is 
incapable of yielding knowledge. 

The problem of the relation between knowledge and 
reality, if we speak of knowledge from the human stand- 
point and not from that of the divine or absolute mind, is 
almost meaningless, for as we have seen the instrument of 
knowledge, the judgment, proves to be no instrument at all. 

Ideally considered, truth is consistency ; it is the har- 
monious relation that exists between the parts of reality 
which is assumed to be conscious stuff or conscious relations. 
Humanly speaking, that is, speaking from the standpoint of 
the human knower, judgments can never be true, for they 
are partial, deal with parts, particular ideas, and truth as 
such is a whole. Thus our judgments are never true, but 
always fall short of absolute truth. Whereas the empiricist 
had trouble in making a place for error, since it is hard to 
see how an idea could disagree with a thing when the idea 
is a copy of the thing, the idealist, on the other hand, finds 
it an equally difficult task to find a place for human truth. 
In finding a place for error in his system it seems that the 
idealist is not able to find a place for anything else. 

Summarizing the knowledge-reality doctrine as treated by 
objective idealism, we may say that it assumes a fixed and 
unchangeable system of reality which is permeated and shot 
through with an intelligence of an absolute type. Human 
knowledge, which is never real or true knowledge, is brought 



248 An Introduction to Philosophy 

about by the judgment which, from the nature of the means 
of making judgments, resulcs not in knowledge but a poor 
substitute. Judgments are never true for two reasons : first, 
the idea which is the predicate of the judgment is gained 
not from true reality, yet it is applied to reality; second, 
judgments can never exhaust reality, but can only approach 
it, so that no human judgment is ever true, and if it could 
be we should never know it. 

The difficulties here are not unlike those found in em- 
piricism. There is a dualism but it is of a different nature, 
namely, that of the eternal and absolute knower, on the one 
hand, and the human knower, on the other, or that of the 
universal system of reality and that of the common sense 
world. Both elements in the dualism are fixed and eternal, 
just as is the case with the mind-things dualism of em- 
piricism. 

It is evident, therefore, that a philosophy of evolution 
must begin with difficulties which are common to both the 
other systems in the hope of bringing to light a more ade- 
quate theory of the nature of knowledge. These difficulties 
are, first and chiefly, the fixed and unalterable elements in 
both types of theory, the authoritative view; and, second, 
the dualism that runs through both theories. 

Let us follow the theory of knowledge and of reality as 
the evolutionist develops it. He in common with the others 
believes that knowledge comes about in the judgment, but 
he holds to no fixed thing called mind and to no equally fixed 
system of objects. Reality is neither a system done up once 
for all by an absolute mind nor is it a world to be copied or 
duplicated by a mind. The evolutionary philosopher be- 
lieves the judgment to be the process which occurs when 
a reconstruction is to take place, when a difficulty is to be 
met, or a problem to be solved. When things have gone 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 249 

wrong, then thinking takes place, and thinking results in a. 
judgment which means a decision, a pronouncement which 
lays down a program for action. The subject of the judg- 
ment is that part of the world which is not m question, not, 
as idealism says, a system of reality, finished and complete, 
for if this were the case no judgments would be necessary 
and no thinking would occur. The subject is the given, the 
granted. The predicate is an idea, and in this there is 
agreement with both idealism and empiricism ; but idea as 
the evolutionist uses the term is neither a copy of a thing 
as empiricism teaches, nor is it something built up out of a 
number of experiences with appearances as idealism teaches ; 
it is a plan of action, a program, a modus operandi. The 
copula represents the experimental, the try-on process, the 
action of fitting the subject and the predicate. We conclude 
that the judgment, from the evolutionary standpoint, is a 
process of trying-on of one plan of action (the predicate) 
to something that is unquestioned (the subject) for the 
purpose of solving a problem or meeting a difficult situation 
which has come about in the life of the one making the 
judgment. There is nothing fixed, neither subject nor 
predicate, but the former is fixed or rather unquestioned for 
the moment and may itself be the questioned at some later 
time in the course of experience; while the latter always 
represents a tentative conclusion. 

The evolutionary view of knowledge is that knowledge 
is for something; it is purposive, directive. This is the 
reason for calling it the instrumental theory of knowledge, 
or instrumental logic, as it is generally called today. Know- 
ing is an instrument, a means of getting on in the world, 
an instrument in the creation of values. It is precisely this 
fact of the creative aspect of intelligence that the early 
revolutionary philosopher, Herbert Spencer for example, 



250 An Introduction to Philosophy 

did not consider. Had he thought of intelligence as crea- 
tive in the judgment he would not have preached laissez 
faire in government and mechanism in ethics. 

Knowledge as it is expressed in the judgment gives us a 
clue to the "instrumentalist's" (we shall use this term now 
for the evolutionary view) theory of reality. It is certainly 
something not fixed once for all, but reality for the instru- 
mentalist is this whole creative process. It is not some- 
thing which is the product of a process, for the product 
never comes to be in any fixed sense, but is ever entering into 
new and vital relations, and is always in solution. Process, 
change, creation, dynamics, movement, evolution — these are 
words which express the instrumentalist's idea of the nature 
of reality. Instead of a reality that is the same "yesterday, 
today and forever," the instrumentalist believes that reality 
is precisely this process of change, flux, and movement. 
Just as life is not something that stands over against the 
series of events which make it up, but is that series of events, 
so is reality not something permanent over against a process 
of change, but is that very process of change itself. The 
process is one of creation — the creation of valuable objects, 
of principles of conduct, and of a self. 

What is the relation between knowledge and reality? 
Knowledge is the creation of objects — objects in the wide 
sense of the term as including principles, values, and insti- 
tutions. It is neither something set over against an ob- 
jective nature as a copy of the latter, nor is it the com- 
pleted universe of an absolute mind, nor the meager details 
of this universe gained by the human mind ; but it stands as 
creator to created — ever ready to recreate in some new ex- 
perience that which has before been created. 

Truth, says instrumentalism, is what works out, that 
which does what you expect it to do. The judgment is true 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 251 

when you can "bank" on it and not be disappointed. If, 
when you predict, or when you follow the lead of your idea 
or plan, it brings you to the ends sought for in the begin- 
ning, your judgment is true. It does not consist in agree- 
ment of ideas, or the agreement of ideas with an outside 
reality; neither is it an eternal something which always is, 
but it is a name given to ways of thinking which get the 
thinker where he started. As a railroad ticket is a "true" 
one when it lands the passenger at the station he sought, 
so is an idea "true," not when it agrees with something 
outside, but when it gets the thinker successfully to the end 
of his intellectual journey. 

Truth, reality, ideas and judgments are not things that 
stand out eternally "there," whether in the skies above or 
in the earth beneath ; but they are names used to charac- 
terize certain vital stages in a process which is ever going 
on, the process of creation, of evolution. In that process 
we may speak of reality, this being valuable for our pur- 
poses ; again, we may speak of truth ; later, of ideas ; and 
still again, of judgments; but because we talk about them 
we should not delude ourselves into thinking we can handle 
them as something eternally existing as we handle a speci- 
men under the glass. 

Such a conception of truth and reality, the instrumen- 
talist believes, is in harmony with the general nature of 
progress. He fails to see how progress, genuine creation, 
can occur on any other theory — on theories of finality, fix- 
ity, and authority ; but he believes that the idea of creation 
which we have sketched here gives man a vote in the affairs 
of the universe, renders him a citizen of the world to aid in 
the creation of valuable objects in the nature of institutions 
and principles, encourages him to attempt things "unat- 
tempted yet in prose or rhyme," inspires him to the crea- 



252 An Introduction to Philosophy 

tion of "more stately mansions," and to the forsaking of his 
"low vaulted past." He believes that the days of authority 
are over, whether in religion, in rulership, in science, or in 
philosophy; and he offers this dynamic universe as a chal- 
lenge to the volition and intelligence of man, a universe to 
be won or lost at man's option, a universe not to fall down 
before and worship as the slave before his master, the sub- 
ject before his king, the scientist before his principle, the 
philosopher before his system, but a universe to be con- 
trolled, directed, and recreated by man's intelligence. 

REFERENCES 

Ames, E. S., Psychology of Religious Experience, 396-421 ; 

Bergson, H., Creative Evolution; 

Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic ; 

Dewey, J., The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, Chap- 
ter I; 

Dewey, J., and others, Studies in Logical Theory, and Crea- 
tive Intelligence; 

Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, Part I ; 

Essays in Honor of William James, 51-81, 459-483; 

Gordon, K., ^Esthetics; 

Hirn, Y., Origin of Art; 

Hobhouse, L. T., Morals in Evolution; 

Holt, E. B., The Concept of Consciousness; 

Huxley, T. H., Methods and Results ; 

James, W., Essays in Radical Empiricism, Pragmatism, and 
Some Problems of Philosophy ; 

Jerusalem, W., Introduction to Philosophy, 62-70, 98- 
133, 210-239 ; 

Judd, J. W., The Coming of Evolution; 

Kellogg, V., Darwinism To-day ; 

King, I., Social Aspects of Education; 

Metz, J. T., History of European Thought in the Nine- 
teenth Century; 

Moore, A. W., Pragmatism and Its Critics ; 



Evolution and the Disciplines of Philosophy 253 

Osborn, H. F., From the Greeks to Darwin; 

Paulsen, F., Introduction to Philosophy, 180-207; 

Perry, R. B., Present Philosophical Tendencies ; 

Poincare, The Foundations of Science; 

Ribot, Th., The Psychology of the Emotions, Chapters 
VIII, IX, XI; 

Romanes, G. J., Darwin and After Darwin; 

Royce, J., The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 273-304; 

Russell, B., Scientific Method in Philosophy; 

Schiller, F. S. C, Axioms as Postulates in Personal Ideal- 
ism, Humanism ; 

Schurman, J. G., The Ethical Import of Darwinism; 

Seward, A. C, Darwin and Modern Science ; 

Spencer, H., First Principles ; 

The New Realism; 

Thilly, F., History of Philosophy, 462-588 ; 

Tufts, J. H., The Genesis of the ^Esthetic Categories. 



INDEX 



.Esthetics, 122 

evolution and, 235ff 
Agassiz, 209 
Animism, 62, 87, 92ff 
Aristocracy, 35 
Aristotle, 147, 193, 206 
Arts, the, as factors in man's de- 
velopment, 74 
Associationism, 190, 202 
Atomism, 138 
Augustine, 144 

Background of Philosophy, 

psychological, 18ff 

physical, 40ff, 48 

social, 54ff 

historical, 147ff 
Bacon, F., 155ff 
Bacon, R., 184, 191 
Baptism, 65 

Behavior, 57; levels of, 70ff 
Beauty, theory of, 190 

evolution and, 235ff 
Bentham, J., 189, 198 
Berkeley, 162ff, 172 
Bill of Rights, 187 

Categories, 179ff, 182 
Causation, 91 
Ceremonials, 28, 86, 89, 94 

of initiation, 42ff, 65ff 

sacrificial, 61 ff 

value of, 77 
Christianity, 64, 80, 142ff, 148 
Church, 21, 144ff 

struggle between science and, 
147ff, 208 
Cognitive processes, 71, 83 ff 
Commercialism, importance of, for 

philosophy, 152 
Conduct, levels of, 70; evolution 

and, 227ff 
Consciousness, 19, 71, 159, 162 
Copernicus, 153, 178 



Cosmology, 117, 120, 125 
Crusades, the, 149 
Custom, 56ff 

influenced by sex, 59 

types of, 60ff 

breakdown of, 71ff 

value of group, 77 

Darwin, 204ff 

Deism, 164 

Democracy, 34, 37, 110, 119 

Democritus, 138 

Descartes, 113, 158, 163, 174, 188, 

243 
Divine Right, 186 
Division of Labor, 34, 41, 73 
Dualism, 121, 160, 163 

Empiricism, 123, 174ff, 184ff, 242ff 
English Philosophy, 184ff 
Enlightenment, the, 178 
Environment, 41 

functioning of instincts in, 
25ff 
Epicureanism, 138ff 
Epistemology, 130, 194, 122 
Ethics, methods of treatment, 56, 
122 

hedonism, 138, 198 

empirical theory of, 197ff 
Evolution, 193 

doctrine of, 204ff 

history of, 206ff 

Darwin's theory of, 209ff 

influence of, 21 Iff, 214ff, 226 ff 

Faith, 175; breakdown of, 147ff 
Family life, influence of, 76 
Food interest, 20ff, 57, 61, 68, 71, 
79 

Genetic method, llff 
Greeks, Orphic and Olympic 
tendencies, 11 Iff, 125, 128 



255 



256 



Index 



Greeks, philosophical problems 
raised by, 102ff, 117, 206 

social and political life of, 
118ff, 107ff 

individualism in, 119, 127 

Hedonism, 138, 198ff 
Hegel, 182 
Heracleitus, 193, 206 
Heredity, 41 
Hobbes, 157ff 
Hume, 171ff 
Huxley, 223 

Idea, 
Platonic, 129 
of substance, 168 
according to Locke, 196 
Idealism, 40, 121, 123, 242ff 
Platonic, 125ff, 162 
subjective, 136, 147, 162ff 
as an ally of religion, 126 
objective, 171ff 
Individualism, 34, 72, 119, 127, 

151ff 
Instincts, origin and classification 
of, 19ff; of reproduction, 
21 ff; those based on food in- 
terests, 23ff, 28ff 

James, W., 240 
John of Salisbury, 184 
Judgment, 246 ff 
Justice, 229 ff 

Kant, 174ff, 188 

Knowledge, theory of, 130ff, 162, 
173, 190 

acquisition of, 58 

theoretical, 61 

empirical, 83, 188, 193ff 

two sources of, 177ff 

evolution and, 240ff 

Language, development of, 43, 76 
Lapsed intelligence, 19 
Law, 31; origin of, 22; as conven- 
tion, 127; purpose of, 97 
Leibnitz, 153, 178 
Locke, 167ff, 190, 194ff, 241 
Logic, 122, 192 
Lyell, 207 



Magic, 85, 87ff 

Marriage, 27ff 

Materialism, 121, 158 

Mathematics, 181ff 

Metaphysics, 129 

Method, of revelation, 156; empir- 
ical, 157; dogmatic, 157; de- 
duction, 192; genetic, llff 

Mill, J. S., 189, 199ff 

Mind and Matter, 160, 163ff, 243; 
priority of, 125; nature of, 
217ff; categories of, 179 

Monism, 121 

Moral indignation, 31 

Morality, as convention, 128; 
standard of, 198ff; growth 
of, 234ff 

Mores, 70 

Mutual Aid, 75 

Mysticism, 140ff, 147 

Myth, 85ff, 94ff; types of, 95ff 

Nationalism, 151 

Nature and primitive man, 85ff; 

Kant's idea of, 182 
Neo-Platonism, 141, 143, 147 
New-Realism, 41 
Newton, 153, 165 

Ontology, 122 
Orphic Mysteries, 126 

Philosophy, backgrounds of, 18ff; 
physical factors in develop- 
ment of, 48ff 
origin of problems of, 102ff, 
122; Pythagorean, 112;' nature 
of problems of, 115ff 
classification of problems of, 

120ff 
decline of Greek, 136ff 
as reflection of social condi- 
tions, 55ff 
certain types of, 137ff 
evolution and the disciplines of, 
226ff 
Plato, 112, 122, 128ff, 163, 200; 

theory of the State, 133ff 
Play, 25 
Plotinus, 141 
Pluralism, 141 

Politics, 80, 122; evolution and, 
219ff 



Index 



257 



Primitive social life, 54; forms of, 

57; nature of, 57 ff 
Problems of Philosophy, cosmo- 
logical, 117, 120; 
metaphysical, 129 
epistemological, 130 
the soul, 132ff 
Progress, history of, 55ff, 71ff; 

from magic to science, 91 
Protagoras, 122, 127, 131 
Psychology and Philosophy, 18ff 
Pythagoreanism, 112, 143 

Qualities, primary and secondary, 
167ff 

Rationalism, 123, 175 

Real, the, 129, 131, 173, 191ff,246 

Realism, 123 

Reality, theory of, 129, 162; for 
the Stoics, 139; for empiric- 
ism, 190ff; for evolution, 241 ff 

Reason, 174 ff; supremacy of, 148c 
critique of, 178 
fallacies of, 99ff 

Reflection, 61, 70, 71 

Religion, 65, 175, 180ff; Greek, 111; 
idealism an ally, 126; relation 
to Orphic mysteries, 126; de- 
velopment of, 60, 80; tech- 
nique of, 89 

Renaissance, period of, 147ff 

Sacrifice, 61 ff; ocasions of, 63; 

rites of purification, 63ff 
Scholastics, 195 
Science, 176, 201ff; origin of, 61, 

102; technique of, 88, 156; 



growth of, 152ff; struggle be- 
tween church and, 147ff 

Scotus, Duns, 184 

Self-determination of peoples, 152 

Sensation, psychological treatment 
of, 25 

Sense, 182 

Sentiments, 26 

Sex, 41, 57ff, 68, 71, 79 

Socrates, 126, 136 

Sophists, 122, 127ff 

Soul, problems of the, 132ff; prim- 
itive idea of, 92ff 

Space, 138, 166ff, 182 

Speculation, decline of Greek, 
136ff 

Spencer, H., 41, 219ff 

Spinoza, 178 

Stoicism, 139ff, 141, 143 

Substance, 167ff 

Superstition, 65, 85, 91 

Taboo, 57ff 

Theory of reality, 129 

of knowledge, 130 

of conduct, 190 

of beautv, 190 

of politics, 133ff, 219ff 
Thought, nature of primitive, 83ff, 

98ff; tvpes of primitive, 87 
Totemism, 62, 83ff, 87, 92ff 

Utilitarianism, 190, 197ff 

War, 27, 30, 74, 75 

Work, 73 ff 

William of Oakham, 184 

Zeno, 139 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



019 953 534 1 



